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CHAPTgR I

INTRODDCTIO*

I
The repg&llee of Syria and Lebanon ara looated at the
eastern end of the Madl tarraxwan Sea in the area generally
termed the Levant.

Today, both eowxtriea are separate,

eontigtioaa, sovereign states,

Syrian Independenoe was

proolalmed in the name of the Allies in Damaaaue on 27 Septmber 1941, by General Oatrouz, Coaimnder-in-Ghief of the

1
free French forces.

Wbanon «a# proelaimad iadepeadedt
2
under the aame authority on 26 November 1941.
The two
proelamations, establishing de faeto Indapendenea for Syria

and Lebanon, followed the twenty years of a Freneh mandate
that had been authorized by the League of Nation# in 1920.
Syria and Lebanon are "amell powera" in the family of
nations.

Neither state ia large geogrephioally. Lebanon,
3
containing 5&00 aquar# milea, approximates Connecticat

1.

"Proclamation of the Independence of Syria and Lebanon
by General Catroux, 27 September 1941, at Damas,"
Botea. Doeumentairee et Ztndea. Ho. 74. Serie Internalleiiàt».
iëlb. *2. *-8.

2*

jyËi^â.*'•

3»

The World Almanao and Book of Facts for 1950, yew York,
p. 1%.

9—10»

g

iû area; Syria, although @l#teem times larger than her

4
alater republle, hae an area of only *6,046 aquare mllaa
and is about the alze of Illlnola,

Syria and Lebanon can

also be elaaalfla4 aa "amall poaara" In Induatrlal activi
ty.

Both eountrlaa are baaleally agrarian and have âevel-

oped only email aaale prodaetlon In the textile, match,
oement, tobaeao, soap, an# olive oil Indaatrlaa#

Tha

aaaralty of large aaale 1aiastry la eaaentlally eaaaed by
inadequate supplies of eaal, Iron, and oil; and even
ahara deposits of am oh basic natural raaouroea are found,
aa Is the Majarba iron and aaal region and the Belr-Izzor
oil region, they have been little exploited.
Daaauea of the aagllglbla amomt of natwal reaoixroaa
and manafaetixrlmg, Syria and Lebanon are poor eountrlea*
Their standards of living are low fcr their email popula
tions. Syria hae S,006,08© people, of «ho» 8,624,5*9 are
5
Moslem*
Lebanon, although smaller in total population,
la larger in Christian population,

fifty-five per aent of
6
the 1,829,545 people in Lebanon are Christian*
Both
Moslem and Christian populatlona lack the necessary labor
skill vital to Indnatrlallaatlom,

4.

The Statesman*s Yearbook# Hew York, 1949, p. 1347.

5.

Ibid,, .1950, p. 1590.
Ibid., p. 1390.

s

Beoause of this shortage of skilled labor, natural
and ioduBtrial reaouroes, and neoeaaary capital, the
Levantin* Dations are not great oompetitora in the trade
market* of the world.

In 1949, their total eiDorts mere

valued at 111 million Syrian pound*; #hlle their import*,
valued at 516 mlllioa Syrian pounds, *ere five time* a*
7
large#
Im Amer lean dollars, export* were equivalent to
$50,226,000 and import* equaled $293,485,000.8
Therefore la *1%#$ population, natural resources, in*
duatrial activity, trade, aad wealth Syria and Lebanon
muet be eoasidered "mmall power*."

However, the Levant

etete* ere etrategioally Important "*mall power*,"

Be-

oau## of their location at the eastern end of the Mediter
ranean, they are part of the indispenaable three-way bridge
of the Hear East ©onneoting Europe, iaia, aad Africa,
Syria and Lebanon play an important role with the rest of
the Bear last a* guardian* of the ïastera Mediterranean#
the Suez Canal, and Persian Gulf "which together form the
g

moat vital s®a route in world trade aad commerce."

fur-

thermore, the Levant mtatea are adjacent to the richest

7.

Ibid., p. 1392.

8.

Moody's Manual of lavestaeats for 1951, lew York,
ld6l, 1906-190%. (#*19148 Syrian pound* equal one
United States dollar.)

9.

lliahu Ben-Horia, Toward Conetructive Democracy,*
Probleas of the Middle last, Kew York University
Comfereoee, 1947, p. ta.

é

petfoleum reserves In the eorld.

And, although oil fields

of eigaifioaaee have sot been developed, there la the pos10
eibllity that future field* may be discovered.
Today# Syria and Lebanon are crossed by tyo oil pipe*
lines ruaaing from the oil flelda of Klrkuk, Iraq to the
refineries of Tripoli, Lebanon.

At present, another line

is under eoaetrueticm. The Kirkuk oil fields and pipe lines
are o#ned and eomtrolled by the Iraq Petroleum Company, a
joint etoek enterprise omned by Iraqi, Dutch, Bn&lish,

11
freneh, Amerioan, mû G# S. Gulbenkiaa interests.

Butch,

Ameriaan, frenoh, and British private oompanie* each o*n
23.75^ of the etook im the Iraq Petroleum Company, the remaining 5$ being owed by the C. 3. Gulbenkian private

10,

Imoyolooedia Americana. 1$48 edition, HVI. Ne* York,
W45, p. 18:.

11.

Calouste Sarkis Gulbemk&am, one of the world*s
wealthiest mem, was born in Istanbul, Turkey, 03 years
ago. He is reportedly a desoeadent of Armenian Kings,
an e%-Turkish rug peddler, and a laee merchant.
Gulbenkian became a British mubjeot in 1902 and at*
tended lings college In London. In 1911, he mangled
oil eoncesslons for all of Iraq for Britain, Germany,
and the Netherlands. In payment for these conaeeaions,
the three governmmts gave Gulbenkian a 5# interest in
Iraq oil eells. These interests in middle Eastern oil
grant him royalties of 11,200,000 yearly, and have
helped to make Gulbenkian worth between $200,000,000
and #800,000,000 today. Little is knosn of Gulben
kian* s personal life. He spends most of his time at
the Hotel Avim in Lisbon, Portugal pursuing his hobby
of collecting Middle festers art treasures.

5

12
Inter*#*#.

la addition to tb* t*o operatlng plpallae#,

m third lice begios at tb# Baiyeeis, Iraq oil fields,
croe##* Syria aad labaBon, ana terminât*# at the Sldon,
Lab&aon reflaarl*#*

Thla $&E5,000,000 Trana-Aieblan pipe

line aztendB 1088 miles and hae been teraed the greatest
13
American eoaatruotlon projeot on foreign aoll.
A line
baa been propoaad to link the Knaalt, Iraq flelda alth the
Tripoli refinery.

Aa yet, eonatruetion he# not begun.

II
The Levant is not only Important to the Big Powers beeau#a of It# atrateglc location, oil pipelines, and poten
tial natural raaonrcaa,
been apbare#

Syria and Lebanon In the paat have

of cultural Influa nee for oartain foreign

power®, eepeolally franaa,

Franee has long elalmed to be

the protector of Chrlatlan# in the area, such elaims, golag baok aa far aa the Craaadaa.

During the lUddle A&ea,

frescfa trader# developed aommerelal relatione with the Le
vant, and theae eommarolal aatlTltlea beoeme very important
to frenae by the 18th and 19th aanturlea,

French mission-

arlea, Preaoh culture, and the French language accompanied

12.

Bualnaaa Week, No. @95 (Sept. 25, 1940), p. 118.

13. *a#a#eek
14.

IHVII, 15 (April 9, 1901), p. 55.

Ibid., p. SS.

6

commerolel latereats# and aobool*» oburohes, aonasterleg,
aod bo*plt@lG «ere built* 1th freaeb moaey. In 1850,
Freae# Bent troopg to Tufklah-oontrollGd Syria to piotect
th« tightg of th# Maro&lte Ourlgtlejia tMn beli^ uaorped
by the Moslem*,

framo* obtalaed an Importaat oonoasBion

from tb% Ottoman goTerameat.

A eeml^autOBomoug dlatrlet

*a# *#t up oDder th# governorahlp of a Christian offlolal.
*?reaoe thus had a traditional olalm to Maronite aympa15
thlee."
The PreDOh olala, brought about primarily thrcugh
rellGloua, aaltural, and eooàomlo pénétration, paia dlvldend# at the San Semo Gonfareno# in 1920 ehea France aeGured a Glaes "A" Maadate over Syria and Lebanon.
On beeoming the maadatory pomer, *?reaee aought to
make use of the #*letlag paroehlal dlfferenoee mhloh la

16
thle area are uaueually profuee, efea for the gear Zaat."
In 1920, the Freaeh goverameot proclaimed Ghrlatlan Lebaaon a aeparate state* thus eeparatln^ the Maronite oommnaity in part fro# Moelem Syria#

Lebanon rem»ioed under

the mandate, and "franoh poliey *aa at once directed to*
17
*ard the permammt reteatlba of the provloeea."
A large

15. I. A. Spaieer, The Halted States and the Bear %a#t.
Cambridge, Mas®,, l6*?, p. 85,
16»

Ibid # # p .• 64^*

17.

The gaeyolopedia Amerloana, p. 190.

7

army was sent loto the Levant, and a merle# of dis
orders and reballlon# followed*

The moat Important of swoh

disorders was the revolt of the Jebal Drwes in 1925.

Al

though the Drnaean revolt bagan as a rebellion again#t
freach civilizing change# In the educational end eoonomic
fields impomed by the frenoh admlnlatrator. Captain Carblllet, other revolts of the time mere initiated primarily by
Arab matlonallatle groupa.

Con#tant attempte ware made to

drive the Freneh from the Levant,

franee persistently re-

fuaed to eithdra* on the ground# that Syria and Lebanon
were not ready for independenee.
Im an endeavor to peelfy the nationalistic attitadee
of the mixed population# In Syria and Lebanon, France
granted a eonetltetion

to Lebanon in 1986 and one to Syria

18
in 19SÔ*

Although both const!tmtions set up unicameral

legialaturee «ith popularly elected presidents» tM French
High Ocmmiealoner retained the veto power over all legis
lation,

Syria and Lebanon were little more than admlni19
strativf dletricte of French contml.
The conetitution#
were no panacea for the political, religloue, economic, and
social ills of the Levantine states, and internal troubles
of a nationalistic and religious sort continued.

18. Speiser, op. cit.» p. 101.
19.

Ben-Horin, op. cjt., p. 81.

6

Syria anû Lebamoa repeatedly âeaaMtô the termination
of the mandate and admiaalon to the League of Ration# as
aovaralgn and independent states,

France, always reluotant,

finally agreed to negotiate treaties of peace, friendship,
and alliance In 19M prior to the grant ing of actual independenee.

The treaty negotiated with Syria wa# concluded

for a twenty*five year period and provided for the ua# by
France of Syrian territory in time of war; the privilege to
maintain troops for eight years

to protect the right# of

minorities in Latakla and J#b#l Drum; and the right to me#
20
two Syrian air field#.
The treaty with Lebanon guaran
teed to France the right to maintain troops within that Levaot nation for twenty-five years.

Both treaties pro

vided for elo#e association of French and Syrian-Lebanese
foreign pollaiea.

Syria and Lebanon were to become fully

Independent three years after the ratification of the
treaties and were to be welcomed into the League of

Ma-

tien».
Keither of the treaties was ratified by the French
parliament beeamme of the outspoken oppoeltlon of military

go.

Samuel Van Talîcenburg, Whose Promised land#?. Sew
York, 1946, p# 56.

mi.

Ibid., p. 5ê,

22.

Ibia.. p. 56

9

25
eommerolal, and eeolealastloal

interests.

These groupe

oontecdea that Syria end Lebanon #ere not ready

Inde*

pendenoe end attacked the logie of eetabllahlng a unitary
government in Syria.

lor had the question of protection

of siaortties been solved by the treaties.

And, finally,

objection* *ere raised because the treaties did not provide
for ayrian^Lebaae»* repayment of French expenses incurred
under the mandate.
Certain nationalietle group* in 3yrla gladly aecepted
the failure of the treaties because they wanted to unite
Syria and Lebanon into a greater Syria; but, the coneeneue
«a# one of increased hostility toeard Prance,

Accompanied

by etrikee and riots, theee rumbling# of natlonallem gre#
in strength.

Prance retaliated with more stringent govern

mental decrees, and in 1939, the Syrian-L#baneee conetltu*
tloas #ere suspended.
•World War II provided a temporary, if tragic, soluÊ4
tion of the Syrian-Lebanese problem."
Anglo»Preneh foree#
invaded the Levant in the eummer of 1941 to take security
meaeure# against Hail penetration and Vichy collaboration
in the region. Remnant# of the Angle-Preneh force# mere
still is Syria and Lebanon #hen World War II ended In 1945*

23,

Speieer, op. cit., p. 101.

24.

Ben-Horln, op. cit.. p. 81.

10

Daring 1945, the Levantine statee made repeat## overturea
to France and Great Britain requeetlng the evaouatlon of all
foreign troop*.

Becauae these requeet* went unheeded by

the two Greet Powers» Syria and Lebanon brought the ques
tion of the evaeuatiOD of Freneh and British troops to tW
attention of the Security Goonoll in February 1048.

11

OUPTSB 1%
m MimgrmmTH MSMim
OF THE 8KDRITT GOmRII,

The Ssnrlaa-Lshaa®»®

»o*@all@d In th# Unltea

Batloa# b@#ema# it ImfolvM th$ #Ya#m%lom of Fren# aM
Britimh troops from Syrlm &aâ LeWmom, iras first brought
before the 8###rity Gommoll at th# tio-hoar long mimetemith
aaatiag at Chmreh Homae, Wamtmlmlmter* LoMoa, on 14 f«brusry iMi.

R#pr@@#m'tatlvea of th# permamamt membara—Ghina,

Frasoa, the Union of Soviet Soeiallst Rapmbllaa, the United
Kingdom, end the United State#—and of imatralia, Brazil,
Igypt, Mexieo» The Matherlamda, end Poland eere prasent.

I
The meeting was eoavened by^the firat president of the
Seottrity Goimoil* 1* J. 0* Kekin

of Amatralia.

After the

1.

Saearity Gomaoil. offieial meoorda: First Tear. Firat
^iliaa. KO» I. nineteenth mZeting. ke# Yorm# limt p. mu

Z,

Sormaa Jdhm Oaaald »kla# the firat preeident of the
Seeurity Oommell# #ae bora on 31 Mar oh 1889. Mekla
has long beea aaeoeiated vith Australian affairs of
state. From 19®t-ltSÉ» he #aa Speaker of the House of
Repreaaatatifas of the Commoaeealth of Aastrelia. la
1*45, Makia eas Minister of Aircraft Produotioa. Since
1046, Makia has beea ambassador to the Baited States
and leader of the Amstmliaa délégation to the Securi
ty Coaaeil.

12

adoption of tha agaMa, tha praeldant referrad tha mwrnhara
to a latter of 4 febroary 194d from the Syrlaa wd Labameae
goverameate to the Seaarlty Couooll ahleh atated:
#..tha 3yrlaa and Labamea# dalagatloaa, aatlmg
oa the laatroetloma of their OoTemmeata# have tha
honour, in aeaordanae #lth Article @4 of the Charter,
to bring thie dlapmta to the attention of the 8ee%:rlty Ooanall and to raquaat It to adopt a deelalon raoomeeodlng tha total and almnltaneowa evaoue^on of
th# foreign troop# from tha terrltorlee of Syria and
the Lebanon#*
Prevloaaly, thla letter had beam alrenlated aa Document 5
in aaaordance alth provlalonal Rule 8 ahloh provided for a
three day notlfleatlan to membara before an laaue could be
placed on the Seonrlty Coancll agenda. Eoaever, before
the agbatanee of the letter aaa aonaldarad, eertaln prob
lème of procedure aera aoggeated to the Council by the preeIdent,
llthoagh tha letter fro# the 8yrlan*Lebaneae delegataa
clearly atated that a "dlapnta* did exist to ahich franca*
the Gait ad Kingdom, Syria, and Lebanon #are partie#, Makin
amggefited that the reality of the alleged *dlap%te" need
not be verified at that time.

Th# prealdent pointed oat

the dlfflei&lty ene«%ntered when the Seenrity Conncll attempted antomatlcally to determine If a qaaatlon brou^t

3.

aeeurlty Gomnell. Official Reeorde; First Year, First
Seriea. Supplement I. Annex 6. Doe. s/s» Ëe# York.
IW, pp.
(ëee appendlz, page 152.)

13

before It #ere m "Clepate" or a

Se #6Tlee6

that the CouDoll could, aot decide that e "dlepiite* or a
"altuatloa" did exlat uatll It had ealled the partie# be
fore It and heard all the evldeaee#

The prealdeat took tbie

atand beeauae If a "dlepute* exiated, partlea to that *dle^
pmte" ##re barred from wtlag under Article 27, paragraph
3, of the Oharter.*

Saeh procedure aaa la line with the

geaaral prlaclple of lateraatloaal lem that a atate ehould
s
Bot be both a party to, aad a jmdge of, Ita o*a ease.
Thla provlao eaa mot made mhen a qaeatloa aaa termed a
"aitmatloh," lo ehlch eaae the abateatlom role did not apply.
The letter from the gyrlam and Lebaaeae delegate# fur~
ther stated that the "dlapate" was belag aabmltted to the
6
Semuplty Oouaall ander Article 34 of the Charter.
But

4,

%e Charter of the Baited gatloaa# Article 2?.
"i. Each member of the 8#curlty douncl1 ahall have
one rote.
2.
Declalw&a of the Security Gcumcll on procedural
matter# ahall be mmda by am affirmative vote of aeven
member#*
Declelon# of the Security Council on all other
matter# eh#ll be #mde by am afflmatlve vote of aeven
membera Indudlag the coacurrlng wtea of the perma*
ment member*; provided that. In declalone under Ghap*
tar VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 62, a party
to a dlapute ehall abataln from voting#"

i»

Xduardo Jlmen#» d# Avechagm, Votlm and the Samdllng
of PlcDutee In the Security Council, Re# TOrkT iwbuT

#.

The Charter of the Omlted Matlona, Article 34..
Security douncli may Invéctigate any dlepute, or
any altuatlon which might lead to international frlctloa or give rl#e to a dlapute, in order to determine
whether the continuance of the dlapute or altuatlon la
likely to endanger the malmt#Dance of international
peace and aecurity."

14

the preeideat auggcsted that the Levaatioe atatea be la*
Tlted to the CooDell table under Article 31 of the Charter
under ehleh the Seeurlty Gowcll did mot have to determine
at the outeet whether # "dlepute" or a "eltuatlon* ezleted;
for& Article @1 permitted the participation of United Na
tion# members in the dlacoaelon of question# before the Se*
curlty Gomncll If the CoimcU coB#ldered the Intereet# of
euch meWber# epeclally effe#t#d.^

Makln #ugg##ted auch a

procedor# beeanee under Article 51 the Council could hear
the queetlon iAtho»t determining "^eubetance" of that l##ue
Immediately.
Furthermore, Preeldemt Maklh propoeed that the dele
gate# from Syria ead Lebmmcm, up^n being eeated at the
Gowell»# table, be glvw* %h# pewr of "pr0po#l%lca*-*th#
right of B0û-S«®wity Council member# to propose method# of
##ttl#meat for qowtloo# to #hleb they #ere a party,
"propoeltlcm#" had

such

mo legal #el^t before the Council.®

7.

The Charter of the Dmited Nat lone. Article 31.
"^Ahy memmer '&t %me 'p'aiiea s'aiiohe #hloh la not a mem*
ber of the geewlty Gwmell mmy participate, without
vote. In the di#eu##loh of any queetlon brought before
the Security Council «henever the latter conel der# that
the Intereat# of that Nhmber are apeclally affected,"

8,

Security Council# Provlalonal Rulea of Procedure, Rule
Rw'York, 1M», p.^0%
"Any meWber of the United Ration# invited In accordance
with the preceding Rule or Im application of Article 82
of the Charter to participate in the dlaou##lona of the
Security council may eubmlt propo#ala and draft reeolutlona. Theae propoeal# end draft résolution# may be
put to a vote only at the requeet of a repreeentatlve
on the Security Council**

15

Tat, to gp&Dt the po*af of "proposition" might facilitate
th# aettleaGOt of a quaatloa,
Befoy# th# Seaurlty Comioll oould aooept th# augg##9
tloo# mad# by th# pramldemt, KamdoWi Rlaz of %ypt iBter-^
r%pt$d to ralB# a qoaatloD of prooedmr##

Th# Egyptlam

&#l#gat# atiggeeted that the Coonoll deold# whether the vota
to &et#rmla# th# #%l#t#mo# of a "dlapnte^ or *altuatlon"
«a# to h# ^prooedoral" or "#ah#taatlv#."

Be oalled for

thl# d##lalon h#for# th# Cooaoll owld hear th# SyrianWban### qa##tl4m.

Th# l##w# rala#d ### of th# Qt#o#t la*

pwtaoo# beeauae# aoaordlng to àrtlel# 27, paragraph 2, of
the Charter, the d#t#rmlnatlom of all "procedural* queatlon#
r#^ulr#d m#r#ly th# affirmative vote of #*y aevem member#
of th# S##uri1y Council*

Bo##v*r, to determine all "non-

proeedaral" or "#ub#ta#tlv#* qmaatlom», a# #tat#d in Artld#
»T# ^regrmph a# am mfflmativ# imt# of aevea member#. In*
clMlog the coacurrlmg *>t#* of th# flv# p#rmMWi«&t members,
#a# h#o###ary. Paragraph 5# of Artlcl# 27, thu#, provided

9#

Kamdoah Slam, ^orn Im C#lro Ih 18S6, #a# educated at
the faculty of La# at the DAlveralty of Parle and th#
School of Political SelcBe# In Pari#. B# #ae Ghalrmma
of Foreign Relatloa# la th# Eoua# of Deputl## la Cairo
from 1944^1945. In 1946, he #a# flnamce a%^ Budget
Commlaeloner, Be ha# been an Egyptian representative
to the General Aeaemhly and Security Council and «ae
one of the #l#ct#d member# to the Council #hen th#
6yrlao*L#bcnc8e queatlon «as before it In 1946.

lÔ

for the veto power of the permmemt member# la all *aubet&Btive* questions.
aiaz «as attempting to blook the use of the ?eto po#er,

Not only did be propose that the Seourity Coumell &#-

old$ mhether the "e^batantive" or "prooedural" vote mhould
apply to the qaeetlon, but eleo
al" vote ehoalA be employed.

eo deqiaiw; a **pPooedw-

To esbetamtiate this etaai.

Bias propoaed the folloaing motion:
That the âeotsioe of the Council as to vhether
any queetion 1& _e diepwte or a eltmatlon is a pro*eedttrel matter.*0
The motion mm Involved the whole questloa of noting
procedure as aet town in Article £7 of the United Hâtions
Charter.

Certain immediate questions mere raised as to the

interpretation of this artlela.
Plret, what ar# procedural mattera end eeoond,
ehat ia the mmtmre of the vote required for the daolalon on whether a matter is procedural within the
meaning of Artiele %7, paragraph 2.^^
The latter queatlon vae raised by Rla*. Be ealled upon
the Seeurity Oouaeil to decide at onee that a "procedural"
vote, or a eoneurrlag vote of any seven members on the
Goonell, mould judge if a "dlapute* or a "situation" ©xlated
la the Syrlan-Lebaneae queatlon.

10.

Seewlty Council, off loi ml Reoorda: First Tear, First
Series. Mo.'T. nfnete^ath rnSetlne. «. S?t.

11.

De Areohaga, o#. clt»i p. 1
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Th* Charter Itself offered ao mnamer to the (^ueetlom.
It d%d, however, provide that mattera oomiag under Chapter#
IT4 V, %, and HI of the Charter ahoald he oonsld^ed "pro*
cedural" In nature.

Article 31 la gound la Chapter ?.

Turtheraore, the 8tateaBBt of the Spoasoria# Goveramamta at
San Franolaeo ragerdlng voting proeedura la the Security
Council provided no eonoluslve list of
aldered "procedural* la mature*

matters to be 00a-

Tet, the atetement did

aaaert lo part I, aeotioo 3:
.,,no ladlvldeal mamber of the Council can alone
prevent oonalderation and diacaaaion by the Council
of a diai;«te or altnatlon broqght to its attention
under paragraph 2, aeetlon A, Chapter YIIl.**
(Dumbarton Oaka Propoaala)^*
Still, thla provision did wt atste the type of vote neoeaaery to decide aueh a queatioa^
Porthermore, a Statement of the sponsoring Qoveramant#
provided In part II, paragraph 1:
In the opinion of the delagatlona of the SponaorIng Oovemmenta, the draft Charter Itaelf eontaina an
Indication of the applleatlon of the voting procadarea
to the varloue funetiona of the Counell.l*
Thla atatement, then* referred to the above aeotlona of
Charter #hleh have been termed ^proeadaral.*^

Eoixever, If a

12.

To be found In Article 55# paragraph 2, of the Charter.

15.

United Bationa Conference on International Organization,
Doemmeata. H# Kea York, 1945, p. ?11.

14' 1*14.. n, p.
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eomtroT#r*y âiû arise over the interpretation ot what «as
"procedural" and Mi&t «as "siabstantiw under the Charter,
the Statement of the Sponeorlng OoTeromente deolared in
part II, paragraph 2;
Should, however, euoh a aetter ariae, the deoiBion regarding the preliminary question a a to whether
or not 8uah a matter la procedural muet be taken by
a vote of aeven members of the Seourity Counoil, in*
eluding the ooaeurring votea of the permoent memaera.lS
To eomplieate the problem still more, the nineteenth
meeting of the Security Couneil had before it no clear-cut
definition of the eiaot diatlnotion between a "dispute"
and e **situât ion,"

No definition was to be found in the

Charter or in the Statement of the Spomaorlng Oovemment#
made in San Fraoeiaeo. The question #a# left for the nntSed
Nations to decide.

As late a« the 15 July 1948, the In

terim Committee of the General Assembly was still trying to
16
draw up a definition.
In connection «1th this attempt at

15. Ibid.. II, p. 914.
18.

"(1) In deciding, for the purposes of Article 27,
paragraph 3, whether a matter brought before the Se
curity Council by a State or States I s a dispute or a
situation, the Security Council shall hold that a dis
pute arises;
"(a) If the State or States bringing the matter
before the Security Council, mod the State or states
«hose conduct is Impunged, agree that there is a
dispute.
"(b) Whenever the State or States bringing the
matter before the Security Council allege that the

19

aeflnltlon»

Imtmrlm Commltt*# mlm d«oiâ«d im 1946 tîmt

the mmmmer of âeelâlag tkm emimtemee or aoa-txiatsBoe of a
«âispate» «as to b# by m *pro@#&i%ral" vote.

tJofortmoately,

tbe Gwmltt#®*# report »a» mot adopte# by the General kêaembly* let alome toy the Seemrity Couaeil.

Even ao, the

Information «as mot before the Seewrlty eoimeil until two
am# oae-half year# after the mlaeteeath meetiag.
Perhapa a more «ortable définition of the differenee
beteeea a "dlapate" and a *#it«atloa" waa given by GoodrlGh and lasbro In their eoaaentary on the Charter;
A dlapmte earn properly be eoasldered as a disagreement or a matter at laaue betaeen teo or more

aotloB# of another State or States im reapeet of the
first State or States eoaatltate a breach of am Intermatlonal obligation or are endangering or are
likely to endanger the malntenanee of International
peaee and aaemrlty, or that aueh aetlona d emonatrate
preparation to eoarnlt a breach of international ob
ligations or to endanger the maintemanee of inter
national peaee and aeomrlty, and the state or Statea
ahloh are the ambjeet of these allegations eonteat,
or do not admit* the faeta alleged or Infereneea to
be drawn from amah allegationa.
*{$) farther. If a State bringing before the Se^
omrlty Coanail a matter of the natmre eontemplated
under paragraph (1) above, allege# that another State
la violating the righta of a third State, and the lat
ter anpporta the eonterntion of the first state, then
the third State shall alee be deemed to be a party to
the dispute*
"(8) Rothing in this definition ahall prevent the
Seourlty Cornell from ddelding tWt a^dlspmte exists
in oireamataaees not eovered by mm above definition."
General Aaambly. Offleial leoordî Third Session, Supplemeat 18. floe. A7êw.' W York: Iftls. iip. 7-8. ' ^

80

etatea tbloh b&# raaohed a #t#g* *t «hloh th# parti##
have formulated alalma sad #ouat#rolaljn# sufficiently
4#flBlt$ to b# paaaAi upom by a eourt or other body
set up for purposes of paelfle settlement. A eituatkm,
by eontraat# 1# a #tate of affair# which ha# not a# y#
assumed the nature of eonfllet between parties but
which may* though not neceaearily, come to have that
character.1?
Like other definitloma, thla one, too, suffers from vaguemeaa; but* It doe# atate that a "dlapute" pre*#uppo#e# the
eilmtenee of clal## and aounterelalm# which in thwaelvea
are of a more aeriow# nature and a greater threat to the
peace than condition# Involved under a "altuatlon»**

%e

conaenau# of the Security Council would appear to make thi#
type of dlatlm»tlon» although the organixation haa never
adopted a set definition of what con#titutea a "dlepute"
or a "altuatlon*"
Because these problem# were raised

by the motion pro

posed by Riaz, other member# of the Council—namely Presi18
dent Nakln# 1 # 1» van Kieffens
of The Netherland#, Gyro

19,

Lelamd M. Goodrich and Xdvard Bambrc, Charter of the
Halted lationSi. Comowntarv and Document#. Bo#ton.
iPdb, p. É4S.

16.

Eelco Hicolaas van Kleffen# wa# born In Beerenveen,
The metherlanda, on 17 fiovember 1894, After an ed*
ucatlom at the Bnlveralty of leyden, he entered govern
ment service. From 1@4#-194?, he aerved a# minister
without portfolio and Netherlands repreaentatlve on
the Sedurity Council and the Economic and Social
Council. Mr. van Kieffan# is the present (1951) Dutch
ambaaaador to the United state#.
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19
20
6# FT€lt4R3*Valle
of Brazil, and Wellington Eoo
of Gblna-#*r# in general agreement that the Egyptian motion should
be referred to the Committee of 2:q)ert8 for further atudy.
Thee# gmmbere deelred to have the Syrian-Lebanese delegate#
eeated Immediately at the Goumoll table eo that the Levantlne eaee eould be heard.
The aetlon of thee# fo%r members eaa chareeterlatlo
of the eamtloi&e atmoeiAere In take Security Gounoll during
It# flrat fe# meetlmge.

Operating onder provlelonel rule#

adopted at Ite flrat meeting, the Security Coimoil ea# In
It# nineteenth meeting etlll feeling Ite eay more or lea#
on day-to-day baala,

$h* repreaentatlve# from Auatralla,

China, The letherlands, and Brazil realized that the Gouaell #a# In the proee## of getting preeedenta, and for thle
reaaon they auggeated that Ibe Coimell take no action Itself la determining whether the exist®ate of a •dispute" or

19. Gyro de Freltaa-Valle, BraelHaa dlplomatlat, *aa bora
In 1894 and edneated la Sao Pablo* He ha# held eaoh
poaltlona aa the General Secretary of the Brazilian
foreign Office In 1939 and the ambaaaadorahlp to Ger
many from 1939-194&, Slnae 1944, he haa been
Brazilian ambaaaador to Oamada and a repreaentatlve of
hla oountry to the United Batlona*
20.

T1 Kyuln Wellington Koo mea boM In 1888* Since reaelTlng hla Doctorate In phlloaophy at Columbia Uni*
veralty, Koo ha# repraaentad the Chlneee government
la the League of Batlona and the United Nation#. Be
haa alao been Ghlaeaa ambaaaador to the united State#
alnee 1948.

22

* "sltaatloa"

to bs oon5ld«re@ a "proseduzal" amttar.

Beoaase the Committee of Expert# #@8 stwdyiag at that tin*
th# protlema relative to the fuaûtlonl% of the Couaoil#
the above mentlomed membera propoaed that the queetlon be
tumea over to that group of experte eharged vlth aecldlag
those very lee*e#,
Maz aooepted the auggeatlon of the praaideat that the
aeolalon on whether a "dlppote* or a "altuatlon" aid azlat
be poatponad imtll after the Security Gounell heard the
Syrlaa and lebemeae delegates.

But the Zgyptlaa delegate

malntalmed that the type of vote neceaaary to datarjalae
that qweatloa ahould be daolded at omee*
the vot# ehould be "prooedaral."

He argwed that

Koo dlaagreed amd attempted

to block the Egyptian motlom;
I au$geat th^ the motion of the repreaentatlve
of Egypt be tabled amd referred to the Committee of
Experte for them to atWy It and report baak to the
Cogaall.Bl

II
At thla polBt, ao aetlon aaa taken on the Egyptian mo
tion or Chineee propoaal.

The Co*noil turned from Ite de*

bate over the wthod of voting to the q^atlom whether the

Bl*

Sae^rlty Cognoll, Offloial Records, First Tear, First
Hëriea, Ho, '']E'^ ' niheteeo^'lastting'» p .''"'#'8".
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m&lateaaao# of freseh aad Brltlmh troop# In Byr&a amA L$b*22
aon eon#tltBt#d # "Al#p*t#" or a "altumtion," Braaat Bavla
of

the Baited Klagdom believed t&at a "dlapute" actually

existed:
If any aoauaer State eay* that there la a dispute,
then there la a dtspate; ead If a State make* a ebarge
egalBSt aaother Stata, aad the State e^alaat ahloh It
1* made repadlatea it or oo&testa it, then there 1# a__
dispute, aad the Goamell *aa aaka Ita reeoamendatkms.**
The United Kingdom delegate aalatalned that beeaaae
Syria emd Labaaoa aaeerted the ezlateaae of a "dispute" Im
their latter of 4 February 1946, the# In faet It did exist.
Be arguad that the Goaaell oaght to aaeept that faet and act
aooordlngly*

la apeeklag thaa, Bevla at l&aet Implied that

the United Kingdom aas partially the oauae of the Syrlaa»
Lebaoaae qaestioa, baeeaa# British troop* were at that time
stationed on 3yriaa~Labaaase territory. Noraorer, In main
taining that a "dlspgte* exlated. Bavin farther Implied
that his oountry, as a party to the *dlapute* aoold be dabarred from TotlBg la tha aeourlty Oounoll aoeordtng to

22.

Iraeat Bevlm (P#0. 1940) aas bom on 9 Mar eh 1881 and
died on 14 April 1961. Bavin lang nerved the British
government* Prom 1940*1#45, he aes Minister of Labor
and National sarviea* Bavin aas Saorctary of state
for foreign Affairs from 1945-1951. Whan the SyrianLebanese question eaoe Into the seourity Gounoll,
represented the United Kingdom as a permanent member,

23.

Saauritv Gouaell* Offlelel Reeords: first Tear, first
deries. #0. I. nineteenth meetlaK.
576.
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Artlol# Z^i paragraph 5, if asd «hem- méthode of eettlement
»ere propoeed.

The Dalted Kiagdom delegate eae the firet

repreeeatative of a (breat Poeer to take this et&ad m the
Syrlaa-Lebeaeee qmetloa.
The vleee of the aealler etatea mere eontrary to those
held by BeTlm,

The delegate* from X&ypt, Brazil, and The

Betherlaade argae* that the Seearlty Goaneil ehould decide
if e parÊiemlar qaeetioa eoaetltated a "diepate," bat only
after the Goamell had heard the partiee to that qneetion
end Wd evaluated mil feet* In the eaee. Tan Kleffene s«®med *p the attitude of the three poaere:
I qmite agree with the repreeentative of China
that it might be a good thing to have that queation
(whether a diepate or a eltuation ea&ated and the
proeednre of deeidimg) mtmêieâ. I think this is a
very healthy debate beeanae the world ean eee that
this Comneil is working oat what we might perheps
call its eommon law. We are trying to find oat our
way. This is a new body, le mnat work very guardedly
in these mmttere, I think all iatereete would beet
be served if we first heard the parties and then took
the deoiaion.Be
The getherlande delegate, in explaining the nsoessity
for the eetabli«hmemt of e eolid foundation for futur# aetlvity, realized that the Oouneil was mm king its eommon law.
for this reaeon# wan deffene pleaded for eo-operetion end
a methodieal approeah to new problems,

perhaps more im

portant, he and representative® of oertein em11 nations

*4.

Ibid., p. a??.
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iatlsttô that the 8##Grlty eonjiell aiiomM ieelie the oature
of q**#tion» pre#eat*d to It thro*gh opea Aleouaaloa.
Through auah aotioa, th# email aatloas olearly aho«@4 thai*
faith im aa latermatloaal orgaalgatlom.
Rlat* by ao« ##ar#

that th* majoTity of Oouaall opln-

loa #*# agaiaat h&a o%i@l#al motioa, zaaorda* hia motloa
to r#ad:
Wltheat
to th# flaal d##laloa ## ahall
take, may a##ia&oa oa *h#ther a oaae broaght before 1&*
8»eerity Go*m#il aoaatltatea a diapat# or a altaatloa
ahall be eoaaldarad to b# a qaeatloa of procedure aa&
ahall tharafor# b# $h# aabjaot of a prooaaural vote.*5
Vas Klaffaaa iat#*f*pt#a #lth a aoaatar propoaal:
I ball eve that, bafoz# «# can vota oa the %yp%lam
propoaal, aa ahoalt firat vote oa tha qaeatioa ahethar
it la maoaaaary to vota oa that propoaal ao*. I bag
to mora that it la no* aaa#a*ary that tha Couaoll vote
oa that propoaal aa*.**
^
Tha Goaaail at thia polat had tao motions before it.
Before a vote aoald be taken oa either the motloa of vaa
lEleffaaa or oa the amaadad motion of Bias# tha aoviet dalagata, Aadral Tyahiaaky,

25 *

Ibl6 * * p• iE80*

•

IblA* * p• WèO•

alahad to apeak.

la hie rebattal

£7.

The saggettioa mmda by loo #aa not a motloa.

18•

Aa&pal Jaaaar&avlah Yyahlaaky, Soviet la«yar and poll*
tlclan, #aa bora la 168$. A mambei of tha Commaaiat
party *la#a 19*0, ha haa 1* tha paat baaa Haad of tha
Legal Saatlom of the Soviet Aaadaay of Saleaoaa,
Depaty-fublle Proaaautor and fablio Proaaautor of tha
Sovlal Daloa# Amba##ador to the Waited State#, aad
Sovlat rapraaaatativa to the Saeurity Counoil.

28

to Riaz* argument that a "procedural" vote ahould be taken
to aetermlne mhether a "dlapute" or a "eltuatlon* was be
fore the Council, Tyshinsky explained:
Procedure is the manner of deciding a matter, a
method of decieion* but the queation a* to ehat the
actual eubetance of a particular matter amouata to,
ehether it ia a aituatlon or a diapute, la not the
manaer of decielon, mat the method of deciding the
matter, but relate* In fact to the evaluation of the
very aubetance of the matter,®'
Since according to Tyahinaky the determination of a "diepute* or a "aituation" concerned the eubatance of a quae*
tion, he maintaimed that a "aubetantlve" vote muat be
taken uader Article 87* paragraph 5.

He argued farther:

If, finally, the queatlon arise* as to ehether a
matter la procedural or not, the rule to be applied
la that laid doen, on ? July 1945, in Sac fraociseo,
on the basis of the report of the Third Committee,
where It is stated that a declBlon in regard to such
questions asast be taken by an affirmative vote of
eeven member* of the security Council, including the
cooourrlhg vote* of the permanent member* of Council,
thgt la, again, aecording to Article 27, paragraph
Vyehlneky baaed hie case upon teo major premises.

Be

insisted that determining a question to be e "dispute" was
a "non*procedural" matter because that determination had
to do with an evaluation of the "eubetenae" of the issues
involved.

In auch a case, the required eoaeurrenee of the

29.

Security Council, Official Seeord*; First Year, First
Series » #o,'t * alae'feeatfe aee i'x'ni» ppT" '
'!

SO.

Ibid., p. 881.

2?

peym&nent mw^ere #ou)Ld permit the uee of the veto. Be
thea laaletea that th* deolaloa ehether e "eabetantlve* o*
"prooe&urel" vote eee to he taken (eooordimg to the State*
meht of the Spoaeorla* GOTefxmente), required the ea&eof*
remoe of the permanent membere.

In the letter ergtmeot the

Soviet delegate #»e eorreot la hie Interpretetion, but hie
aeeertioa that "eabetentlve" voting ehoald determine ehether
a "dlepmte" or a "eltuetlom" prevailed *ae debatable.
were Tyehimeky^e argweat aeoepted (that the quallfleatlon of a eaee a* a "dlapete* or a "eltuatlon" «ae to be
deolded by a "eubetamtlve* vote), then a permanent meeker
of the Seourlty Cotmell eould, by hie dleeent alone, pre
vent the identlfioatlon of any leaue to ehloh he eae a
party ee a "dlepnte."*

Dhder euah prooedare, the permanent

member oould retain hie rlg^it of veto even ehen, eeoording
to Impartial atanderds, the queetlon *ae a "dlepute." The
permanent mwdber thue eonld act as a jndge In Ite oen eame,
fo prevent thle very danger# Artlele W, paragraph

of

the Bnlted Nation* Charter *ae Ineorporated to prevent nee
of the veto by pertlee to a ^'dlepote" under Chapter TI and
Artlele 52*

In 1946, the Goanell had

not eoeeeeded in de

fining a "dispute* nor la re&olving that a "procedural"
method of voting mould bo need to deolde ehether a *dle»
pnte" ezieted.
After the Soviet argument for the "eubetantive" vote.

28

Makla oalled for # vote upon the van Kleffena aotloa which
had gtatea that the Gooaeil need not vot# oa the Blaz mo
tion at thia time.

Eight #embara voted in the affirmative
31
and the motion «a* oarrled.
Elaz* motion *aa automatleally killed.
The preaident of the Co%mell then invited the delegatee fr«m Oyrla and Lebanon to take their eeate at tlw
Council table,

Ha explained the Counoll prooednre to them:

I ahowld like to Inform the repraaentatlvea who
have jaat taken their seats at the table that they
are invlied by the 3eeurlty Gownell to take part in
its dellberatlona upon the question that la now before it, and aith the right to participate in the dle*
euasioas althoat vote. Also, at an appropriate time
they till have the opportunity of making a propoaltlon,
if it la their aleh to do ao* In those alraumatancea,
they «111 reellze that the Gonneli hae dealred tbelr
attendance and invited them to take part in its diaeuaaiooe upon thla matter.^2

III
In aummation# the nineteenth meeting of the Security
Couneil decided very little.

The Council did not decide

whether the meintenanoe of British and freneh troops in

31. Ibid., p. 881, (In the early meetlnge of the Security
dounell, no breakdown was given in regard to the way
members voted on a particular lesue. Total votes were
recorded only. How the vote i s broken down as follows:
in favor, against, abetainlng, and absent.)
32,

Ibid., p. 283.
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Syria and lebaaoa ooastltutea a "dlapate" or a "situation."
Although Devin malntaloed that If a stat* eald a "dlapute*
did Gzlat, then In fact it aid; the other ammbere appear**
to b# uaallllag to arrive at auch daelsloa until after all
p&rtlea to the "Alapute" had been heard. In addition, and
even mare to^)ortant, idle Security Council oouiq not agree
aa to the type of voting procedure to be followed Im deter
mining snob que atl one.
T*o diametrically opposed views developed,

Rlaz main

tained that the question was *pro@edur&l;" Vyablnsky inaleted that it w&e "eubetentive,*

The uae of the veto In

suoh matters ^as therefore left undecided.

Even though a

Bolutlon wae offered by &oo, van Kleffens, and de ffeltasValle (to submit the question to the Committee of Eiperte
for determination)* the Council took no action.
However, the meeting did take some poaltlve action.
The Syrian-Lebanese question waa brought before the Seeurity Council# and placed upon the future agenda. The SyriaoLebaneae delegatea were eeeted at the Gouaoll table. They
were invited to take part in the dlGcuaaion, and they were
given the right of "propoaitlon."

3uoh aetlon implied that

the Seeurlty Council might at some later date, after hear
ing the Syrien-Lebaaese oaet, peaoefully aettle the queatloa regarding the evacuation of Brltleh and French troop#
from Syria end Lebenon.

Furthermore, the Counoil implied

30

that It might iD some future meetlag deteraiae «h#ti#r a
"dispute" oz a "gltuatloa" eiistea ia Syria and lebaaonaa
wall a# «hathar thé "prooadural" or "aubatantlva" vote *a#
to b@ employed In maklog that declaloa*

31

OEiPTZR III

TBE TMKTIRS MEETING OF
TBE 8W0RITT GOmCIL

OB

the a#%t

Amy,

Friday#

15

February

194@,

the teem-

tleth meeting of the geearlty Comsell me held at Ghmreh
Booee, weetmlmleter# Loadom, amd the eetml dleeuealon of
the Syrlam-lebameee qeeetIon hegam.
presided ©ter by Pre mid eat Makim.

Thle aeetljqg# too, eae

The eame delegate a were

1
present with one exeeptlom; Sir Alexander Cadogaa,

repre*

eeatimg the Waited Klmgdom, replaeed Beria eho at thie time

2
eaa oe#spied eitfa ether affaire.

I
After the edoptloa of the agemde end the eeetiag of

1.

The &t* Boa. Sir Alexander George moatagrn Gadogao eae
bora oa 85 BoveWber 1®84 a ad edmeated at Itoa ##d Ox
ford. Gadogaa has lorn# been aommeeted #lth diplomatie
servi oes for lie Majeety*# Goverameat a ad eae aabaeaador to Ohima from 1G3#^1956 a ad permaee# trader secre
tary of forei^ Affaire 1938-1946. Siaee 194#, ha ha#
been a Wmited Kiagdom delegate to the Dai ted Hâtions.

2.

Seewit? Coaaeil. Offielal leeorda; First Tear, First
Seriee/m>. I. teeaUitk meetiae.
«4.
'
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3
4
Hastia B#y framgl# of Leb&nom and Fari® ii-ïhoîufi of
Syria, tkm pr#ald*at oallad upon th# Levant in# delegates
to state tbelr oaee#
fraagie of Lebanon epoke first.

In preeentlng the

Lebanese ease, be first made it el ear that Lebmon and
Syria

aoverelgn and Independent state»»

Both of the

Levant nation# bad elgned the Tfnl t#d Sat loos Charter In
8an Pranoleeo In 1945# and thie aetlon in Iteelf $ Praagie
argaeâ» preeluded any limitation of their eoverelgnty. For
proof, be referred to Artie le 2 of the Obarter ehloh stated
that the organ!m tion me based op on the eovereign equality
S
of its member8.
Other mwdxer mtiom# tee a, accepted thie
eoverelgnty and Independeme# In the Lemnt «hen they, too,
nlgned the Charter, Fraagie argmed. fraaee and the United

3.

Blograpbloal material on Frangle le unavailable.

4.

Farie ll*Ehoari» representative of Syria to the Seonrlty Gonnoll torlag tW Syrlan-Lebaaeee qneetlon, mae
born la Eeir, Syria In 167i. Se «as edmoated at the
Amer lean University of Beirut and baa been professor
at the Syria© Wnlverelty of Damaaene and a member of
the Arab Aeadeev sinee 191#.

5.

The United Ration# Charter. Artlele 2.
4he Organisation and iie Member#, In pnrenit of the
Pmrpoaea stated la Artlele 1, shall act In aeéordanee
with the following Prlnelplee,
1. The Organ 1 nation le baaed on the principle of the
eoverelgn egoality of all its Mehbera.
2 , All Member»,. In order to en#are to all of them the
right® and benefits reaulting from membership, shall
fnlflll In good faith the ebligatlone aasumed by them
in aeeordance «1th the present Charter..."
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Kingdom as signatories had accepted Syria and Lebanon as
sovereign nations,
Frangle

eorreot In hi# argument. The ITnltad Kl%-

dom and Franc# not only aaeaptad Syria and Labanon a# aoveralgn and lnda#nd#nt atataa In 1945 at San Pranolsoo# but
tba t#o Greet Pomera had aeaepted that Independmoe In the
paat*

Before the Imraalon of Syria and Lebanon In 1941#

General Gatroux, repreaantlng Free franoe In the Bear Eaat,
on 8 Jume 1941» etated;

*»,#! eome to put an end to the

d
mmdatory regime and to proolal# you free end Independent."
The proolam&tlon aet up# at leaat In ^ faeto etatua, Syria
and Lebanon aa Imdependwt atatea,

Catroux promlaed that

the Independenoe mould be guaranteed "In a tr«*ty In ehlch

?
(our) mutml relatione #111 be defined»" a treaty to be
negotiated ae eoon aa poaalhle#
On the aame day. Sir Kllea Lampaon» BrltlgA anbaeaadDr
at Cairo, made the folloelng etetement regarding Brltlah
polley In the Levant:
I am authorlaed by Ml# Majeaty*# Governmnt In
the Dnlted Kingdom to deolare that they eupport and
aaaodate thmaaelvee #lth the maauranee of indepenienoe given by General Oatrmwc on behalf of General

d*

Klnlatere de L* informât Ion# "La France et lea Etata
du Levant*" #otea. Doeumkentalraa et Btudea. Bo* 74.
Serle Internationale. Parle, lEvl* V. ^aee a^andiz.
pege

?*

Ibid#* p# ?.

04

8
4$ Gaulle of Syria and Leb&aoa.
LampsoD «eat on to etate that If Syria aa& Lebanon awp*
ported the Alllee, they eould enjoy all the aavaatagee of
the free oountrlea of the «orld Including the lifting of
the blockade and admittance to the aterllng block.
Theae tao earlier guarantees of indepandenoe were
elaborated later in the awmmer of 1941 by the Lyttelton*
de Qenlle Agreement of ? Ai^uat 1941.

The United Kingdom

reatated her earlier pledge to Syria and I,eh&non, for
lyttelton #rote;

"Both Free Franoe aal Ofeat Britain are
9
pledged to the Independimee of Syria and Lebanon."
Fur

thermore, the United Kingdom recognized the favored posi
tion of Franoe In the Levant after eomplete Independenee
«&S granted:
#hen thla eaaentlal atep haa been taken (the
oompleta InAependenee of Syria and Lebanon), and
without prejudice to it# *e freely admit that franoe
ahoald have the prede#laant poeltlon In Syria and
Lebanon over any other European pwer.l^^
Lyttelton did not define thla privileged poeltlon, but It

8#

Sir Mllea Lampeoa, **Deelaratl@B by Sla l^jeaty*a jm»
baeaador at Cairo* B ynne 1941*" 3tat@a#Aa of Polloy
by Ms *a j##ty*e Wvemmemt in the'Halted KihKdom in
%o Myria a#4 Letwoon. 8 fuie* isAi amd^9 septemer l#41, uommahd ëWo # London * i##ë# p. z.
(ëee app#n4l%, page

9*

Ibid,* p » 3•

10.

Ibid., p. 5 *
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Bas geaerelly ooaoeâed that france

should have preferea*

tl&l trestment In cultural» eooaoalc, aa4 strategic saBsMk
The Importance of the Lytteltoa-âe Gaulle Agreeaeat
V&8 that the Halted llngùom and France again oommlttea
themselves to the la&epsa&eaoe of Syria aa& lebaaoa. Purtheraore, the n%ited Elogdom Gccepted a pri?llege& posltioa
for France la the L@T&at %hca that la6epea<lea.c€

remliaa.

Therefore, Zroagle *&2 correct ahsa he malataiaed that
Fr&j^ce and the United Elngdc& accepted ttm Levantine atatee
as sovereign and Independent.
With this hlBtory in mind, frangle infermed the Securi
ty Council that British and Trench troops at that moment
tere stationed on Syrian and lebaneae aoll,

Gkch action,

he said, constituted a grave vlolaticn of the sovereignty
of the t»o nations, especially alnoe there «as no legiti
mate reason for these troopa to be la Syria and Lebanon.
#or aes the preeence of these troopa approved by the
levantine goversmente,

Ae FrsBgle stated, the occupation

#a8 not "jnetlflGd by the eilatence of any agreeoents,

11
treaties or understanding of any eort."
frangle #as correct.

There tae no legitimate reasonibr

the maintenance of Brltleh and french troope in Syria

11.

Security Coupoll. Official Reoorda: First Tear, Flrat
Berlem* #0. I, tventietb meeting, p. 665.
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I,ebaAon In 1946 even thomgh there had been a juatlfl*
oatlon In the peet.

frenoh troop# mere etatloned In Syria

ana Lebanon elnee the beginning of the mandate granted to
12
France at the 8an Bemo Conference on 24 April 1920.
Theee troops eere to be maintained f% the defense of the
15
mandated territories#
Boeever* "French rale bore too
close a reeeAlance to that anmexatlcn for #lch It #as a
mibstltnte, and the limits of the mandate, as orlglmlly
contemplated, were In faet soon eztended by a process of
14
military conquest.'*
Revolts occurred snch as
Dmeean revolt of 1926-1926, and France found It necessary to
send larger mmbers of troops (many of «hlch sere the
hated Senegalese) Into Syria and Wbanon. The Syrian and
Lebanese peoples objected to this shoe of foreign mili
tarism.

They objected. In fact, from 1920 until 1948.

British troop* joined French cecupatlon forces In
the Levant In 1941.

On 8 Jime 1941» a mixed force of Im-

12.

Q, M. Gathome-Bardy# A Short gletory of International
Affairs. 1920^1934. Lonéos, 1934, p. 121.

13.

The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon. Article 2.
"^Tke %indatory may maintain Its troops In the said
territory fcr Its defense. It shall farther be em^
pceered, until the entry Into force of the organlm
la# and the reestabllshmsnt of public secwlty, to
the defense snd also for the maintenance of order.
These local forces may only be recruited from the
Inhabitants of said territory.

14.

Gethorne-aardy, op. cit., p. 121.
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perlai, Pre* Preach, aaâ other Allied troop* umder oommaDd
of General 31r Henry Maltland Bilson oroseed the frontier*
15
of Syria and Lebanon.
The Invaalon came a* no euddem
eurprlee, beoauae it aa* eommon knoaledge that franee par
le
mltted German aircraft to aee Syrian alrbase*.
To pre-rent *uah aetlon and farther Natl penetration Into the Le
vant, Gatrow wad Lampeon made their jolmt proelametion* of
Syrian and Labaneae Indepeadenee on the aeme day that Al
lied foroe* were oroealng Levantlme frontier*.
After four aeek* of ooncentrated fluting* Tlohy
force* under General Dent% aaed for an armlatloe. The
Allied oootipatlon of Syria and Lebanon aa* auooeaafol.
Remnaate of theee Preneh aad Brltleh foreee, a* eell a*
Brltleh troop* ehloh Intervened In May 1945 at the requeet
of Syria mad Lebanon, aere etlll la the Levant In 1946*
BkMeever, Syria and Lebanon no longer aaa a need of or a
deelre for the oontlnaed malntenanoe of theae troop* by
1946.

Therefore# Praagle, In apeaklng before the Coanoll*

argued that theee troop* aere violating Syrian-Lebanese
eoverelgnty and moat be evaaaated^
Prangle oontlnaed the Labaneae ease by informing the

15.

Albert Habib Boaranl, Syria and Lebanon, Rea Tork,
1948, p. 237.

16.

Ibid., p. 2S7.
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Cooacll that Syria and Lebaaoa bed. made repe&tea repré
sentations to jTr&ace end the United KlBgaom elBce the end
of Woria War II la aa atteapt to secure the slmultaaeouB
elthdreaal of foreign troops.

Ee stated that such regxs^

had failed to settle the "dispute* and that the United
Elngdom and franoe had not *lthdra«n their troope.

In-

Btead, the t*o Great Poser# had slgaed the Anglo-Freneh
Agreeaent of 13 Deoember 1945:
The programme of evacuation *111 be draen up In
eueh a *ay that It «111 ensure the salntenanee In
the Levant of sufficient foroea to guarantee eeourlty, until Gueh time aa the Baited Nations has decided
on the orgaalzatlon of eolleotlve aeourlty In this
zone. Until theee arrangemeate have been carried
out* the freneh Government *111 retain forces re
grouped In the Lebanon#!?
Frengle admitted that the agreement mentioned evacu
ation* but he Ineleted it made no (Wmmltment on ho* or
*hen that evaeuation *ae to take plaee. fraagle also ar
gued that the Angl@«"Freae6 Agrement *a# a violation of
the Charter bem&uae *md*r that agreement fra&ee and the
United Elngdmm *ere maintaining troope on Syrlan-Lebaneae
eoll until the United Batlone oould provide
aeeurity* in the region.
illegal.

If*

"eolleetive

Ee Inaiated that euoh action eae

Syria and Lebanon *ere independent natlona.

Anglo-French Agreement 13 Deomber 1945, (3ee appendix,
pi<»C. ISZ)

89

Keither had been dGslgaated a "truat territory* or a "stra1A
teglc area.*
Their slgmlag of the Charter preoluaed any
poealbllity that Syria aad lehaaos oooia fall In either of
19
these categories.
Moreover, Trangie also aeagred the
Cowaoil that Syria mad lebaaoa #ere able to provide for
their o*n aeeurlty and la aueh manner fulfill their obliga30
tloaa to the United Nation* uader Artlel* 43.

18,

The Charter of the United Batloae, Article 82.
"There may be designated, la aay truetse&hip agree
ment, a etrategle area #bleh may laclnde part or all
of the truat territory to «hlch the agreement appllea,
without prejudice to aay apecial agreeaeat or agreemeate under Article 45." (Certain of the ^aoiflo
laland* are an example of *uoh areas. The United
States hae full poaer of adalaletretioa, legisletioa,
and jurlmdletlon, and protection over theee lalanda.)
Article 78.
"the truateeehlp eyet^m ahall not apply to territories
mhich have become Member# of the Dnlted Ifatione, re
lationship among #hich ahall be baaed on reapeot for
the principle of aoveralgn equality."

20.

IbAd.. Article 43
"ÎT"" All Member* of the United Nations, la order to
contribute to the maintenance of international peace
and security, undertake to make available to the 2ecurity Cowncll, on Ita call and in accordance «ith a
special agreement or agreemeota, eraed forces, assist
ance, and facilltlee, including the right of passage,
neceaaary for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and aecurlty.
&. Such agreement or agreemente Aall govern the num
bers and typea of forces, their degree cf readiness
and general location, and the nature of the facilltlee
and asaistance to be provided.
3, The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as
soon as possible on the initiative of the Security
Council, They ahall be concluded between the Security
Council and Members or between the Security Council and
groups of Members and shall fee subject to ratification
by the signatory states la accordance with their re
spective constitutional processes

40

He stated:
They (Syria and Lebanoa) have no deelre that
foreign powers should settle matters oa their hehalf or should aot Im their atead In the accomplish*
ment of this mlaaloo.^
Gweh aetlon, frangle contended oonatltuted a "dlapute" ahloh
22
created "a threat to International peace#*'
and Syria and
Lebanon «ere ambmlttlng the "dispute" to the Security Coun@11 for aettlement*
In elosiag, frsagle made it plain that had Syria and
Lebanon requested unilateral troop withdrawal, British
troops would have been out of the Levant.

Eoaever* he

statedÎ
for our part# we have always asked for the aim*
ultameou# althdranal of Irltlah and French troops,
namely# that of treating on a footing of equality
all frlendlv Power# and all Powers «1th whom ae have
relatione.^

II
li-Ihomrl of Syria aoeepted all the argumente preaented
by his aollaagma, Fraagle.

the Syrian delegate, too, con

tended that Syria and Lebanon «ere Independent states and

21.

Seourlty Council. Official Beoorda; First Tear. First
S»rtea. So. Ï. ttentieth aeetlng. p. MS.
Ibid., p. B64.

23.

ibid., p. 285.
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that the statloalng of troop* oa their territories *as an
abridgment of soverelgaty.
the Charter.

Such action #aa a violation of

Overturea that Syria had made to franoe for

troop evaaaatlon had gone anaowered, Il-Ihouri stated.
The Syrian delegate rejeeted the Anglo»Preooh Agree
ment of 13 Deeemher XS45 baaaoae it «as a bilateral agreememt het«e*n Prsmoe and the United Ilngdom*

He contended

that the establishment of "eollectlTe security" as pro
vided is the agreement «as
«as not legal.

not needed, #as not aanted* and

Be objected farther to the bilateral agree

ment on the grounds that It was vague and that it did not
set a time limit for the evacuation of all foreign troops.
And, finally, ll-Ihourl explained that evacuation under the
agreement *as mot dependent upon purely technical consideratlone. Il-lhotiri*s position at this time «as eounter to
that taken by Syria and Lebanon #hen the Anglo-Freoeb Troop
Agreement «as made public.
In Deewher If45, the populations of Syria and Lebanon
first rejoiced at the Anglo-French Agreement because of the
promise of evacuation of the Levant and mutual support and
consultation between France and the United Eingdom on Mid
dle gastern affairs.

Bcmever, the joy expressed in the
©4
Levant soon turned to reneeed hostility.
When the French

Ë4.

The Me# York Times, Dec. 30, 1945, p. 6.
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mad British military experts met in Beirut on 21 Deoember
1945 to dra« up plans for evacuation, they found themaelvee
in dlaagreement aa to the method to be followed and the
E5
time limit to be set.
A mia-interpretation arose between
the signatory po#era over ## question of regroupme nt.
France maintained that the United Kingdom should regroup in
Taleatina.

The Fnited Kingdom interpreted the agreement

to mean that her?forces ahould regroup in Lebanon («ith
the French) until the levant «as
Demonstrations

27
completely evacuated.

and strikes mere called in the Levant to

aho# the Syrian and Lebaneee diasatisfaction over the lack
28
of agreement among the two Great Powers over evacuation.
Freneh troopa #$re put under Britiah guard, and France «as
forced to give up the remaining control# over cuatcma,
radio stations, and railways in Syria.

But these conces

sion# did not satisfy the Syrian and Lebanese governments
which Insisted that foreign troops be completely removed.
Syria and Lebanon sent notes to France on 26 December
1945 and the # January 1946 informing France of their dis-

25.

Ibid.. Dec. 22, 1945, p. ?

26.

Ibid., Dee. 28, 1945, p. 3

27.

Ibid.. Deo. 28, 1945, p. 3

28.

Ibid.. Deo. 28, 1945, p. 3

29,

Ibid.. Dec. 28, 1945, p. 9
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90
approval of the troop agreement.
#es ans#ere& by ?ranee.

Neither of the notes

The Lebanese note of 9 January

1946 Btetedf
The Lebanew gOTeroment Immediately made kno#n
to th# %lnl#t#r of Great Britain and to the repreaentatlT# of France in Lebanon, that being the third
party #ith reapeet to th# agreement, it oonld only
reeognlze the atlpolatlona of It aa likely to ing^
fringe *pon th# right* and intereata of Lebanon.
Beeanae the not## ##nt nnana#ered, and beeanae no
dafinit# aetlon «aa taken for the aithdraaal of troops, 31*
Ihouri Informed the General Assembly of oondltiona In th#
Levant at it* alzteenth meeting on 19 January 1946:
The Syrian Govammaat, acting on a motion
paaaed by the Syrian Parliament, haa reqaeated the
Syrian delegation to bring thia matter to the atten
tion of the Dnited Ration*, dem&ndlng an early and
complet# aithdraaal of foreign troop#.
The Syrian delegation *onld be content for the
moment to do no more than aall th* attention of the
Aaaembly to thla matter, ahloh It hope# #111 be reaolved by the early aithdraaal of foreign troops so
that it #111 not be naoaaaary to bring up thla ques
tion in full before the United Batlona Orgmnlzatim.®^
Before the Aaaembly in Jannary, ll-Ehouri did not re
fer to oondltlona in Syria and Lebanon aa aonatltnting a
"dlapRta."

On the aontrary he uaed the term "matter."

30,

The Syrian legation did not eo-operate In aendlng a
copy of the Syrian note of 26 December 1945,

31.

See Lebanese Mote of 9 January 1946, appendix, page

52.

General Assembly, Journal, First Session, No. 10,
"
York. 194*. p. 25ST
'
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nomever la the joint Istter of 4 February 1946, the Gyrlsn
aaa lebaaese governnants

statea that ooadltlona at that

tl#e ooaatltuted a "aiapute.*

It must be Implied, then,

that the aiaagreeoent betteea the British aa& the Freaoh
themeelves ea to evacuation and regroupaeat of forces, the
failure of that eTaooatloa of foreign forces to become a
reality, the atrlkea and rlota that broke out la the Levant
over the Interpretation of the agreement, the failure of
France to anaiier overture a made by Syria and Lebanon In
regard to évacuation, and the growing resentment bet*een
French troopa and the Syrlan^Lebaneae populatloz^ leere the
oauaes of the "dispute" on 4 February 1946.

These condl-

tiona are sufficient causes for any "dispute."
^Ith this history In aind, El-Ehourl oontlnued the
Syrian case before the Council by ea^)lalnlng that a "dlapute* did e%l#t In Syria and Lebanon during this twentieth
meeting of the Security Gounell.

5e malntalwd that French

and British troopa *ere the oauae of thia *61apute."

Be

called upon the Security Council to take action and propose
methoda of aettlement by deciding that:
...all foreign armed foroee should be #ithdra*n
almultaneouely from Syria end Lebanon and to fix a
maximum date #hlch la technically posaible for the
realization of the mlthdremal.^S

33»

Security Gounoil, official Reeorde; First Year,
B ê r l e s , K o . I , "' ' W ê n t i e t h m e e t i n g % ' " p .

First

Ill

34
Georges Bidault,

la speaking for franoe, #aa care

ful to Inform th# Council of the paet bcnefolent French
attitude toward tibe Levant states.

He ezplalned that In-

depenàenoa wae granted to Syria eM Lebanon In 1641.

Thla

Independence eaa reoognlzed by the other nations of the
world* and Bldaolt Inelated

for that reason that Franee

had been Inetrumental In having the Levant states Invited
to the San Francleco Conference. Syria anA Lebanon re35
ceived Invitatlona on 28 TKmrdh 1945.
The question of whether Syria and Lebanon were eompletely independent was debatable ae waa the etatement
that France was Inetritmental in having Syria and Lebanon
invited to the San franeisoo Conference.

The argument

that other nations of the world had aeoepted SyrlanLebanese independence wae not debatable.

The United King-

dom extended formal recognition to Lebanon on 26 DeoeaAer

34»

George* Bidault, freaoh diplomat, hiatorian, and edi
tor, waa born In 1899. During World Far II, he
served in the ranks and wae held prlaoner by the Nazie
for eighteen montha. After relaaee, he became Chairawin of the Reeietanoe Council Inelde France. Bidault
has been a past Prime Minister, Foreign !Mlnlster, and
Kinleter of Foreign Affaire for JKranoe. He is a
member of the Trench delegation to the United Rations.

35.

Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chroaolo*y
of the Second Woild War, New York, 1947, p. SSVl.
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36
1941.

Im July 1944, the

Union of Soviet Socialist Be-

publlo* r#oognlzed Syria and Labanon aa aoTaralgn, Imda@7
pandaAt atataa.
Tha Umltad States aompletad raeognltlon
@8
by tha Great Foitrs on E7 September 1944.
Sièaalt ooataadad that Fremeh troops #ara In Syria
and Lebanon bacanaa of the heritage of war.
that Frenoh and

Ha pointed out

British troops invaded the Levant In 1941

to pro teet the Syrian and Lebanese populations from the
horrora of aar. Therefore, he frankly admitted that he
eould not see hoe the Levant government* eonld insist npon
the evaeimtlon of troops at this time. He explained that
troops #ere still stationed In other belligerent eoontriea
all over the world.

Certainly, the Syrlan-Lebaneae situ

ation did not differ from any of

these.

And, furthermore,

Bidault argued that freneh troops eere legally in the Le
vant.

After all, France had been given certain responsi

bilities nnder the mandate.

One of these was the protec

tion of the mandated territory.

Bidault Inalated that the

mandate had never been terminated de jnre through the no#
defunct League of gatlone, and that conaeqnently It earn up

56.

Eonranl, op. cit.. p. 2S2.

@7.

Ibid., p. 30%.

38.

U. 3. Dept. of State, "Recognition of Syrian and Leba
nese Independence," Wipt. of state Bulletin, XI,
Vaahlngton, p. 313*
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to the Ualted Bationa "to ammime (o#r) respooeibllity aad
to deeid# whether apeolfio mmaaares ahoold be taken to ooo59
tlaae to emaare the eeourlty of the region In queation.*
Bidault Imaletad that a "dlapiAe* did act eziet beteeea JgYemoe and Syria and Lebanon.

Aa eTldenmt, he elted

the apeeeh of Il^Khoorl b#fore the General Aaaembly on 19
Janïiary 1948.

At that time ai*Kho%rl had referred to ecmdl-

tlona la the letant aa a "matter" and not ae a "dispute,"
Bidault stated:
Bothlag has happened elnee then that oould alter
the statua of.j^e question or give it the eharaeter
of a dlapute**9
Saving eoneluded that no "dispute* eziated, Bidault argued
that Article 55 of the Charter #aa lnoperatlT@ in this case
because that article referred to a "diapute" or e "altua41
tlon being brought before the Council by any swmber nation#

39. Security Gounell# official Beeorda: Mrat Tear, first
aeries.':*. I. teeatietk meetiae. p. *9S.
40.

Ibid., p. B9g.

41.

fke Oalted lationa Charter. Article 35.
"i. Any Meaner of ihîe (fnited Nations may bring any
dispete, or aay aituetioa of the nature referred to In
Artlele 2t4# to the attenitioa of the Security Oounell
or of the Gemeral Aeeembly.
2. A state ahlch is not a Kember of the United Ra
tions may bring to the attention of the Security Counoil or of the General Aaeembly any dispute to ehloh It
la a party if it aecepts in advance, for the purposes
of the dispute# the obligations of paoiflo settlement
provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedlage of the General Assembly in reepect
of matters brought to its attention under this Article
#111 be subject to the provlsicws of Articles 11 and 12."

48

E# argued that Artlele 55 *aa Inoperative becauee the
partie* isTolTed, Biaault contended, had not attempteo
aettlemeat through negptlatloaB or other method* prior to
42
auhmlttlag the question to the COQncll,
(Prance had
turaed a deaf ear to the overturea made by Syria acd Leba*
Bon in notes of 26 Peeemher 1945 and 9 Janoary 1948.)
farthermorep Bidault argued that Article 34 (the article
under which the Syrian and lebaaeae goTerament* had aubfflltted

the "dispute" to the Council] was inoperative because

under this article the Counell aaa glTen the right to inveatlgate any "dispute* or any "aituatlon" that might en43
danger morld peace.
The Council had not inreatlgated the
Syrian-Lebaneee queation in

the peat, so Bidault queatloned:

Why, therefore, invoke thla Article (34) no*, if
not because in fact there is no dispute, and bec%uae
the existing eituatlon la Syria and Lebanon cannot in
good faith be considered as likely to endanger inter
national peace and aecurity?**

42"

2*14.. Article 35.
*IT" The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
ehlch is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all,
seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, re
sort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice.
2, The Security Council shall, when it deems neces
sary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute
by such means."

43.

See pase.

44.

Security Gounoil. Official Records; First Tear, First
Serle s.Wo."'I, twentieth meeting, p. ^62.

la.
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The Freaoh delegate** argument that a "dispute* did
not exist la Syria and Lebanon «as b&eed upon hla inter
pretation of Artioles 35, 34, and 35 of the Charter.

Thia

Interprétation, hoaever, wee that of only one meaber of
the Security Counoll,
*83 Bound.

It la questionable whether its logic

The ezlsteaee or non-eziatence of a *dlapute"

cannot be eetabllshed by merely examining certain ertlclea
of the Charter.

The "eubetanoe* or oauee of that condition

gust be studied.

The evidence of all parties involved must

be heard.

The majority of the member* had accepted the

latter procedure in

the nineteenth meeting.

The French position obvlouely was oppoeed to that taken
by the Syrian and Lebaneee delegate*.

The latter had ar

gued that a "diepute" did eilet la the levant at this time.
That "dlepute* #a* eauaed by the maintenance of French ana
Brltiah troop* in the region against the ezpreeaed *111 of
the Syrimn-Lebaneme people*.
that aueh *aa not true.

The French delegate insisted

He argued that there *aa no "dis»

pute;" and, moreover, that French troope «ere not a threat
to world peace beeeuae they had a legal right to be in
Syria and Lebanon.

Ill
Cadogan, representing the United Kingdom In the ab-

50

aeaoe of Bevla, aaaured the Security Couaoll that hla governmeat 3lahed to evaouate British troopa from Syria aad
Lehaaon aa sooa aa posaible.

Be, as did Bidault, ooateaded

that British troopa wefe la the Levant aa * heritage of
Rorld 3ar II.

But, mere Importaat atiil, Cadogaa iaforaed

the members that Brltiah troops were in the Levaat beoauae
they had been requested by the Syriaa-Lebaaese goverameata
la Bay 1945.
To uaderataad Cadogaa'* argumeat, a brief eiaalaatioa
must be made of oondltlo&s in Syria aad Lebaaoa la the
aprlag aad aummer of 1945.
During April aad May 1946, France, represeated by
General Paul-B#yaet, #a* attempting to aegptlate oertaia
treatlea #lth Syria aad Lebanon prior to the turning over
of the "troupea apeolalea*

to the Levant government s aad

prior to the complete evaeuatloa of French troop*. The
treatle* *ere to guarantee to France atrateglc right* in
the form of air fields in Syria and naval bases in Lebanon ;

45.

The "troupes epeclalea" mere Syrian and Lebanese
troops «îiich «ere incorporated into the frenoh army
in that they «ere completely under the jurisdiction
of the freneh eommand. They totaled between 25,000
end 30,000 in July 1945. In contract, there were only
5,000 French troop* in the Levant at the time. But,
because France controlled the ^troupes aplclales,"
she controlled the military strength ot Syria and
Lebanon and could, therefore, dictate policy. The
Kern York Timee, July 8, 1945, p. 6.
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#ooao*lo privileges in the fom of preferential tariffs;
ana cultural advantagea ia that th# Franob languag# *aa to
48
the aompulaory languag# in Levant aohools»
Th# Levantine
4?
states agreed only to th# #trat#gle right# condition.
Durlag the proa#*# of negotiation, the Pr#B#h steamer,
46
Jeanme d'lr#. unload#d 500 S#n#gal### troops at Beirut,
fran## #ont#nd#d that the &#n#gal### *#r# needed replaoememta for fïench troop# la Syria and Lebanon then being
##nt to the Paeifio.

Syria and Lebanon interpreted the

move a# #n attempt to build up Freaeh military strength in
the Levant to eoeree their government# into granting the
special righte France d##lr*d. In retaliation, the Syrian
and Lebanese r#pre$ent#tiv## walked out of the conferenoe.
A chain réaction followed the walkout.

Strikes and

riots, culminating in street fighting in Damascus, Aleppo,
and Bern# enmed.

On Sd l^y 1945, the United States ad

dressed a note to the French government expressing "deep
concern over the French thrwt of fore# to obtain conceesloos of a political, cultural, and military nature" in the
49
Bear last.
Syria and Lebanon appealed to the Sen

46.

Time. XLV, 1945, p. 58.

4? *

Ibid *, p# 38*

40.

Bewsweek. XZV, 1945, p. 61.

49.

The lew York Times, May 29, 1945, p. 1.
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rf&nol*oo Goafer&D** to take aotloa la the "dlapute" bat
##re laformad that the body #a# la a prooe#* of foramtloa
50
aad had no jurladletloa.
Therefore, they appealed to
the Bolted Klagdo* for aeeded Brltlah troop proteotlon,
Brltlah troop# *#re ##Bt Imto the area oa 51 %ay 1945, th#
same day that Chardhlll aeat hi# *##ae# fire" note to de
Oaulle atatlngi
la cyder to avoid a oolllalon heteeen the Brltlah
a*d Preaeh feree# «# regaemt you immediately to order
th# Freneh troop# to ##a*# fire aad #lthdra# to their
harraaka. Oao# firing ha* eeaaed and order haa heea
reatored, «e ahall he prepared to hegln tripartite
talk# hare la Loadoa*5l
Immediately after reeelvlag th# "a#a## fir#" order, de
Gaulle, la an attempt to #av# fa## la the Rear Beat, proposed a foar Power Confarenae of franoe, the Baited Kingdom,
the Soviet Baloa, aad th# Baited Stat## to daal alth all
52
problems In th# Bear Bast.
Th# #oaf#reaoe #as not held
heeaaa* the Baited Stat## aad th# Bait#d Klagdom b#ll#v#d
that th# aattlameat of eoadltloa* la Syria and Labaaon
Shoold b# left up to the poaer# Involved.
franae attempted another method of settlement In the
latter part of Jume 1945. The frenah representative.

50.

Ibid.. *#f 30, 1945, p. 18.

51.

Ibid.. Jaae 1, 1945, p. #.

52.

Iblâ.,

3, 1945, p * S»
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Joaaph p&%l-Boa@our, appeals* to E&«ard 3. Stettlniua,
Ghelrman of the 3%#@utlT# Commltte* at the 8an franclaao
Ooafereaae, to eatabllah a three meabar aooolllatory oom55
mltta* to Investigate aondltlon* Im the lavant.
StettUdaa
refueea on the groon&a that the United Ratlone aaa not
@4
eqnippad to handle ##oh qgeatlona at that time.
The or
ganization *ae la a pro***# of formation, and It would ap»
pear that Stettlnla# «lahed to keep it free from settling
partlonlar lasuea until the proper maehlnery *as eatahUahed.
franee

and the Ualtad Kingdom did reach certain agree-

manta *lth Syria and Lebanon derlag the anmmer of 1945,

On

? July 1945, General Beyaet annonaoad that the "troapea
apdelalea" *oald be teraed over to Syrian and Lebaaeae an55
thorltiea within forty-flTe day#.
Thl# aotloa #aa complated within the atlpalated time limit.

On 25 July 1945,

France and the United Xlngdom agreed, through an agreement
signed by General Paget and General Beynet, that Freneh
6
troop# were to remain la the eoaatal areaa of labanon only.
On Ë8 July 1945, the complete military control of Syria waa
taraed o*#r to the 8yrlan govarnment with the one ezception

53.

Ibid.. June 25, 1*45, p. 10,

54.

Ibid., June 25, 1945, p. 10.

55.

Ibid.. July 8, 1945, p. 6.

56.

Ibid.. July 26, 1945, p. 9.
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S?
that fraaoe retalaed several mlrflelds ia the country,
Hosever the complete evaouatloo of foreign troops had
aot haea oarried out by Deeeaber 1945.

la aa attempt to

reach aa egreem&at aa to evaouatloa aad to provide for *e*
ourlty In the zone uatll th# United BatlGBs oould aot, the
AB&lo-?reaoh igreemeat of 13 Deoeaber 1945 *as eigaed,
Thla *as the agreement to whleh Syria and Lebaaoa objeeted
beeawae no aet tlme-llait for evaegatlon #aa e&tabllshed.
The aembera eere aeara of theae facts at the time that
Cadogaa *as addreeelag the tweatleth meetlog of the Seourlty COBAOll,
Oadogaa eoatlaaad the British eaee *lth the British
laterpretatioa of the Aaglo~Frea*h igreemeat of 15 Deeeaber
1945*

Be argued that it #a* Impoaelble for the British to

elthdra# their troopa aad leave a vaeawm la th* levaat, »h
mhere, he remladed th# Oouaell, th#r# had beea troubled
eoadltloa# aad bad feellag.

After all, Brltlmh troope had

been ealled la for th# preeervatloa of order* aad Gadogaa
felt that theae troopa should be malatalned until the Se*
ourity Comaell oould eatablleh "oolleotlve eeourlty,"
Gadogaa argued that the agreemeat oould la ao may be in
terpreted to mean that Frenoh *ad Brltlah troop* mere to
stay in the Levaat for aa Imdeflalte time,

57.

Ibid,. July 27, 1945, p. 7.

oa the eoatrary.
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statad:
And I repeat, o*r desire la to «Ithdre# at the
aarlleat pe#*ibl* #o**at and ba fr*a of raspoaalblllty to «biôh, by our preseaca la tha Levaat,
are
a%poa#â*G6

IT
Th# t#aatl#th maatlag of tha 8#*urity Gouaeil proTldad a forum for th# actual dlaoeaalon of tha Syrian*
Lebaaeaa question by the four parties imvolvad. Rone of
tha other mambers ezprassa* oplaloa# oa tha question in
thl# maetlag.
Tha ayriaa and &ab#aas* dalegatas# El-Khourl aad
Fraa&la, formally aAvised tha Oouaoll that fraaoh and
Brltlah troop# #are balag malatalaad oa Syrian and Leban
ese soil agaiast tha eiprassad alshas of their governments.
They insisted that the praaaaoa of thaa* foreign troops
«as a definite vlolatioa of their sovereignty,

further

more, Fraagie and Zl»Khourl eonteadad that these foreign
troops oa their soil ooastltuted a "dispute" #hloh might
gravely threaten tha peao#.

They insisted that these

foreign troops be evaeuat#d immediately and oalled upoa
the Couaall to take aotloa.

58,

Besurlty Oounai1. Official Baoordsi first Year, First
È er le s, ao,' I, t# ent i at h maetinr, pT
~
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Bidault and Cadogaa admitted that Freneh and British
troopa gere stationed In Eyrlc ana Lebanon,

nowevar, they

argued that their foroea were In the Levant because of the
heritage of *ar an&la fact, Dlda&lt olBlmed that French
troops had kept the Lavant safe from the horrors of #ar.
Gadogan admitted that British troops had entered with the
Allied foreee In 1941, but he alao pointed out that Brltlah
troopa were la Syria and Lebanoa because their preaenoe had
been requested by the Syrian aad Lebanaae goveraments In
Bay 1945.
B&th Bidault and Cadogan reeognlzed the eoTereignty
and Independeace of Syria and Lebanon, but they appeared to
believe that the preeeaoe of their troops within the Levant
state* was no abridgment of independence.

Bidault eon-

tended that Franoe atlll had certain reaponalbilitlea with
in the area, namely that of providing secwrlty.

Be eiplain-

ed that Ptanee wae charged with this duty until the United
Nations could eatabliah eeourity in the Levant.
accepted the latter arg#m&nt.

Cadogan

Both admitted that the Anglo-

French Agreement of 15 December 1945 had been drawn up for
this interim period until the United Mations could establish
"collective security,"
frangle and Sl~Khourl complained that the Anglo-French
Agreement was a bilateral agreement whloh vitiated their
sovereignty and the Charter. They argued that Syria and

5?

Lebanon «ere able to provide for their own aeourlty.
Prangle eyrlelaed that neither Syria aor Lebeooa #ere
"trust terrltoriea" or *#trate%lo area#," and, foreign
forcee had no legal right In their ooentrle#.
Bidault etated flatly that a "dlapute" did not ezlat.
Be taraed to Artlelaa 33, 34, and 35 of the Charter to
prove his point.

Primarily, he b^#*d the Frenah eaae om

the Interpretation of Article 55, malntalalng that eloee
Syria and Lebanon had refuaed to negotiate there could be
BO "dlepqte."

Cadogan *me Bon*oom*lttal on the question

of whether a "dlapate* did or did not ezlat» but he did
admit that @ troubled eoadltlon eilated la Kay 1945,
Prscgle and Sl-Khourl mlatruated Cadogan*a non-committal
attitude and flatly rejected Bldault*a ineletenoe that a
"dispute" did not ezlat.
frengle and El»Khourl maintained that tb* Security
Council should pettle the "dlepete."
mediate, glmolteneoua mithdrmeal.

They requeated Im

Bidault Implied the

laaue could be settled between the parties through nego
tiations.

Frangie and El-Khourl mlatruated negotiations

because aegotietlona la the past had been unauccesaful.
Cadogan did not commit himself oa a method of settlement.
3e stated that British troops were ready to withdraw, and
further informed the Gouaoll that the prioolple of evacuatioa aes set dosn in the Anglo-freneh Agreement.

52^

In

tSG&tlGtb meetl&g of the Scourity Council ao

actlOD %&8 taken for the settlement of the Syrlaa-Lebaaeaa
question,

the arguments of the four p&rtlsG In

volved BGre heerC.

The ma^berG, therefore, received Infor-

matloa that alght aid la the future settlemeat of a condi*
tioB iB Syria acd Lebanon thick Wrangle and 21-Ehouri
termed & "dispute."
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Cm?T2R 17

THE TW2gTT*?IR8T MEETING

oy THE szcnaiTY coiwcii,

The Seemrity Counoil reassembled after a three hoar
recE#*, mû dlaouesloa of the Syrlaa-Lebaneee queetlon
*as eoDtlBued la

the teeaty-flrat meeting held at Church

House, Weatmlalater, Londoa, on 15 February 1946. The

same repreeeatatlve* *ere present, #lth one ezeeptlon:
Bevln, the permanent delegate from the Baited Kingdom,
1
replmeea Oadogan mho had eat la the teeatleth meeting»

I
Frasgle of lebaaoa opened the dleoueeloa.

He attasked

the paeudo-benevolent attitude of fraBce ae palated by
Bidault In the previous meeting aad eontended that the is
sue did not lie beteeea aa almaye geaermua France and al
ways dlaeoatented Syria aad Lebanon.

In proof, he stated ;

...the reoogaltloa of Syria*# aad lebanoa+a
ladepeadeae* *as not a pure gesture of benevolenoe

1.

Security Council, Official Records; first Year, First
9eriea/Ko. Î. tfenty-firet meetiai. p. S98. '
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but am aet of Jastic® as «ell as being vital for the
«ar effort.*
In axplasatloc, Frangle noted that Syria and Lebanon had
aided the Allies la World War II.

Both of the Levant

State# had placed at the dlapoaal of the Allie# their man#
of ooamunication, their eoonomio and industrial souroes,
3
and their troop*.
Prangie Insisted that eithout thi# aid
(ainoe there #ere only 12,000 British and 3,000 frenoh
troop# in the area in 1941), the Allied oampaign in the
4

Rear East mould have loat it# effeotiveae##.

Se oonelmded

that Syria and Lebanon had #ho»n that they mere eapable of
defending themaelTe# and, oerteialy to a great extent, had
earned their independenoe,
Prangie again refuted the heritage of nar argument
ttsed

pretioasly by Cadogan and Bidault.

Hostilities had

ended, and he insisted that Freneh and British troop# must
be evacuated.

Xvaouation preaented no baaic problem#.

The

Lebaaeae delegate oalatained that all the Pïenoh and British
had to do eas withdraw. These troop# had no legal right to
provide for Syrian and Lebame#e #eourity.

frangle insisted

that as sovereign and independent states, Lebanon and Syria
«ere reaponaible for their

o«n aeeurity, and foreign troop#

had no legal or moral right to usurp this responsibility.

2.

Ibid., p.

5.

Ibid., p. 29*.

4.

Ibid., p. 296.

296.
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fraagle oallea upon tbe Security Council to mettle th*
qaeetloa:
The Lebaneae delegation, a* «ell aa the Syrian
delegation, la prepared to eonalder a eolgtlon which,
on the baala of tke fundamentel prlnelplea of the Char
ter, eoBld provide for the almnltaneona *lthdra*al of
freneh a6d Brltlah troop# atatloned in Syria and Leba
non in full reeognitlon of the aoverelgn rights of
theae Stataa».#*
8ueh avaouation, he explained, ahould not only be aimultan#o%a But nnaondltlonal.

Re aaked that th# «Ithdraeal be

anbjeot only "to the tl#e required for making the neoeasary

©
teehnleal and material arrangementa."
would aoeept no other aondltlona.

Syria and Lebanon

Frangie then aeked that

the gueation be settled under the continued auepioes of the
Council until the eithdraaal had been carried out in full.

II
The repreaeatative of the United States, Br. Edaard R»
f
Stettinlua, spoke for the firat time on the Syrien-Lebaneaa

6*

Xbid.» * p « wOO •

6,

Ibid*, p. 500.

?.

Edward B* Stettiniua, Jr., was born on 22 October 1900.
Re waa educated *& Pcmfret school and at the Onlveralty
of Virginia. Be ha* l#ng been connected with govern
ment affairs in t&e United States. In 1944-1945,
Stettinlua waa Secretary of State. Be hae been chair
man of the united States delegation to the General Aaaembly alnoe 1945 and la the American representative
on the Security Council.
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question la this meeting.

Sttttinlas believe# that the

t»€stion of évacuation of French and British troops should
tome under Article 33 of the Charter.

Slnee negotiations

had not been ezhaueted by the parties Involved, he suggeeted that they farther eontlnne negotiation* among themeelvea,

Ontll a aettlement *a* reeehed, the gueetlon ehould

be of coatletting concern to the Council.
In omtllnlng general United State* policy In awch mat
ter*, Stettlnla* Informed the Council that hie government
supported and encouraged the removal of Allied troop* from
member nation* #hen thoee member nation* so requested.
stated:

Be

In ©o

In conformity with this general policy, I wish
to ezprea* the hope of the United State* Government
that the desire* of the Syrian and Lebanese Govern
ment* that the foreign troops in their territory
should depart at the earliest practicable moment
shall be met by mean* of e mutually satisfactory
agreement to that effect.*
Thus Stettlnlu* committed the United State* government.
The United States not only deelred the evacuation of ingloPrench troop* from Syria and Lebanon, but auch evacuation
ehould take place at the earliest practicable moment.
Stettlni** did not define "practicable moment."
this to the parties Involved.

8. Ibid., p. 301.

He left

83

III
?y«hlD#ky rebutted Bidault*e argument on t*o major
premieea.

He claimed that the plaolng of any ooadltlone

OB the oomplete eTaouatioa of Aaglo-freneh troops from
Syria and Lebanon #as contrary to the Charter, and he ooatended that franee had no right to special privileges in
Syria and Lebanon.
Tyshinsky again referred to the French note of General

»

Beynet to Syria aod Lebanon of 18 May 1945*

Be informed

the Gooneil that the note had demanded certain cultural,
strategic, and economic privileges before france would
give %p the "troapes spéciales *

to Syria and Lebanon.

He implied that, because Bidault #as uneillli% to commit
himself on certain conditions to be settled before the evecuatlon, France still was attempting to get the same privi
leges as those la Nay 1945,

Tyshinsky called upon Bidault

to etate epeeifically ehat conditions sere to be f^&fllled
before the removal of troops could be realized.

The Soviet

delegate cautioned the Council that conditions of the na
ture impoeed upon Syria and Lebanon by france in 1945 sere

9. la a letter of 29 January 1951 to the author, the French
Embassy stated that the note *as not made public.
10. See page
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imeompatlble *lth Artlol* E of th# GharteT.
Vyahlnaky atated that

Soviet UmloD could not ao-

oapt the premlB* that Ffaaoe ma* entitled to special privi
leges la th* Levant. He alleged that the halted Kingdom
did aoeept freneh special privileges la the Levant (the
Lyttelton-.de Oaulle Agreement of 7 lagnst 1941 had stlpa-

11
lated saoh.)

As proof# he quoted from a ^eeoh made by

de Gaulle In the Consultative Assembly of franee la June
1945:
On# might say that the Interest s of our t#o ns'»
tlons (France and the United Kingdom) and the Inter*
eats of Arab 3tates Imply the aeoesslty for franoe
and England to adopt a eommon position and to porsae
a oommon pollay, as se have suggested a good number
of tlmms.l*
The Anglo*frensb Troop Agreement of 15 Dso«sber 1945 did
provide for mutual ewpport aad oonsaltatlon betseen franee
13
and the United Kingdom on all Near Eastern problems.
Farthenmore, neither France nor the United Elagdom sas to
Interfere *lth the other's established laterests la that
14
area,
Tyshlnsky soasladed that the latter statemeat
could only refer to eertala special laterests.

11.

See

12.

Security Coaaoll. Offloial Records: First Ygar, first
Èerles. Bo* Ï, twenty-first meeting, p. 305.

13.

See appendix, pà&c. JSl.

14. Ibid..

3V.
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VyshlB*ky*B el&lm *@a not unfoundea.

Churchill, In

reporting before the House of Common# In 1945 on the Yalta
Confereoce, mtated that the Dnlted Kl%6om "nould never
#eek to enpplant French Inflmenee by British Influenoe in
15
the Levant State*."
It was Indisputable that the United
Kingdom at the time

of Yalta favored a privileged poai16
tlon for france In Syria and Lebanon.
Opposing the

British position at Yalta were the United State* and the
Soviet Union *iio insisted that there mere to be "no ane*
17
clal pomitlona for any foreign eountrle* "
in the Levant.
Vyahlnaky had such statements in mind when dlsouaaing
French special privileges before the Gonncil.
The Soviet delegate continued to attack the AngloFrench Troop Agreement on legal grounds.

Be stated that

it *a# a violation of the principles of sovereignty laid
dosn in Article B of the Charter bee*use the agreement #a#
signed withoet the consent of Syria and Lebanon.

Further-

more, Tyshinaky attacked the agreement because It contained
no set method for evacuation,

le argued that the agreement

contai&ed nothing but "algebraic formulae, and abstract

15.

The Re# York Times, March 5, 1945, p. 10.

16.

Ibid.. March 5, 1945, p. 18.

17.

Ibid., March 5, 1945, p. 18.
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18
proml#ee, mltbomt any real basla of reality,"
feand It totally uomorkahle,

end he

laatly, Vyahlnaky iaalatad

that "oolleotlve aaourlty" me* a matter which aonoarned
Syria and lebanon alone because the Dolteo Hatlona had not
acted.

He maintained that France and the United Kingdom

had no legal right to l*po*e aecurlty on a sovereign state,
and he coneluded:
fros the point of vie* of the elementary prin
ciples of international la*, this Agreement is sim
ply Illegal, simply unfair in regard to the sover*
elgnty of Syria and Lebanon,..19
Tyahlnsky mentioned nothing abont the principle of
evacuation that actually was embodied In the Anglo-French
jlgreement.

He did not attack It# "substance."

ge could

not because the principle of evacuation was stated,
Tyshlnsky was correct In maintalnlog that no method of
withdrawal was established*

He was correct in *Bintainlng

that the agreement abridged the sovereignty of Syria and
Lebanon»

After all, the agreement wae signed by France and

the Fnlted Kingdom without the consent or without the par
ticipation of the levantine states.
Tyshlnaky admitted the need for French and British

18,

Security Counoll, Official Record; first Tear, first
3erles. No. I. twenty-first meetiAg, p, 305.

19. Ibid., p. @05.
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troops in the Levant durlag World %ar II, bcoauae thoae
troops #er@ providing "oolleotlve security* for the Levant
durlag the #ar period. However, he malatalned that there
DO longer %as a need for forel&a troops in the area* aaa
that actually freach troops gere creating "collective lageourlty" because they *ere being atatloned against the e%presaed ^111 of the Syrian and lebaaea* peoplea.

Re re»

ferred to the etrlkes and riots of May 1945 as an example
of "oolleetlve Ineecurlty," and insisted that much condltlone did Goaatltute a "dispute."

Because of these clrca*^

etencea, the Soviet delegate Informed the membere thst the
Syrian-Lebanese appeal for evacuation of troops *a* a "de20
mand" and not a "requeet*"
He Inelated that the Council
could not stand by as a epeetator in thl* "dispute,* and
called upon It for Immediate action to bring about settles
ment*

vymhlneky concluded:

The only decision worthy of our Organization la
to satisfy the demand of the Syrian and Lebanese Governaents, which the Soviet delegation hereby fully
supports in the name of the Soviet Government.

IT
la speaking for Chine, loo insisted that the malnten-

20.

Ibid,, p. 309.

21.

Ibid., p. 30@.
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aace of foreign troops im the territory of a friendly
eoverel&B state, elthout the ezpre** oomeeat of that state,
«a® a prima facie case of limitation of that state's sorerelgaty.

He polated out that this *ae happeaiag la Syria

aaâ Lebanoa aad stated:
22
as sooa as possible»*

"Such troops should be eithdraea

Koo suggested aegotlatioas beteeea the fomr parties
iavolved as a method of settlemeat. Be eiplalaed that
these aegotiatloas oaght to be ooaoeraed only with the praotieal arrangements aeeessary for withdrawal, iaeludiag the
flzlag of a period for the begiaalag sad oompletloa of the
evae%iatioa.

tJotil the evaoaatioa «as eompleted, the Chinese

delegate believed that the 5#eurity Ooaooll should be tept
laformed of the progress of the aegotlatloas betmeen the
parties.
At this point, the presldeat briefly summarized the
causes of the Syriaa-Lebaaese question. He stated that
although troops had beea statioaed la the Levaat ia the
past for a definite purpose, that purpose was ao# aeoompushed, aad Syria aad Lebanoa had requested that these
troops be eveeuatea.

Be oautloaed the members that these

troops mere ao# statioaed oa the territories of tio member
aatloas agaiast the #111 of those member cations, aad that

Ibia.. p. 309.

69

therefor* the guestioa «a* of a different nature than thet
25
of the three prevloua easee before the Couaell.
The
president euggeated the folloeing plan for eveooatlon:
..*lt would be sufflcieat if the Couaeil took
note of the etetementa of the partiee and invited
them to eoBtinne aegotletlone *ith a Tie* to reaohiag an agreed aolutloa of thie problem epeedlly.
The résulta of the aegotiatloaa mhould be reported
to th* Cooneil, and if they are not aatiaf otorily
eoneluded aithin a reesonable time* the Coonoil can
thea eoneldar #hat further aetioa it might aleh to
take.*4
No aotloB aae taken oa the preeldeat** proposal.

?

Biaz of Egypt ineieted that the Syrian and Lebanese
reqaeata for troop aithdraaal #ae abaolutely legal.

He

pointed oat that the reqaeet #aa foaaded oa the beaio
premlee upon ahich the United Katioaa had been eatabllehed,
that of the aovereiga eqaality of aatioaa. Be etatedi
If ageh a elear and eell eatabllehed prlaoiple
le put Into doubt ...it eoald be better for ua to
disband this Organiaatloa and leave to the five
great foeere the right to do what they thlak fit for

23.

la the Iraaian qaeatloa foreign troops mere atationed
la Iran uader legal tresty arraagamenta. In the Greek
and ladoneaiaa queetloas, foreign troops «ere atation
ed upon Greek and Indoaealan territory with the eonaeat of those t$o governmenta.

24.

^oarlty Counell, Official Reeorde; first Tear, First
Series, Ko. 1, tienty-fIrat meeting, p. ^11.
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25
the malDtenaDee of peace end proBperlty.
Although Wlaz coasldered that the Syrian and lebanese akdma
were based upon legpl groundc, the égyptien dele&ate deemed
the franeh olalm to be baaed upon mere political, moral,
hlatorleal, and opportunlatlo grounds.

Be eteted:

"...the

freneh argument does not reat on any legal baala; It la no
more based on the text of tiie Charter than on recognized prln2*
olples of International la#.*
Rlez* Interpretation *as eorrect. Syria mad Lebanon
were no longer "mandate*" or "truata."

The levant dele

gates algned the Charter and #ere aooected Into the family
27
of sovereign nation* at San ffanolaoo,
franee, however,
atlll considered the mandate to be In de jure effect beo&use she had not turned It over to an International or
ganization.

This position *aa not accepted by the other

natlona» nor «ea It valid fro* a legal standpoint.
Hlaz questioned the right of franoe and the United
Kingdom to provide for aeaurlty In Syria and Lebanon.

Re

maintained that, accordlag to Article 43 of the Charter,
28

Syria and Lebanon were responsible for their oi-m security.

25.

Ibid*, p. 311.

2Ô.

Ibid., p. 311.

27.

See page -54.

28.

See page 3?,

?1

Be Informed the Couaoll that mgreemeote made bet#e#D meabers
for protection under Article 43 *ere to be aegotlated "on
29
the Initiative of the Seoorlty Council."
The Anglo-French
Agreement of 1& Deoember 1945 had not been negotiated on the
inltlstlve of the Council.

Therefore Prenoe and the United

Kingdom, aooordlng to Blmz, were usurping the right* and
dutlee of Syria end lebanoo as *ell as thoee of the Security
Council.
Blaz aeoepted Koo'e anggeatlon for settlement.

The

Egyptian delegate aeaerted that negotiation# should be
started Immediately bet#een the four parties to the "dispute."
Ee too believed that negotiation* ahomld deal only *ltb the
dlacuaalon of the ways and means Beoeasary to bring about
troop "withdrawal from Lebaaon and Syria aa gulekly aa poe30

Bible."
31
Mr. Zygmunt Modaelevakl

of Folaod spoke for the first

29.

8ea page 39.

30.

Security Counell Officiel Beoorda, First Year., First
series, te, I, teenty-firat meeting, p. Z1È.

31.

Zygmunt Modzeleeekl, Polish statesman and diplomat, eaa
twrn In 1900, He *as adueated at the School of Politi
cal Science In Paris. After serving as an officer In
the rollah Army In %orld War II, he beeame Ambassador
to the Soviet Union In 1945. Ee also served aa Polish
Dnder-Seeretary of State and Minister of Foreign Af
fairs In 1945. In 1946, Modzelewakl *a* W&e Polish
repreaentatlve on the Security Council and one of the
Members of the Polish delegation to the Geaeral Assembly.
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time on the Syrlaa-Lebanese qwcstloa,

After welcomlag

Syria and Lebanon to the family of Independeat states, he
Informed the Gouaoll that It should settle the legally
juetlfled claims preseated by the Levantine aationa,

Ee

stated:
...the Polish deleratloa *111 not heeltate to
vote in support of the solution asked for by the
delegations of Syria end Lebaaoa,a6vea if my delegation should be In the minority..
Therefore, the Polish delegate aaaepted the elala of the
Levant states.

Furthermore, Modzelewski asserted that the

founeil should take aetlon to rid those two countries of
freneh and British troops.
Be Freltas-Talle of Brazil, in azplalnlng that foreign
troops should be kept In a member nation only by virtue of
agreement *lth that nation In which troops mere atatloned,
aceepted the Stettinlus philosophy expressed earlier In
this meeting.

The Brazilian delegate agreed with the other

members of the Council «ho proposed negotiations between
France, the United Kingdom, Syria and Lebanon,

32,

Security Council, Offlolal Records, First Tear, First
ëerles, No.'''Ï» t*enly-firet meting, p." 3l4'.
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VI
Bidault, iB &Ba«er to Tymhlaaky+a pravloua queatlona,
did DOt aiplala #bat apaalfle laauee freoo# alàbed to ne
gotiate prior to evaeuatloB.

Be did laform the CouBcll,

homaver, that la J%Be 1945 d* Qaull* had propoaed a five
po*#r oonfereoce to examlae the «hole Bear Baatarn altwatioa.

The Graat fo*er@ bad not aecaptad the Invitation.

Purthermora, Prane* had requaetad that the 8an Franalaoo
Confaraaoa aat up a aommlaaloa of aaqalry to atudy oondl34
tloaa In Syria and Labaaon In Juae 1945,
Thla aotlon,
too, had aot baas aooaptad.

Tharafora, Bidault maintained

that hla govarnmeat had attamptad to uaaovar the faota In
the oaaa,

Slaae no actloa *aa taken prevloualy, the French

delegate mainteInad:
*,.lf the proble* la studied with the necaaeary
Impartiality, it %111 be fouBd that there la noddlapute likely to andaagar paaca or, therefore, to juatlfy any apaolal action on the part cf the Security
Oooacll*"
Sine* there aaa no "dlapate," Bidault propoaed that the se
curity Council ahould rely upon the French government, to-

33.

See page 52.

34.

See page

55*

Security Coiwoll, Official Records; Flrat Year, First
Siriei, lo. "1.' tmenty-flret mèeting* p.'

gather *lth the British goverameat In agreement *lt& Syria
amd lebanon, to reach a satisfactory aolutloa of the aifflQultleB 3ubmltte& to the Couooll.
Bidault *38 Gorreet la assertlag that PraDee had at
tempted on the tao ocoaaioas eeatloaed to have the problem
lovestlgated.

Both times froBoe

BAD

beea turoed do*D.

Homever, Franoe %aa never reedy to evacuate without Impoelag certain ooadltloa* oa Syria end Lebeaàa.

For thle rem*

eoa, Syria mad Lebeaoa had, aa a lest resort, gybmltted
*hat they termed a "dlepute" to the security Coucoll,
Yaa Eleffeae of The Retherland* *ee the laet to speak
on the Syrlaa-Lebaaeee queetloa la the taeaty-flrst meeting.
He partially upheld the Freaoh poeltloa by Implylag that
Freaee mould %lthdra* her troope at the earliest poaelble
time.

He e&id that troop* etlll «ere atatloaed la many

oouBtrlee ae a result of the #er.
be remedied overalght,

suah oondltloDe oouia not

Tet The Netherlaada delegate admit

ted that the atatlonlag of troops on the territory of a
eoTereiga etate without the eooeeat of that state esa a
breech of that etate*s eoverelgaty,

For thl* reaeoa he *ae

eare that Praaee mould *lthdr** her troop*.

Bovever, If

withdrawal of foreign troop* oould aot be erraaged betveea
the p&rtlee Involved, van Eleffene suggeated th&t the Se
curity Couacll thea take ectloa uader Article 34 of the
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Charter*

He #uhmltte4 the folloeing motion for eettlemeat

of the Syrlan-Lebaaege diapute:
I therefore believe that the Couaeil ahoald take
note of the atatemeate ma&e by the foar State*; e%preae Ita ooafl&enoe that, a# a result of negotla*
tioB* or otherelae* the foreign troope la Syria eod
Lebaaoa *111 be elthdraen at ao distant date; reqmeat the partie# to Inform the Council mhen thle ha#
been done, la order that the Gouaell may at any tlm#
revert to the ^»#tlon; and pe#e on to the next Item
on the agenda.™
The van Kleffene motion *a# the first formal proposal for
#ettlemeat of the Syrlan-lebaneee dlapete.

It euggeated

that the four partie# to th# "diepate* nettle that "dlepnte"
through negotiation# among themaelvee.

These negotiation#

mere to deal with the evaouatlon of foreign troope.

The

Connoll ees to be informed «hen evacuation «aa completed
eith the etipulation that the Connoll oonld at any time re
vert to dlaeusalon of the queetion.

VII
Th# t«enty-firat meeting of the Seeurlty Council pro
vided for further dleouaeion of the Byrian-Lebaneae queation
that tended to uav#ll t«o baaio difference# of opinion

58.

See page /3.

37.

Seeurity Gounoil, Official Record#; Plrat Tear, first
Seriea.'Wo. I. tienty-flrat meeting, p. 91?. '
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#ithlD the Couaoil.

frangle aod Yyahloeky atlll malBtalaed

that a "dlapate* did e%l#t,
pute" did not ezist.

Bidault Insisted that a "dis

The other members of the Gounoll were

non-eommittal; but they agreed that the malateaenoe of
troops apOD the territory of a sovereign state *lthout the
eonsemt of that state ##s eontrary to the Charter and to
international la# and that much troops mhowld be eTaouated
ae soon as possible.
From this point there eae diaagreement apon the manner
in #hioh the frenoh and British troop* should be reaoved
from Syria and Lebanon,

frangie, basked by Tyehlnsky and

Modeelemaki, insisted that the Security Council should pre
scribe the manner of evacuation and that such évacuation
should be simultaneous and immediate*

Stettinius, &oo,

Makin, Riaz, de Freitas-Valle, Bidault» and van Kleffens
#ere of the opinion that the four parties should settle
the question themselves through negotietions.

Van Eleffens

submitted a motion to that effect that the parties involved
negotiate or employ some

other means of settlement to bring

about the evacuation of French and

British troops from

Syria and Lebanon and notify the Council *ben this action
mas accomplished.

Bntll such settlement, the Council could

revert to the question at any time.
No vote *as taken on the van Kleffens motion in the
twenty^first meeting\^

However, the first definite plan of

77

eettleaeat for the Syrlea-Lebaneee qaeatlon *&3 put before
the Couneil--the Impllcetloa belag that th* Couaoll later
*oul& take action, perhaps uaaer the Yaa KleffeBs motion
or perhape In some other way, to brlag about the avaquatlon
of freaeb ana Brltlah troop* from Syria eod lebeaoa.
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C&àPTEE 7

«mz TWERTT-SECOim mSTIRG
OF THE smmiTT comciL

Th# Seeurlty Comneil resuaeâ the dlseussloo of the
SyrlaB-Lebanese qaestlon the next mornlDg* 16 February
194#, at its twnty-aeooBd meeting.
tl?es *#re preeent*

The a erne repreeenta-

After the Syrlaa-Lebanese delegetea

took their seats at the Couneil table, discussion was
1
opened by Padllla Rervo of B&ileo.

I
Paiilla Rerfo stated that the Mexican governaient could
"never approve the preaenoe of foreign troops in the terri
tory of a sovereign State without the free and express con-

1.

Luis Padllla Servo, Mesioan poet-diplomat, was born
ès 19 Âugttst 1898, He has represented hie eouotry
in Mezloaa embaaaiea and legations In five European
countries and in e l # t weatern hemisphere nations,
Fadilla Nervo haa also represented Mexico in the
United Kations, and was the Mexican delegate to the
Security Council in 1946, The lexiean diplomat wrltea
poetry in hie spare time—«modern stuff with s philo
sophical flavor."
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2
Beat of its legitimate government."

Therefore, be salâ

that the Anglo-frenoh Agreement of 13 Deeember 1945 was 11legal beoBuae it provided for French troop regroupaent la
3
Lebanon elthout the consent of Lebanon*
Padllla Rervo
aleo qmeetioned the ground on «hioh franee and the United
Kingdom took It upon themeelvea to eetablleh eecurity in
the Levant.
eil.

Thia «aa a job delegated to the ijiecurlty Coun-

He contended that the obllgationa of rrance and the

United Kingdom to the United Nations (the reapect of eover^
elgoty of member nation# under Article Z) should prevail
over the obligetlone of the two countries to each other un
der the Aagjo-French Agreement,

The Anglo-french Agreement
4
Has thus a violation of Article 105 of the Charter.
Padllla Nervo submitted the following motion for the
settlement of the "dispute."
1. That the claim of the Syrian and Lebanese
Government a to the effect that the British and French
troope should be mithdramn eimultaneouely and at the
earliest possible date is justified.

Ê,

SeouritT Council. Official Becords: First Tear* Ftrst
Series, ko.'f, "i#ent?-8@@oad meeting, p. 3lé.

8.

See appendix, page 152.

4.

The Charter of the United Rations, Article 103.
'^In the" eveni of a"eonfitct betweea the obligations of
the Members of the United Nat ions under the present
Charter and their obligations under mj other interna
tional agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail."
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8. That the date for the cYaouatlon of cucb
troops should be fixed by aegotiatioos between the
parties In thla case, It being understood that suoh
negotiations will be oonoerned exclusively with the
mlllt&ry-teohnloal arrangements necessary for the
adequate evmouatloa of such troope.
3, To request thm parties to Inform the Counoll mhen thi& 1@ done.^
The motion of the Mexican delegate required the partlee to
the "dlapute" to aegptlate.

In this respect. It agreed

?ith the Tan Kieffens motion of

the laat meeting.

Bo*sver,

Padllla Keryo's motion differed In one important rempeot,
Negotiations were to be limited to those of a "mllltaryteohnloal" variety.

There oould b# no doubt that euoh nego

tiations #er# not to deal *lth the "mubetanoe" of the ques»
tlon.

Van Kleffene* motion did not speolfy th# nature of

negotiation*.

II
Frangie of Lebanon Interrupted before a vote eould be
taken on Padllla Kervo*a motion.

The Lebanon delegate

stated that actually all the members vera in agreement In
principle that foreign trocps should be evacuated from Syria

5.

Securl ty Coupoll» Official Records, first Tear# First
Series, No. I, twenty-secohd ree'tïÊk»" p">'
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and Labaaoa,
6
Agreement.)

(France had stated aa maoh In the Anglo-French
Furthermore* the eoneenaue «as that evacuation

procedures should be eatabllahed through negotlatioae be*
tmeen the partlee lawlTed.

Frangle laalated that $uch ae-

gotlationa should deal only with the "fizin* of a timelimit for oarrylag out withdrawal.*

Although he preferred

that the Council set thla time limit, he did state that Leba
non would bow to the Council's decision if the Council
ruled that the time-limit was to be determined through nego
tiation by the four partiea to the "dispate."
Frangie preferred to trust the Security Council rather
than the proposed negotlatione.

For this reason be called

upon the Security Council to #et a time-limit to which France
and the United Kingdom were to conform.

On similar grounds,

Frangie objectmd to the motion submitted by van Kleffene.
He mistrusted the nature of the negotiations that France
would envisage under the motion,

frangie maintained that

negotiations regarding evaouation should be oompletely inde
pendent of any other agreement between lebanon and France.
21*Bhourl of Syria accepted Prangle's agreement, but
with one radical eioeptlon.

Zl-Khourl flatly stated that

6.

See appendix, pa^e 152.

?.

Security Council, Official Records ; First Year, First
Series, No. ' I. twenty^second meetIn'g»""p." %2'U.
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there *as so n@ea for De&otlatloma,

Be laslated that yreao*

and the United %la?&oa need merely *lthdra* their foroea.
He Informed the Council that after all such 93s the nolloy
In the United Kingdom abere Aaerlean forces vera evaouetlng.
No negotiation ?ae aeceasary.

Bavin Interrupted to point

out thet the United States and the United Kln^doe did have
8
"to negotiate on the bride*."

After the interruption, 31-

Khourl Gonoluded his case for no negotletlon by stating:
I deolare aolemnly here, in th@ name of my Oovernaent, that we shall raise no objeetiona to avaauatlon.
%e shall lapoae no oondltiona as to foraallties. %e
shall not say anything. Let them evaouate without asking U8, without negotiating *lth ua, because for ua
there la no question of opposing a prinelple tbw applloatlon of *hloh *e are emphatioslly demasdln#.*

Ill
At this point Biaz of 3gypt proposed the third motion
for settlement of the Syrian-Lebanese dispute:
After having heard the statements by the represeatativee of Lebanon, Syria, Prance ani the United
Kingdoa, and after having ezohanged views on the ease
#hioh Is suMltted to it,
The Seearity Oounoil,
Considering that the preaence of British and
French troops on Lebanese and Syrian territory is

8#

Ibid., p. 322

9.

Ibid., p. 322
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Incompatible mith the priaclpl# cf the Boverelga
equality of all Kember* laid do#n la the Charter;
Believing that this principle, the validity of
*hlGh is fully recognized by all the parties oonoerned, ahould receive Its full application by the
Immediate and simultaneous «Ithdrawal of all Brltldi
and FreBch troops still In the territories referred
to;
Eeeommemds to the Brltiah and /reach Government a
on the one hand, and Lebanese and Syrian Government#
OD the other band, to eater lato negotiations as soon
as possible with a vie# to establishing exclusively
the technical details of the said «ith&ramel, includ
ing the filing of the date of Its completion, and re
quests the& to keep the Council Informed of the re
sult of these negotiation*,
The Rlaz motion #aa similar to the van Kleffens and
fadllla Hervo motions In that it, too, provided for negotlatlona bet#een the four parties.

Ho*ever, the Hlaz mo-

tlon contained certain fumdameatal differences.

Negotia

tions were to be exclusively for arranging the technical
details of #lthdra#ml.

Padllla jiervo had stated the same,

but van Kleffens had merely mentlomec negotiations or other
means.

Hlaz' motion provided for Immediate and simultaneous

evacuation,

fadlll* Kervo made so mention of immediate

#ithdra#al, and van Kleffens made no mention of simultaneous
withdrawal.

Although the other t#o motions requested that

the negotiating parties Inform the Council #hen negotiations
had been completed, Rlaz* motion Implied that the parties

10.

Ibid., pp. 583-224
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to keep the Counoll Informed of tlm progress of negotiatioas.

Under theme olroimstanoee, the Council could

play a more active role.

Both Rlaz and Pad ilia îîervo pro

vided that the negotiations fix a time limit for evacuation.
Van Kleffeag did not.

Finally* Biaz* motion atated that

the maintenanee of foreign troops upon the territories of
member atete® without their eoasent was ino ompatible with
the prlaelple of sovereign equality.

Neither of the other

two motions had made this atatement, although fadllla Nervo
had atated that the elaim for *ithdra*al *a® just.
Before dlaouseion of the Rlaz motion, Bidault anawered
the questions put to him in the taenty-flrat meeting by
Vyahlnsky.

Bidault pointed out that naturally France had

special Interests In the Levant since she had been given
certain responsibilities there under the mandate.

The man

date had charged France with the protection of her mandate
peoples, and Bidault stressed that point. He explained
that French interests were cultural end strategic.

Bidault

mentioned the letter of 4 February 1946 from Syria and Leba
non as en example of a cultural interest*
been written in French.

The letter had

Bidault admitted that such cultural

rights should be protected by cultural methods but he
explained:
I could wish only that the voice of Intellect
could be heard and that, in particular, our French
schools in Syria were not at present the object of

85

digerimlnatory memaureG #hlcb ere not In keeping
11
*lth the status of the other schools in that country.
The French eomplaint of dlscriffllnation failed to point out
that such dlacrlmlaatlon ®as part of a desperate policy to
get French troops to eveouate.
Bidault continued, turning to the question of strategic interests.

He stated that the problem *as not that of

dealing with a state that had been Independent and a member
of the League, but a problem involving the question of a
mandated territory.

France had been responsible for seouri-

ty in the region umder the mandate.

To aid in this task,

France had recruited the "troupes spéciales".

These

troops had since been returned to Syria's and Lebanon's
Jurisdiction in the fall of 1046.

However, Bidault eon*

tended that French troops could not just *ithdra* and leave
a vacuum in the area.

"In order to fill this gap, the

Agreement of 13 December 1946 proposed a system of collee13
tive security*"
Bidault coneluded.
The French argument was logical as well as legal only
so long es the mandate was in existence.

In fact, the

French argument was logical during the war after the actual

11,

Ibid., p. 524.

IE,

See page

13.

Security Council, Official Records; first Year, First
Series, No. I,, twenty-second meeting', p. 525.

50,

footnote

45.
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grant of Indepeadence,

Bat after the Levantine natlona

signed the Charter at San Francisco and mere recognized as
eoverelgn, independent oationa, elth the etlpulatlon that
neither «as a *tramt" territory under irtlele 78 of the
Charter» there can be no doubt that France eae no longer
charged elth the protection of #hat eae no* a defunct
14
aandate.
18 enewr to the Rlat argument of the prevloua meeting,
Bidault Iwkleted that Article 43 of the Charter did not in
any #ay Invalidate the term# of the Anglo-frencb Troop
Agreement,

Blisult ^maintained that according to paragraph
15
E in Article 43,
much agreements should govern the number
and types of force*, their degree of readiness and general
location and the nature of the facilitiea aM aaeletance
to be provided.

He maintained that the Anglo-French Agree

ment did juet this.

Then, too, the agreement provided for

the principle of evacuation.

Furthermore, that agreement

provided for the transfer of the responsibility for the
amintenance of security in Syria and Lebanon to some organ
of the United Ration*.

Before this transfer could become

effective, Bidault explained that negotiation* eere neceaeary

14.

Rorman Benteich and Andre# Martin, A Commentary on the
Charter of the United Mations, lev tork# 165Ù,p. l§ll
ÎÀlso' aee page" 39footnote' 19.)

15.

See page 39, footnote 20.
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betmeen the parties lovolved. Se

no# ahookeA that

Byrla and Lebanon desired no negotiations.

Re stated:

Either there is a dispute, In *hloh ease me are
required under Article 33 of the Charter to negotiate
*lth a Tie* to seeking a solution of the dispute; or
else, if there are no negotlatloae and there is a re
fusal to negotiate, the assumption muet be that there
is no dispute.,.**
The paradox in the whole affair #as that Bidault de*
sired negotiations while M-Khourl did not.
Bidault*s eonelusion *as a «eak one.

Ho#ever, Bi

The faet that Syria

and Lebanon did not *lsh to negotiate with franoe did not
necessarily negate the existence of a ^dispute,"

Bidault

failed to state that Syria and Lebanon had tried to nego
tiate in May 1945.

The Levant nations se« refused further

negotiations only beeause Franee attempted to make the
evacuation of troops dependent upon other negotiations
tihleh were to grant her preferential treatment in the Le
vant.

Furthermore, merely because Bidault aooepted the

prinoiple of

evacuation as stipulated in the Anglo-French

Agreement did not necessarily mean that the negotiations he
wished #ere not of the same nature as those of May 1945.
The neea for any type of negotiations became very question
able.

Syria and Lebanon were independent.

France had no

legal right to maintain troops «ithin their territories or

1$.

Security Council, Official Records ; Fir at Tear, First
iSeries. BO. I, tWnty»secocA'
p. 326.
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to demaaa special prlTlleges ualess Syria and Lebanon so
Seslîei.

IT
Rlmt of Egypt 61ep%t#d Bidault'* Interpretation of

1?
paragraph 2, Artlola 43, af the Oharter.

It aae thle

aeotlon upon *bloh Bidault baaed frenoh military regroupmeat la Lebanon.

BldaBlt Interpreted the paragraph to re

fer to the forces of any atate.
atated:

Rlaz, on t&a other hand,

"...thla paragraph deala alth the forcee of the

38
country concerned and not with the farces of another State."
Tha baale for the Egyptian Interpretation aaa paragraph 1,
19
of Article 40.
Under paragraph 1, all mmbere of the
Halted Rations were to «ake available to the Security Connoil upon It# call or through necessary agraemnta forces
for maintaining International peace and security.

Rlaz in-

alated that thla paragraph referred "to the territory and
the armed force* ef the State conearneà, and not to the
go
forces of a foreign country."

17.

See page 39, footnote 20.

18.

Seoarity gouncdLl» Official Records ; First Tear, First
Em lea. Mo. 1. t#enty«"aecond àeetlng, p. 327.

19.

See page 39, footnote 20.

20.

Securl ty Council, Official Reoox^ai Fir at Tear, first
Seriem, #0.'
twenty-aecond meeting, p. 5^^.' '
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There is little Aoubt thet the Riez' laterpretatlon of
Article 45 eae more oorreot than that of Bidault.

Rlaz

might further have mentlooed that aooordlng to paragraph 3
of that artiele, the Security Couaoll muat iaitlate auoh

21
agreeaente beteeea the member*.

Soeever, both Elaz and

Bidault might be aeeueed of mielaterpretation of Article 43;
for, under that ^tlele action ie to be taken ehen there are
threat* to iateraatlooal peace io the form of overt eggreaaion.

Bueh *8* mot the case in Syria aad lebanoQ»

Bevin iaterrupted Riaz #ith a remarkable obaervation.
Be iBformed the Cooaell that hie oouatry *aa really not iaTolved in

the coatroverey.

the United Kingdom mae

After all, Bevia aaaerted,

ready to evaoumte.

Therefore, since

the ooBsenaua had been in the previoue meeting that the four
parties ahould enter into negotiatlone, Sevin suggeeted th&t
a method of mettlemeat had ao* been reached.
the van Kleffena* motion.

Re accepted

Furthermore, he stated that ne*

gotiationa ahould deal mith those procedural problem* the
Council had diacuaaed.

If #o, he believed such action mould

provide a satisfactory matt]mmeat.
The mere faet Qiat Britlah troopa eere ready to evacuate the Levant did not meke the United Kingdom guiltless,
Bevin ignored the fact that British troops as veil ae Trench

21.

Sec page 39, footnote 20,
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foxeee #ere still in Syria and Lebanon,

The United Kingdom

therefore *as a party to the oontroverey.

Bevin*e strategy

appeared to be one of aloofness at this point.

In attempt

ing to mho# hie country «as not involved* he tried not to
take sides with Syria, Lebanon, or ?mnce.

T
The Levant delegates regained the floor aM frangie
informed the Council twt the diffioulties between Lebanon
and France were not a quarrel or an eeonoaie question.
Lebanon was not trying to censure France,

frangie stated

that all Lebanon desired was the ooaplete evaeuation of
foreign troops.

Fmrthermore, he maintained that Lebanon

and Syria were eapable of making a direct oontrlWtlon to
their own seocorlty.

Therefore, he refused to accept the

French argument that troops were being stationed in the Le
vant because ?ranee was eharged with the protection of that
area under the mandate, and he stated;

"We no longer recog

nize anybody's right to argue on the basis of that mandate,
and in particular we resent any attempt to claim privileges
M
under the mandate."

22.

Security Sounell, Official Becords; First Year, First
"Series. Mo. I, twenty-second meeting, p. 330.
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Frangle accepted the prloelple of eTaouatlon as stated
In the motion of van Kleffena, hut he did not aocept it®
terms beoauee, "they might give rise to ne# disputes in the
23
future."
He objected primarily became the type of nego
tiations «as not qualified.

Hoeever$ Prangie accepted the

Blaz motion, because under it negotiation# were to be of a
"teehniesl" mature only.

The Padilla iervo motion nae the

second choice of the Lebanese delegate.
11-Khouri, too, argued that France had no right to
maintain security In Syria and Wbmon, Be baaed his argu84
ment on Article 106
of the Charter which provided for
joint action of the pe ma ne nt members in getting up securi
ty.

He insisted that the Anglo-French Troop Agreement could

not be considered joint action.

It waa bilateral action on

the part of France and the United Kingdom.
The Syrian delegate contended that there were no dif-

g3.

Ibid., p. 550.

24.

The Charter of the United Ratione. Article 106.
«pending the eomlng into force of much special
agreemnte referred to in Article 42 as in the opinion
of the Security Council enable it to begin the exer
cise of ita responsibilities under Article 4&# the
parties to the Four-Ration Declaration, signed at Mos00*, October 50, 1945, and France, shall, in accord
ance *ith the pronlsioaa of paragraph S of that Declara
tion, consult *ith one mother and aa occaaion requires
»lth other M##bere of the United Bationa with a view to
auch joint action on behalf of the Organization as may
be necessary for the purpose of maintaining interna
tional peace and aecurity.*
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flealtles oonneoted «rith eraeuatioa» nor sere any segotiatloBS required,

Hs stated that Syria mould acoept aegotla-

tloas only at the Inalatenae of the Coaaeil» and such aegotiatloae should deal ulth evaouatlon oaly because Syria ms
mot "ready to eater iato Begotlatlon* om suhjeets other
#5
than the évacuation...*
H-ïhourl again called upon the security Couacll to
take aome type of action to eettle the "dispute."

He did

mot acoept or reject any of the motions before the Council.
He did not favor any of the motions as did Frangie.

TI
A fourth motion, a eoa®»hat iK>dlfled ver ai on of the
one proposed by van Eleffeas, was submitted by Stettinius:
The 3ecwIty Council
Takes note of the atatemeata made by the four
parties and by the other members of the Council;
Impresses Its confidence that the foreign troop#
in Syria and Lebanon *111 be withdrawn as soon a#
practicable* and the negotiations to that end #111 be
undertaken bj the parties «Ithout delay; and
Request# the parties to inform it of the results
of the negotiations.®®

£S.

Security Council» Official Record a: First Tear, First
Series, go. I. téènty-aeccmd meeting, p. 3SS.

26.

Ibid., pp. 332-583.
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The StettinluG motion, too, propcGed &ettlcaKmt of the
8yrlan*Lcb&a6Be aispute through negotiations between the
parties Involvaa.

Eoaever# Stettlnlue dl& not atata la hla

motion the nature dT thaae negotiation».

He did not limit

hie negotiations ae did Blaz and ladllla Nervo to thoae of
a taehnloal nature. The Stet&lnlu# motion did not mention
Immediate avaouatlon aa did Elaz*.

The Stettlnlue motion

did not stipulate that evacuation was to be sliaultaneoas as
did the motlona of Bla% and Padllla Narvo.

The Stattlqlua

motion did, however, aatabllah the principle of evaeuatlon,
provide

for a method of nagqtlatlona, and stipulate tb#t

the parties ln$olved should Inform the Seeurltj Counell of
the reeulta of negotiation.

All four propoaala had theae

three thing* In ooraon,
Vyahlnmky analyzed the four motlona at thla point.

B#

stated that the motions of van Kleffena and stettlniua #*ra
alike In aubatanea; neither defined the type of negotiations
to be entered Into by the four parties.
jected to the two motlona.

Therefore, he ob

On the other hand, Vyahlnaky ae-

eapted the Blaz motion becauae it apeclfloally stated that
negotiation# were to be of a teuhnleal nature.

If the Rlaz

motion w«re aooeptad, h# aaaertad, there could be no queation of the "substaaee» of oegotlatlone.

^ahlnaky thus

baokad the atand taken by fzangle*
Before the meeting adjourjaad, stettlniua replied to

M

TysMoAky'e Interpretation of his motion.

StettlDi%B In

formed VyahlDaky and the Oonnoil that hie motion referred
oàly to negotiations oonoerneâ «Itb the eTacuatlon of foreign
troops from Syria aM lebanofi.

Re explained that the Be ne

gotiations «ere to deal «Itb tl^ method of mltMramel en8
not #lth the "nubatmwe" of #ltMre#al, and he atated that
the %ordB "to that md" oould only refer to negotlatlona
neeesaary to aat up a method for aTaowtlon,

VII
In aummary, at the end of the tventy-aaoond meeting,
the Security Gounoll had fomr

mot lone before It for the

aettlemant of the Syrlan-Lebaneee question.

31nee no ac

tion had been taken upon any of the motion# In the meting,
the oumberaome taak of making a deelalon a#alted the Oounell In A&ture meeting#*

The four motions #ere ell in

agreement In pplnelple—the evaeuatlon of foreign troop*.
The four motlona iiere In agreement In mthod-^-negotlatlon#
between the partiee Involved,

furthermore, the fonr motlona

mere all In agreement that the Seewlty Gounoll should be
Infomed aa to the reaulte of theme negotiation*.
However, there «ere baalo dlfferemoee In the four mo
tions.

The motions of Padllle Kervo and Rlaz limited nego

tiations to those of a **teehnieel" nature.

The motlona of
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van Kleffens eind Ztettialus aerely mentloned negotiatloaa.
Tet Stettialua atated before the Couaoll thst by negotia
tions he referrod to %GotlotloD3 releYant to e-vaouatlon.
The Conaoll Itaelf oowld not egfee upon a pertlcul&r
motion aa a method of aettllag the Gyrian-Lebsnese question.
Ilore lapoTtant, the par ties Involved dlaagreed on #hat mo
tion nould effectively bring about evacuation and peaceful
settlement.

Bevln aeeepted van Eleffenm* awtlon.

Bidault

aeoepted negotiation*, but felt that auoh negotiations
should be oarrled on outside the jnrledlotlon of the Coonoil. In other eorde, Bidault thought the Council should
drop the matter,

frangie eipreeeed an inherent fear of any

type of negotiations, but he did aooept the Riez motion.
His aeoomd choice was the Fadilla ïîervo motion.

These mo-

tioae limited ncgotietionG to those of a "technical* nature.
El-Khoarl flatly inaleted that negotiations *ere not neces
sary, and he aalntalned he did aot want to negotiate. Ee
insiated that the Counoll ahould set a tlme-lialt by dilch
foreign troops should be eveouated.

Only If the Counoll re

fused and stated that negotiation #ere to be carried out
beteeen the pertiee involved, *ould be aooept.

Tyehinaky

accepted the Hlaz motion but condemned the motions of van
Eleffen8 and Stettlnius because they failed to stipulate
the natare of the negotiations.

The zeabers who proposed

motions naturally accepted their own motlone.

The other
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members of the CouoGll *are mon-commlttal at tbie polat.
The closest allgBment la the tgentj-seeoaë meeting
*se bmtseea Wrangle, El-Ebourl, Vyshlosky, aad Blaz.
Bidault Btoo6 slont.

Bevla tried tc play the role of a

aeutral la stenAlag bet*ee& Bidault aad the leYantloe dele
gate#.

loo took no part In dlecueelon,

mltted hie motion for

Stettlnlue eub-

eveoaatloB and malatalaed that

troofs should be #lthdra#n from the levant a* soon practic
able.
Fadllla Kervo, Praagle, El-Khoarl, Blaz, aad Yyahlnaky
geaerally agreed that the aoglo-freooh Agreeaant of 13
December 1945 «aa Illegal and violated the Charter.
and Bldaolt malntalaed It did act.
decleloa pro or coG,

Bevin

The Couacll made ao

Felther d&d the Couaeil deolde the

correct laterpretetloB of Article 45*

Although Bidault and

Blaz disagreed radically on that Article, the Interpreta
tion of the Charter *@8 left to the aembera.
No deolaloa %as made for the aettlament of the ayrlanLebaneae question in

the t%enty»@econd meeting.

In fact,

the meeting showed a aonalderable disagreement on ho* the
question shoald be settled.

Cf the foqr motions submitted

to aettle the question* not one *as aeoeptable to the four
parties Involved, !îo vote

taken upon any motions aub-

mitted. Sosever, the Ccunoil did again dlscusa the queatlon
before it.

The Council did dlscuaa

the methoda propoaed
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for t&G eettlemsaL of tL&t queatloa.
future

seems*! Dearer.

Ti&e poaslbillty of

CmiTER 71
THE TW3MTT-TRIBD H3ETIBG
OF THE S3C9RIT? COUBCIL

I
After a three hour recess, the twenty-thiré meeting
of the Saoqrlty Çouoell» the final meeting at whieh the
Syrian-Lebanese question va# eoneldered, convened on 16
February 1946 at Ohoreh Hoase, weetainlster, London,

The

meeting nas called to order hy the president and the first
order of bnelneae was the continuation of dlseneelon of
the Syrian-Lebeneee question.
Stettlnlu* of the Baited States opened the discussion
by stating that throoghoat the 20th, 21st, and &2nd meetings
the Seeiirlty Goiineil had

shown itself generally In agreement

that foreign troops should be *lthdra*n from Syria and Leba
non.

He Insisted, therefore, that the principle of evacua

tion had been established, and he argued that his motion in
stating that "negotiations were to be held to that end," re
ferred only to negotiations that were consistent with the
principle of evacuation. Stettlnlu* concluded that his mo
tion was perfectly clear, and he urged the Council to accept
that motion and prove to the rest of the world that It would
not permit "itself to be divided by a lack of mutual confidence
and mutual trust.

1.

Ibid., p. 556.
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Stettiûlms* gxplaoatloa coupled nitfe h la orlglml mo*
tion left little doubt that the aegotiatioas *hich be propoeed mere to be of a "prooedwal" nature.

Although the

United States delegate did not «me the words "teohnleal,"
"prooedar##*" "mllltary^techmleel*" or "ezolwlvely" la
hi a resolution, hie ezplaoatloa did make It blear that aegotlatloaa were to deal with the evaooat lea of foreign
troops and not the queatlon of mhether theme foreign troops
ahocld be emouated#
So#ever, not all the member# agreed with Stettlnlua,
Tyahlaaky still qmatloaed the ambiguity of the reeolutlone
of van Eleffem and Stettlniua*

He qoeatloned the inter

pretation of the «ords "megotlatlona or otherwise" in the
Dmtoh motion and the meamimg of the #ord# "to that end" in
the imeriean*

Stet M ni us informed the Imasian delegate

one# again that "to that end" referred to negotlatlona that
#ere to be eonneeted #ith troop evaoumtlon. The Bus si an
delegate ooumtered that the Hmited States motion thua refer
red to the same polloy embodied In the Egyptian motion.
The only difference, awordlqg to Vyshinsky, earn that Hiaz
specifically stated %at negotiations *ere to deal with
"technical details."

Beemise

of su eh clarity, the Soviet

representative heartily aooepted the Riat motion.
Bidault, on the other band, wouM not accept the
Egyptian motion.

He found it unacceptable because it did
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not pzovlde for negotiation» D#r a#$ bst Halted the pertlea
ecmoerned to merely *teehnloal negotlatione."

The Prœoh

delegate Inalated that the 8yrian»Lebaneae tyieatlon boiled
aoen to one of teo alterQatlve»**?#lther there la a dlapute
&
or there la not a dlapote."
If a "dlapute" did e%lat# a
eettlement mmat be arrived at through negotlatlwa a a pro
vided for In Artlol* 93*
ture of the oegotlatloaa.

Artlele 33 did not limit the na*
"If irtlele 53 la not applica

ble," Bidault atate*# "there la no dlapnte ; in that eaae,
I eomder ehat #e have been doing here fbr w many houra*
S
itaefully apent, no do&bt, but to ehat purpoae?"
The freneh attituid# eippeaaed by Bid a nit by no# eaa
aome#hat changed*

By hla rejection of "te^nloal nagotla*

tiona" and hla inalatenee on unlimited negotiations aa pro*
Tided for under Article 33, Bidault admitted negatively, at
leaat, that a condition e%i#ted in S?ria and Lebanon, brought
about by the maintenance cf Frmch and Brltiah troope, ehlch
required a aolntlon.

Bla referme# to irtlde 33 implied

firthw that a "dlapnta" might exlat. The Article epeelfl4
cally mentioned "the partlee to any diapnte," and then
provided for negotiatlone or other methoda of eettleamnt.

2•

Ibid#, p• 338»

3.

IhH*, p. 338.

4*

See page 48, footnote 42,
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Dlecuaslon amltohed baek to the Agreement of 33 De
cember 1945,

Blaz contemdedl Q&at the Yaguenese of t A t

agreem^t #aB a baalo cause fbr the dlaagreement In the
Security Gouaall.

Ea propoeeé that the Security Gouaoll

Interpret the ajgrewemt and give It meaning as aell as
reaoh aome kind of deolelon on a method to be followed for
the complete eW total evaomt lem of Syria amd LebanoD#
Be 0OA tended hla motloa ahleh provided for "teohnleal oegotlatlona" beat served thle paxpoee.
IB rebattal, Bevln attempted to alarlfy eertala atatemeats made by Cadogaa Im the taentl eth aeetii^. Oram ting
that a "dlapate" did exist la the Le vast in May 1945#
Be vim Inal# ted that eoaSitioRS had @1 eared up considerably
as of the An^o-Premeh Agree meat im Deeember 1945. Tet he
eoaeeded that mialnterpretatlon of that agraemeat Md
ee*#ed a "dispute."

Still, be earn e of the British at ate-

meat of althdrwal a ad the empltflaation of the Anglo-Preaoh
Agreement by Bldaalt la the E2ac meet lag to the effect that
Frmoe, too, envieaged althdraaal; Bevla aoaoluded:

***.-!

muggeet that tb# dlepate arlalag oat of the paragraph qaoted
S
ao longer exists*"
Bevia* 8 position in the Byr iaa-Lebane ae question aaa
far from clear*

6,

Bevla argued that a "diapute" had existed

Security Council Official Records; First Year. First
Series, No. I, twenty-third meeting, p. 399.
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la the past—la Kay 1945 *ben Brltl&h troops latarYeaed in
the levant to preaerY* orèer, and In December 1945 over the
Interpretation of the ADg%o-^Tenoh Agreement,

Ths latter

"dispute" *@3 brought about beoause of a dlaagreement betseen the British ang frenoh authorltlee thamaelves over
the place to uhlch the United Zimgdom should #lthdra« her
fweea.

6
franoe Interpreted the agreement to mean Palestine.

The Dnlted Kingdom interprets the agreement to mean Lebanon until French fore#s, too, idthdre# from that Levant
7
State,
Hoeever, Bevln no* insisted that oonditloDS could
no longer be temed a "dispute** because a tintement s had been
made In the previous meetings of the Council by himself and
Bidault oonflrming evaouation at an early date*

If Bevln's

statement «as true, his statement made In the 19th meeting
of the Council (If a state says a "dispute" ezists, then in
fact it does) mas fallacious, for, in ooafbrmance *lth
thot line of reasoning, a "dispute" *as still in progress
because Syria and Lebanon maiatained that sueh a "dispute"
did ealet.
Rlaz ohalleaged Bevin*s argument by insisting that a
"dispute" did ezist an* that the Security Council *as
charged vith the settling of

thct "dispute."

6.

Nee York Times, December 28, 1946, p. 3

7.

Ibid., December £8, 1946» p. S.

Re contmded
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th# qu$*tlOD mnether aoi miiea Biitish aad franeh troope
mere to evaoucte 3;yTla sad Leb&aon bad brought about aueh
eoailtloaa.

Bavin retortad that the daoialoa to aithdra#

aaa pataat under the Anglo^fraoeh ^raemat. aoaaver, the
Brltlah delegate aonoadad ^at hla goveramaat aould accept
tba 3tattlalus raaolutloa aiaee the agreamaot appeared not
daflalta enough. Sa ballavad audh aetloa mould make th#
agraamant definite, oad ha oooeludad:

"..*1 ahould hava
8
thought# alaarad up tha raal dlaputa that axlata,"
Bavlo aBalg coatradloted hlmaaif, fw hare ha atatad
that a "dlaputa** azlatad.

Again he took the poaltloa that

he held la the 19th maetljqg*
Baeauaa of the utterly eoafuaed state of affairs la
the Ceaaoil by this time, Stettlnlua requested that tha
other three partica luvolvad empraaa ihelr vie ma upon hia
aotlon.

Bidault atatad that frauaa mould have preferred

to dlapenaa mlth a motion of the type aubalttad by 8tattlalua but mas aom ready to support it aa a method of aattlement.
Therefor#, both of the Great Pomara to the "dlaputa" aecap tad tha Stettlaius raaolution.

Fraugla expiai aad that

Labanoa still faver ad the motlone of Blaz and PadUla Servo
because both stated clearly the type of aegotlatioas to be

8.

Saaurlty Couaail Cfflclal Racorda; First Tear, First
Series, Bo. I, t-geioty-third meeting* p. ë#).

1C4

entered lato.

Bosever, the Lebeneae delegate propoGed that

If Immediately before the 9«arde "to that end" In the
Stettlnlus resolution, the word *0XGlu3l?ely" was Inserted,
end if at the erd of Die nroroeel the #ords "ae nell as of
9
the floRl date of elthdramal" %*re added, then he would

10
agree *ith the Stettlnlue reeolutlon and accept it,
Bevin ohjeoted to the proposals to aawnd the Stettlnlua
motion on the grounda that wch limited negotiations to the
Rithdraval of troops only end Implied ^et negotlationm on
no o%ier metteic eo%ld be oonAacted.

He eontended that

ench aotlon «ae unduly dieeriminatory end argued that ell
kind* of negotiation* *ere going on in other eouatrlee in
lehieh foreign troope «ere atôtloned.
regulated by the Security Council.

Kone of theee nere

Re did, however, (luall-

fy the negotiatlone desired and stated:
I ought to meke It elear that the other negotlatioas ahould not be mde dependent upon the *ithdraaal of the troops, bat I am quite olear that eomethlng ha# to be done while *# are withdrawing; and,
if the tcrda in this text tare u@ea# It Bouli mean
that we coald not dieenea anything at all.ll
The Brltl#h delegate, in admitting that other negotia
tion# mere neoessary for withdrawal, did not edmlt ehat

Itid". p. 340.
10$

The Lebanese delegate*» euggeetions were not formal
amendments enô the Connell did not vote.

11.

Security Council Official Records; First Year, first
Series, No. I, twenty-third me etIng, p. 541,

lOG

matter# theee other gegotletlon# *ere to imolude.

But,

Bevln made it emphatioally clear to the Sjriah and lebanee# Relegates and the other meWber# thet troop elthdramal
should not be dependent om any other negotlatitme.
atatemant
Lebanon.

The

#as a definite j^itiah guarantee to Syria and
The oppoaite had been true regarding negotiationa

bet#eea framce^ Syria, and Lebanon la May 1945.

Bevin'a

statement guaranteed that eu A procedure eould not recur
uBder the motion aa propoaed by Stettinlue.
frangie of Lebamon Interrigpted the dlacuealon to point
out that the teo Lenmtine atatee did not refhee megotlatloae.

But he maiatalaed that both Syria and Lebanon did

refuse "to negotiate on the question of the uithdraeal of

12
troops in relation to other queetiome*"

For thle reaeon

he had Imaerted the eord "eaMHaalvely" iu the Stettlniue
motion "to avoid eny ettempt to confuse teo types cf negotiations in euoh a way that the result of one ^pe of aego*
13
tlatioas might influenee the result of another type.*
Tyshlnaky agreed eith Framgie * a argument and asserted
that uniese the Council specified the obaracter of the ne*
gotiatlone epeelfleally in the eritten motion, #be organi*
zation mould get noehere in the settlement of the Syrian-

12.

Ibid,,

342.

13#

itia.. p. 5*2.

10*

Lebameae queatioa,

Ea oallaâ apoa tha Preooh reprasanta-

tlve aiplieltly to oommit bimeelf upon tlw ebaraetar of lha
nagotlatloaa ?raa% anvlsagad.

Baoaaaa BWault bad not

aaa##r*d VyBblaaky'a aama qoeatloa prevloualy, th# Soviet
delegate admitted that be eae led to believe that Frmnoe
etlll elmhed to negotiate upon ti» eultural, eeonomle, and
atrategle eonditioae ehe bad %med In %ey 1945.

for thla

reaeoa, he oalled apon the Goqnell to make a clear wt decieion on the negotlatlona emd aonaoded:
If they are to be teebaleal megotlatlone, let
ue aay ao; if they are to be megotlatlone of another
kind, let ae aay eo; but, unleee ee do# I feel that
mot only shall #e eomtlmme to mark time, but the
eltua^on iteelf may beoome more difficult
from Vyehloaky^e atatememt# %e queetion aroee, eae
the Soviet delagate moe eonelderlng the leaue a "dlapute^
or a "eituatioa?" Hie eomeludlmg atatement referr^ to
the possibility of the "situation" beeomlug more difficult.
Zvem the Soviet delegete eae not dear ea to Wiieh pre
vailed. Certainly the other msmbereeere not. Eoeever,
Vyahinsky eae positive that $he Seeuiity Counell should
aet doen a définitloa of tsrme.

Sueh definition eould have

to Imolude epeolfie metbode of settlement to Wiich the feu*
partlee eoaoerned eould be bound, tnder susb procedure.

14. Ibid., p. 543.
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France, the United Kingdcm, Syria, and Lebanon louM have to
confom to the pattern eet by the Security Council, and
there could be no mleinterpretation of t&e type of aegotiatlone to be follomed,

Tyakijaeky contended that euob

*&* not true under the Stettlnius motion.
In an attempt to lend clarification to hie original
motion, Stettiniue made #e following amendment to hie ori
ginal motion:

"and that negotiations to that end, inde15
pendently of other ieeuee, *111 be undertaken."
With

the nee epejidment, the orig&wl atettlniue motion had been
amended three timea—teiee by Prangie and once by atettlniue.
In addition, the Counell had three other motions, thoee of
van Kleffene, Padllla Hervo, and Riez, before it.
fyehineky denounced the stettinine amendment because
it did not limit negotlatione to thoee of a technical na
ture. In aeceptin^ the aewndmenk, Bevin etated:
are
and
far
the

I am milling to mce#gpt that theee negotieticne
«lèlasively for the withdranal of the troope;
if they do that, that ie all there ia to it, ae
ae I can mee. That ane#ere the complaint that
lebmneee and Syrl ane put to ue»**

Frangie, in epeaklng Ar the levmatlne etatee, explained
that the Stettinine amendwant did not clear up the politi
cal ieeuee Involved in the Agreement of 13 December 1945.

15,

Ibid., p. 543.

16. Ibid*, p. 345.
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Se Qould accept the amended motion only If France vould no
longer stand by the Agreement of 1945 and etlpulate that no
oondltione other than teehnlcal ones necesaary to withdraw
al would be InelTided In the negotlatlone. Frangle aeaured
the membera that after aueh eondltiona had been fulfilled,
both Syria and Lebanon

would be happy to dlaouaa any oui*

tural, eoonomlo and strateglo laeuea,

Bidault aooepted

the amendment but aalntalaed that his oouctry waa in honor
bound by the Inglo-Frenoh Troop Agreement. Re did clarify
the French etand

eonalderably:

The purpoae of the negotiation# provided for in
the text le beyond doWbt the evacuation of the
oountrlea referred to. For my part, I set no objeotion, quite the oontrary, to theme negotiation# beIng aeparate fro# other negotlatlona leading to a re-*
sumption of fully eatlsfaetory relation# between our
various oountrlee and our old friend* of tbe Levant.!"
Bevin and Bidault, then, aeeepted unoondltlonally the
method for eettlement of the Syrian-lebaneae queetlon a#
laid down in the amended version of hie original motion by
Stettlniwa.

The other two pat tie# to the "dispute," as

?r angle eta ted, aeoepted the emendaent and original propoeal only with quallfieatione.

They demanded that Frenee

no longer etand by the Anglo-Freneh Agreement for troop
evaouation In the Levant.

Furthermore, Frangle deaaoded

that France stipulate eondl tlom for evacuation be only

17. Ibid., p. 346.
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thosG of a technical nature so that Begotiatlona aeceasary
to evaouatloa coula la no way be made depeadeot upon any
other oegotlatlong betseen Freaoe and Syria and Lebanon.
Bidault ecoepted the condition ihat the negotiations vould
be concerned %ith eraouatlon and mould be aeparate from
any negotiations leading to a resumption of more eatlafaotory relation* with 8yrlc and Lebanon.
clarify the yrenoh etaod.

Bidault, then, dl4

He stated %nequlvocally tbat

other negotiations mould be eepaTate froa troop évacuation
negotiation». So^eveT, he did not etate epeolfleally that
evacuation negotiations mould not be dependent upon other
saooeseful nGgotiatlonB. 2e did not cornait France on the
time elemnt involved.
The trend tomard general agreement on the atettlnlue
motion between the partie* to the **dl8pute" did not prevent
further atteagpts to change tkat motion,

Van ICleffene of

The NetlKrlande euggeeted the morde, "mhieh may be dlsoue-

18
eed*

be added to the original motion to qualify the "ne19
gotiatione**' Bevln requeeted that the lïcrd "mutually"
be ineerted before the toard *dleouased."
mere not ooneldered formal emendmente.
fuse the Gounoll further.

18.

Ibid., p. 346.

19i

Ibid., p. 346.

The t%o proposal a

Both helped to con^
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1# timual# 7y*hin#ky foand the m## propoaala objection
able beeauaa nalthar mde memtloa of l&a "ambatano#" of tha
nagotlatioDa.

Ha a till maiatalma that tha Counoll ahoulA

apaoifloally #tat* la the motlea the "proaadura" to be follo#ad, laaviag only tha tlma of althdraaal, detail# of
althdraaal, mod dapartwya aahadula to tha four partie» to
the "diaputa." Bla aomtentioa #aa that Fraaoa atill aiahad
to aagotlata oa tha "aubatanaa" of tha qsaatloa.
Yyahiaaky'a attitude aaa uaaarraatad,

Tha aoaaaaama

aaa that troopa ahoold be altbdra«a from Syria aad Labanoa#
%Yaa Bidault had

openly admlttW that fraaoa favored auah

policy# aad every awmber praaappoaed that aagotlationa bet#aaa the partlaa aould be @oaa#%mad aith avaomtioa pro*
cadara^,

Bid wit aeaep&ed thla pollay ahea he atated:

I ooaaiier that the «hole problem of later pretatloa aa to tha mtura of the aegotlatloaa to take
plaaa betaaaa ua haaLalraady beea aolvad by ^e foregoiag azplaaatloaa.**^
At thla polat, loo praaaatad om of tha mat ratloaal
avaluetlmxa of tha proposed methoda for aattleaeat of the
qaeatloa.

Be

maintained

that the orlglaal motion of

Stettlalaa aaa tha moat aarkable beoaaae it laeorporatad
all Idaaa ia tha other motloaa.
aothlag bat aoafaalag.

Be fbaad the amaadmaata

Ha explalaad that "aa soon ea

praetlaabla" aad "to that aad" aould refer oaly to the

*0. Ibid., p. 547.

Ill

praotloal arfangeaeatg to be
r*f#r to "#ub»taatlTe" queetloa**
much la hi# explanations*

Th# phrases could aot
Stattlmlg* had aald me

Furthermore, Koo informed the

Couooll that It «as to be oonoeimed lith negotiatlone for
eiMiom tion only.

Other negotiatloae «ere going on in the

*orld every day and «ere mo eoneera of the Coimoil,

There

fore, elooe theee aegotlatloB# #ere to be eonoemed «ith
the evaeuation of foreign troope from Syria and I^banon,
einee the prinoiple of eithdramal had been definitely reeogaized by membere, aM eiae* negotiatioss «ould naturally
eenter apoo praetieal arrangeseata for the eithdraeal of
freneh end British troops, Koo called upon the Oouaoil to
accept the original Stettlaiae motion and settle the
que ation.
Sl-Khourl la attempting to olmrify Fraagie^e ameadment
(iaeertion of the word *e%Olw@ively*)

asserted

that

it

did mot prevent other me got la ti one between the four oouatriee
if eueh mere mutmlly egreed upoa.

Be lnform#d the Coaaoil

that hie goverameat aad the Lebanese governmeat wished the
«card iaeluded as definite proteetioa again»t amy attempt to
make évacuatioa negotiations depeademt apoa any other nego
tiations beteeea fraaee and Syria and Lebanon.

(Bidault

had not apecifloally stated fraaee eould act attempt to do
thi##

Bavin had stated the United Kingdom mould not.)

Furthermore, the Syrian delegate did not favor the inoluaioa
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of the StettiDlaa ameMmmt

added the %ord8 "lade»

peadently of other laews." He felt the addition vould
only eomplicate oegotiatioae by laeln%ating that other
ieswea had to be aegotiated.

Be etated;

I e%preaa the vieea of my Government ehea I e:gr
that# for the tlm# beiag. It prefer# that no other
ewbjeet ehoold be opebed for aegotlation elth France
aa loag aa treepa are la ow eouatry.^^
Boeever, Ël*Khomrt qmlified hi# etatemaat by aaying that
Syria eonld eeleome aegotlatioa# oa any queatlone elth aay
governmeat a# eoea aa foreign troepa eere oat of 8]BPla,
gl*Khoarl, eho had ;qp#vloa#ly expiai aed to the Couaell that hi# eoaatry preferred the motion# of Biaz and
Padllla Rervo to

the Stettialu# motion, informed the Se*

ourlty Oouaell at thl# point that a# long a# the matter of
eithdraeal of foreign troope ea# aabetantlated, aooepted,
and reoommended by the Gouaell# tben:
..*any method ebieh 1# adopted to attain that
ea& eoald be eqgually a<^ptable to ae, provided that
ao matter# for aa^ptiatlon# are ia^oeed on th# par^
tie# ia addition to the mala i##aa# ezeapt by mutua 1
eonaent.**
By thla etatemaat# %l*ghouri Iji^lied that 3yrla eould ae*
eept the Stettinia# reeolatloa.

lay method of eettlement

adopted by the Security Coanoll ea# aeeepteble to him a#

Ibia.* p. 34^*
2B»

«# p« 350»
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long a* the natter of #lthilra«al #@8 mabetaatlated and aooeptei.

Praagie

leas conciliatory.

He had not stated

he %ould drop hie amBOdmeat oontalnlng the eord ^'excluslvely."*

Furthermore, although both Syria aod Lebanon refueed

aegotlatlona without muWal eonsent, yrangle maintained
that Lebanon refused to negotiate any other leeue with
France tmtll frweh troops vere evacuated.

The pwadox

#ae that Chrletlan Lebanoa, aleaya more friendly toward
Rpanee than Moaimm Syria, at this point appeared more
hostile.
Of the propoaal# for aettlament of the Syrian-Lebanese
question, most of the dlaeqeelon had centered around the
original veraloa and the amended verelon
Stettlnlue.

proposed

by

Aware of thla faot and tryl% to bring eboot

a method of aettlememt* the president of the Counell again
celled upon the partita Involved to etate their preference
between the two#
motion,

Bevln admitted he fawred the original

El-Khouri hedged.

Be etated tbat Syria wod Leba

non felt that the text ebould be elaborated in such form to
protect the "amll powers" If Ihe Ormat Powers attempted
to iBteipret the résolution as they saw fit.

f^angle did

not aeeept either of the Stettlnlme resolutions.

He stated

that he would drop the amendment *'eielualTely" but main
tained tbat the negotlatlone should be technical and that
the Security Council should be informed of th# final date
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of sithdiawal.

Fraagie could aaeapt the Stettlalua aotloa

only «1th thaae propoagd amaMaamte.
at this time*

Bidault did not apeak

Previously In the meetlog he had stated that

he tould agoept the Stettlalus reaolatloa*
After aaoertalalng the atatemeota of the parties to
the "dlapute," iWekla put the follomlag queatloa to the
Gouaell:
I ahould like to aak the ammbera of the Couacll
«hether. In the llg^t
the explanatloma that #e have
had, there 1# any objeotlon to tb# original teit that
*a* aRbmltted by *r. Stettlnlge.BB
Before the membera noold respond Tyehlnaky Interrupted
to propoae that the

Conseil eetabllah *n order of voting

npon the motions befere It. Re proposed that Hole @2 of
the provlalomal rules be follo#ed end that van Kleffena*
motion be veted mpon first, Pndllla nervosa second# Hlaz*
third, and Stettlnlms* fourth.
Before the vote

The Council agreed.

taken on van lOLeffen^e motion.

The ]fetherlanda delegate mlthdree It. He took this action
under Enle @5 of the provlelon&l rulee of pioeedure bellev-

*3.

Ibid., p. 35d.

24.

aeourlty Gounell. Provisional Rules of Proeedure. Res
fork. Juïi. I«4«,''fiule JS.
Trlnoiple motlooa end draft reaolutlona ahall
heve precedence In the order of their submission.
"Parts of a motion or of e draft resolution
shall be voted on separately at the re#eat of any
representative, unleee the original mover objects."
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log that there «aa Buffiolent agreemmt on the Stettlalus
25
r#»oiutloD.
The action left three proposals before the
Gouooll.

Beoauae the Jtettlnlua reaolutlon was eo oon-

fusea hy auggemted aa»a&aent9$ It %aa read to tl* meabera
In original form:
The Sawirlty Couaoil
Takea note of the atatemaate aade by the four
part lea and by the other members of the Gounell;
Bipraaaea Ita oonflAeno# that the foreign troopa
In Syria and Lebanon *111 be vlth&reen as eoon as
praotloable and that negotiation* to that end *111 be
nndartaken by the parties althout delay; and
Raqusata the pwtlea to Inform It of the result*
of the negotiation*.^^
After th# rereading» 3t#ttlnlus #%plained that there *as
only one amenam#mt to the motion, that belqg the addition
of the «ord* "independently of other laeuea" after the *oraa
"to that end."
?rangle of Lebanon and Rlat of ggypt propoaed certain
formal amemdments befor# the other motion* could be read to
the Gounall.

25.

frangle *ithdre* hi# propoaed amendmwit to

Ibid.. Bule 3G.
*1 motion or draft resolution can at any time be
*lthdra*n, so long a* no vete haa been taken *rth
reapeet to It,
"If th# motion or draft resolution ha* been
aeoonded, the representative on the Security Council
#ho has seocndad it may require that It be put to the
vote a* hi* motion or draft resolution with the earn#
rlsht of preoedenoe es If the original mover had not
*iEhdra*n it."

26. 8#ourlty Council, Official Record*; first Year, first
a#rie#/#o. %. t*#nty-thlra^meetW. P. 555. *
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Insert the aorâ "eicluslvely" before the tords "to that
tad" In the Stettlnlus motion,

Eo*$?6r* Wrangle aaln-

t&lBeù that his other t*o eaendmente, the Inclusion of tie
sord "teehnicsl" before negotletlcna and the addition of
the word* "as mell as of the final date of *lthdra%&l" at
the end of the Calted States resolution, atlll stood.
Rlaz amended his motion by deleting the $ord "azoluelTely.*
The motions as read by the president of the Council
were as folloaa:
The Seourlty Gounall shall decide:

1 . That the claim of the Syrian and Lebanese
Governments to the effect that the British and rrench
troop# sho&ld be «ithdraan almultaneously and at the
earlleat poealble date 1* justified.
Ê. "That the date of th# evaeuatioa of such
troops should be fixed by negotiation# between the
parties In thl# ease* it Wing understood that suoh
negotiatione will be oomcerned eicluaively with the
mllitary-teebnleal arraagemmnte neoessary for the
adequate evaeuation of such troop#.
3. To request the parses to Inform the Council
when this is done.
The motion of Hlaz, the delegate from Igypt;
After having heard %ie statements by the repré
sentative a of Lebanon, Syria, frenee and the United
Kingdom, and after having exchanged views on the case
whloh is submitted to it*
The Security Counoll,
Considering that the presenoe of British and
French troops
Lebanese aad Syrian territory Is
incompatible with the principle of tbe sovereign
equality of all Members laid down in the Charter;
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Believing that thje principle, the valiùlty of
#bloh l8 fully Mcogal%#d by all the parties eoacerneà; chould receive Itt; full spplloatlon by the
immediate »M alaaltaaeou# #itb4ra#al of all Brit lab
6D& frenoh troops still In the territories referred
to;
Reaommeod# to the Brltiah eM freneh Government G on the one band, end to the Lebanese end Syrian
Qovaramenta on the other hand, to enter into negotia
tions 88 aoon as possible %lth e vlet to establlahlng
the ted&nieal datai la of the aaid elthdraaal, IneludIng tb€ fixing of the date of Ita eoapletlon, and
requaate them to iceep the Counell Informed of the re
sult of tbeee BEgotlatlona.
The motion of Stettlnlaa, the delegate from the United
Gtstee:
The Security Council
Takes note of the statemeote make by the four
parties and by the other ammbars of the Gomell,
ETpyessea its confldanoa that the foreign troops
in Syria end Lebanon #111 be nithdraan as soon as
praetleable, and that negotiations to that end *111
be undertaken by the parties tlthouk delay; and
IRequests the parties to Inform it of the results
of the negotiations.
Thia *&s tbe originel motion of the representative of the
TOnlted St&tes.

The president of the Council did not sub

mit the amended version*

II
Before the Seourlty Council #as reedy to vote, the
question of "aubetantive" and "prooadural* voting, ehleh
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had been lalaed but aot settled In the nlaeteGath meetlsg,
*69 ajrin brought up by Tyshlnsky.

Ths Soviet delegate in-

eleted* as before, that & "substartlve" vote be taken under
Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter.

Because Tyehlnaky

malBtalned that a "dlepuie* did eilst. It *as loslcal for
him to Gall this article Into force. Since under the ar
ticle parties to a "dispute* Tsre to refrain from voting
under Chapter 71 and Article

of the Cherter, Tyshinaky

#e* actuelly calling upon the Council to legally decide the
Gyrlan-Lebanese queetlon constituted e "dispute."
Although the pr$8igent had no authority to determine
by hlmetlf If the queetlon constituted a "dispute," beceuae the opinion In th# Council hed previouely Implied
that some foim of a "dispute" did exist, he stated:
...If there Is no objection, I eh&ll take it to
%e the declaion of the Comnail that a dlepute doea
exist between Syria and lebamon on the one byid and
France and the United Kingdom on the other,*"
Bidault end Bevln objected to the decialon.
Bidault, ea throughout the entire diecoaalon on the
Syrian-Lebanese question, limiatad that a "dispute" did
not exlet.

He adhered to the aeme argument used earlier

and pointed out that Syria aM Labanon did not alah to
negotiate under Article 35 of the Charter.

27.

Ibid., p. 357.

Ria conclusioa
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**#, therefore, that a "dlepate" did not exist»

Further"

more# Bidault baeed hla oaee om the letter of 4 Tebrwry
1946 from the Syrla&^Lebameee government a. He oontended
that the letter #aa ImooMlateat.

Although the fifth para

graph memtloaed that "thla dlapute" #ae being brought to
the attention of the Security Oounell, the aeooM paragraph
a#* a oomtradlotlea and atatad that "the preewae of theae
troopa, ahloh oomatltutaa a grave Infringement on the aover-*
algnty of tao @tatea Me#er» of the United Eatlona» may
give rlae to ear loue dlaputea*"

Bidault* a oonolualon aaa

that even Syria and Lebanon aere not poeltlva Aat a "dlapute" did ezlat.
Bevln, ahoae p(»ltion #ae aonfuaed throughout the en*
tire dlaeuaalom qf the Syrlam-Lebaneae qoeetlon, did not
no# admit that a "diaputa* axlatad.

He, too, took note of

the letter from the Syrian and tebaneae governmmnte.

If

he admitted that a "dlapute** did a%lat, he alao had to ad-*
mit that Brltlah troape aere eonetl^tl%% a "grave infringe
ment of the aoverelgnty* of Syria and Lebanon.

Bavin ln«

formed the Council #at the latter aould not be the oaae
beoauaa the praaenae of Brltleh troope had been requeated
by the Syrian and Lebanaee governmenta In May 1945$

There

fore# auoh troope could not be gravely Infringing their
aoverelgnty.

Bevln ueed tble exouee to hedge and ooaoluded:
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I am really not pitting the opinion I ezprasaad
than (If sa aaeuaer state ##y# there is a dlapata,
there la a d la put a, aagpresead In nineteenth meeting)
against the oplnlena that mere ezpreaaed all around
the table by the grmt authorities ae have here no#
on procedure.^
Aa am alternative, Bevln aoggeatad that the queatlon go to
the Committee of Experts that was aet ap for determining
baala questions of procedure.

In the mBentlme, he a tat ad

thet the United Kingdom aould, In aeoordanee alt h Bidault*e
atatamant, refrain voluntarily from voting without preju
dice to future daolalona*
In oppositloa to the positions adopted by Bidault and
Bevla, ll-Ehûuri, In epaakiag for Syria and Lebanon, mala*
taiaed that a "dispute" did exist.

The Syrian representa

tive referred to the letter from hia government of 4 Febru
ary 1946 to prove hla point.

He pointed out that the fifth

paragraph stated that a "dispute" did exist•

Furthermore,

he aontended that the "dispute" might take one or more
forma.

It might lead to more sazloua "dlsputea" as stated

In paragraph t»o.

Bo#ever, Sl*Khourl Insisted the possi

bility of more serious "disputes" did not negate the "dis
pute" then in existecoe,

TyAlnsky and Rlam agreed aith

this interpretation,
Tyshlnaky, too, rebutted the

28. Ibid.. p. 352.

argument expressed by

lei

Bidault.

K#

the ffweh delegate that the Saonilty

Coonoll *a» the organization charged #lth determining, af
ter hearing all evidence, «hether a "dlapute* actually
*%l#ted.

It *a# not @p to one nation to decide after In-

Yeetlgatlng plecee of evldenoe.

Be further reminded the

Gonnell that irtlele 33 of the Charter provided that partie*
to a *dl#pute" eere to eeek eolntlon

by "negotiation, en

quiry, medlatlony eonelllatlon, arbitration, judicial aettleMnt# reeort to regional agenclee or errengemente, or
other peaceful mean# of

their o*n eholee."

The Soviet

delegate Ineleted, therefore, that negotiation *ae but one
method of peaceful eettlement and the turning do#n of that
one method by partlee to a *dl#pute" did not rule out the
exletence of that "dlapute,"

With theee rea#»ne In mind

Tyehlneky eoneladeA:
It le a dlapute #hleh threetena International
relatione, ehleh may lead to further bloodehed and
eonetltuW a menaee to International peace and aecurlty,*. We have to admit that the dlapute la,^t
aolved yet, and that the Council muet eolve It.
In ao doing, Tyehlneky contended that Article 27, paragraph
S, of the Charter should be followed.
The eaae TyehlnWcy preaemted #ae logloal.

Merely be*

29.

See page 48, footnote 42.

30.

Secw ity Council, Official Recorda; First Tear, first
aeriee.'Bo. I. pi 56*.
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oaus* Syrl* aad Lebaaon did not wish to accept one meana
of aettlement under Article 53, that of negotiation, did
not neoeasarlly mean, as Bidault concluded, that a "die*
put*" did not exist.

The reason the LevantIne states re-

fuaed negotiation ma# their fear that negotlatlona for the
évacuatIon of troop# «ouId be dependent upon other negot1atlone.

Such had been the ea#e In *ay 1945.

Furthermore,

Tyshlneky #aa correct in maintaining that it «as the duty
of the Security Council to determine after hearing all e?l~
dene* «hether a "dispute" did ezlat.

Although the Security

Council did not epeclflcally commit itself, opinion in the
Council, barring that expressed by Bidault and Bevin, «a#
that a "diepute" did e%i*t.

Even Bevin tmice had admitted

as much, end Bidault had insinuated as much in this meet
ing.

However, Tyahlnaky'e argument implying that the "dis

pute* could lead to bloodshed and become a menace to inter
nat ional peace «as more debatable.

It is impossible to

tell «hat might have happened in the 8yrlan*Lebaneae ques
tion had it not been settled, but it is possible to con
clude that a "diapute" or "eltuation" left unchecked is a
possible threat to «orld peace and security.
Makin proposed that the Council vote upon the motions
before It. He did not term the question a "dispute" or a
"situation" but suggested that the vote be taken without
any formal decision on voting rules since the delegates
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fro* fraoee aaâ tfee United Kingdom stated they would re
frain from voting.

The procedure made voting possible

without the Council's aotml deterMmtlon of whether the
Syrlan-'Lebanaee queatlon waa a "dlapote."

Ill
Toting waa aonduoted in tb* ehronologlcal order In
which the mot lone had been aiabaltted and the motion of
Padllla îîerTo waa the first to be voted upon.

Before the

vote wae taken# the Mezlcan delegate requested that he be
allowed to amend hia motion by deleting the word "exolualvely."

Thla #ae done, but the motion #ea loat. four

members voted for the motion; an affirmative vote of aeven
31
gae neeeaaary to carry.
The Egyptian motion* which car32
rled only four affirmative votes, waa likewise defeated.
Before a vote could be taken on Stettlnlua* motion,
Vyahlaaky propoaed three amendmenta.

The first amendment

replaced the words "aipreaaea its confidence that the
foreign troops in Syria and Lebanon will be withdrawn" by

31.

Ibid.» p. 364, (In the early meetings of the Seourlty bouneil, no breakdown was given in regard to the
way members voted on a partioular issue. Total votes
were recorded only. Later meetings divide the vote
into auch categories as: in favor, agalnat, abstain^
Ing, and absent

32. Ibid.* p. 364.

1%

the eipreeslon "recommendg to the GoTtrmmmats of tb& United
Kingdom eM Frence

to #itbdra« their troops from the ter33
ri tories of Syrie si^ Lebanon."
The gecond amscdment aub34
stltuted the «ord "immdletely"
fcr
»ooD ae praoticable." The third called for the iBeertion of the word "teeh35
ni cal*
before the ecrd "oegotietione." The vote became
more eosfueed ae Biaz ao* propoeed an amendment to the Soviet

amendment.

Be

euggeeted deleting the word "recommande"* in

the Soviet gmecdment and insertion of the words "takes
35
note,"
Tyehinaky aceepted the Egyptian amendment.
The voting proceeded. Eiaz' amendment eae lost by an
3?
affirmative vote of three.
Tyahinmky*e second amendment
58
«as lo$t by affirmative vote of teo.
Rig third amendment
39
#88 defeated by an affirmative vote of five.
The original
motion of Stettiniue we voted upon neit and carried by an
40
affirmative vote of a even.
Bavin aM Bidault abstained

33. Ibid.. p. 365
34.

Ibid.. p. 365

55.

Ibid.» p. 366

56.

Ibid*. p. 566

57.

Ibid.. p. 567

38.

Ibid., p. 367

59. Ibid.. P# 567
40.

Ibid.. p. 367
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voluntarily because of their previous pledges to the Securi
ty Council.

The Syrian and Lebanese delegates did not have

the franohlee. Poland abstained.

Modelewskl informed the

Council that he did not vote beoauee the Stettinlue motion
did not completely eatlefy him that it mould yield good
result#.
TyWilneky voted agsinet the Stettiaiu# reeolution.
He maintained, since voting was condwted under Article 27,
paragraph 3, of the Charter, that the motion #ae defeated*
He ezereleed hie po#*r of the veto and eiplained the Soviet
poa&tion by stmtlmg;
I am m permanent wmber, and I voted against this
proposal, because the amendments which would have en
abled me to vote for it have not been accepted. I
think the position le quit# clear. I am applying a
rule, end I am using my right as a permanent member to
make such stateinents as I think proper.**
Stettinlue and Eoo made no comment.

The other tiio per

manent members accepted the position taken by the Soviet
delegate as being completely within the Interpretation of
the Charter.

Bidault stated:

The Interpretation of Article 27 by the repre
sentative of the Soviet Dnlon is entirely in conform
ity with the letter and spirit of the Charter. I
therefore believe that, from the leg^l standpoint,
thle vote does not create an obligation.**

41.

Ibid., p. 367.

48.

Ibid.. p. 388.
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His colleague, Bevln, concurred:
I jolD «1th Mr. Bidault and I agree that legally the interpretation given of the Charter is correct.
We mill, as a party to this conflict, carry out the
majority decision of the Couzwil ae ezpreeaed in the
vote.43
Bidault, in sroeakiag for France, also pointed out that his

gOTernment «ould carry out the decieion of the Council,
"After five houra and fifty mlnutea of a debate that failed
44
to reach a decision,"
the president declared the motion
not carried and the Security Council passed on to the next
order of business,

IT
Legally, the twenty-third meeting of the Security Coun
oil did not settle the Syrian-Lebanese question. The proposal for settlement by Stettinius «as vetoed by the Soviet
delegate under the "substantive" provision for voting em
bodied in irticle 29, paragraph 3, of the Charter, and by
this action, the opinion of the majority of the Council sas
nullified by Tyahlnsky.
Actually, though, since the majqpity of the members
favored the Stettinius motion, Bidault and Be vin stated

43.

Ibid., p. 368.

44.

The Nes York Times, February 16, 1946, p. 1.
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that their governmente «ould be mcrally bound to conform
to lt8 etlpulBtlome.
practicable.

They

agreed to negotiate as aoon as

They accepted the Council*s opinion that

negotiations mere to be directed to*ayd evacuation pro*
cedures.

They agreed to notify the Counell as soon as

negotiations wre carried out. The d0#lre for settlement
#88, therefore, aeoepted.

The technicalities of evacua

tion «ere to be carried out by frsnoe, the United Kingdom,
Syria, and Lebanon.
The alignment
iim of

delegates In

the twenty-third meet-

the Security Council was more

discernible than in

any of the other meeting# In ehlch the Syrian-Lebanese
question «as considered.

gl~Khourl and frangle #ere agreed,

as throughout the entire discussion, that a ^dispute"
existed and that the Security Council should take action to
put an end to that "dispute*'*

They preferred the motion#

of Blaz and Padllla Servo as methods of settlement because
these motions limited negotiation# to those of a "technical"
nature.

They insisted that any other negotiations between

their governments and France and the Dnlted Kingdom should
In no #ay be dependent upon negotiations related to the
evacuation of troops.

From this point, there vac some dls-

agreement between the t#o delegates,

frangie stated speci-

fically that his country «as not viilllnp to have negotiatlons «1th France on other matters until troops «ere evacu
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ated*

El-Khourl implied as much, but he stated that Syria

mould aooept any solutloa agreed upon by the Council as
long as the prinelple of évacuation vas embodied in that
aolution.

Frangie insisted upon "technical" negotiatloDs

and that the Council aet a date at «hieh time eyaouation
should be completed.

ïlie Lebanese delegate did not yield

on lAese points, although he did finally vithdrav hie
ameadment #hich had stated negotiations should be ""eiclusively" directed toward evacuation,
Vyshinaky and Riaz upheld the atand taken by the Le
vant delegatesi

They insisted that a "dispute" existed

and that the best method of settlament of that "dispute"
nas embodied in the Biaz motion because that motion pro
vided for "technical" negotiations.

Because the Stettinius

motion made no such limitation on negotiations, vyshlnsky
vetoed it.

Bidault and B#vin #ere agreed that the Soviet

action #as justified

because of the "substantive" nature

of the vote under Article 27, paragraph 3.
Stettinius and Zoo did not commit themselves on the
legality of the Soviet veto.
the procedure.

However, neither questioned

Koo and Stettinius were non-committal on

the question of whether a "dispute" actually eilated, but,
again, neither contested voting procedure being oindnoted
under Article 27, paragraph 5, which stated that parties
to a "dispute" must abstain froai v. ting.
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Bidault and Bevln veie la general agreement at the end
of the tT»enty-third aeetlng that oondltlons In the Levant
did Bot conatltute s "dispute."

The French delegate had in

sisted upon this point throughout the discussion, but the
British delegate had vacillated back and forth, at one time
maintaining that a "^dispute" did exist, and at another main*
taining that it did not*

Both delegates accepted the prin

ciple of and th» method for evaouation aa set do%n in the
Stettlniua motion.
Delegates of the other nations, mith the eioeption of
Hodelenskl, after auoh pro and con discussion, also sooepted the Btettinius notion.

Their decisions nere arrived

at only after prolonged discussion that at lotervala beoeme
so involved and so coaiplloated that it appeared unlikely
that the Council *oald ever some to a decision.

Although

the process mas tedious, and although ultimate results ^ere
doubtful, a deolalon #as finally reached.

British and

French troops mere soon to be evacuated from Syria and
Lebanon.

lao

CmPTER VII

CGKCLTJSION

I
In a letter dated 30 April 1948 addressed to the près*
ident of the Security Council, Ambaaeador Henri Bonnet of
France Informed the

Council tbat the French and British

gOTernmanta had jointly made arrangements for the complete
evacuation of their troops from Syrian territory by 30
1
April 1946.
These arrangements had been agreed upon at a
conference of French and British military eiperts held in
larls from 2-6 March 1946, the purpose of #hioa wa to de
termine the procedures to be folloi^ed In the evacuation as
«ell aa to set time limite under «hlch the evacuation ^8s
2
to be carried out.
The British and French troo;» in ques
tion #ere evacuated from Syria by 15 April 194Ô, and the
Syrian Premier Saadallah El Jablrl eonflrmed this fact in a
telegram of the 19 May 1946 to the Security Council:

1,

Security Council, letter froc jgbassador B. -onnet to
tïï'è President oi' t& Èecur it y ëbûnoll. Doc «"g/'ëë, Ëew
York, 3 May 1946. (See aipendli, page 161)

E.

Security Council, Letter from the minister of Lebanon
in Washing ton^D. d. to the necretary-General> Doe.
È/60, New York, 20 .j^une I'GiB. (See appendii, page 164)
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The Syrian OoTernmeat he8 the honour to Inform
the mmbera of the Security Council that the evacu
ation of the foreign troopa from the Syrian terri
tory In compliance with the proposal of the delegate
of the Dnlted Staten of America has teen aocompllahed
during the fir at t#o veeka of April 1946.^
In conjunction Mth the French and British military
conference of 2*6 March 1946, the French and Lebaneee
Mlnlatera of Foreign Affaire met in Parle to fix a date
by vbleh all French troona #ould be evacuated from leba4
non. This date #as set at 1 April 1947.
Brltlah forces
5
«ere to be #lthdra«n from Lebanon by 30 June 1946.
Fur
thermore# the flrat thousand Brltleh and the first thou6
sand French troops «ere to be evacuated by 31 March 1946.

#lthdra##l of these forces «as carried out by the appointed
dates.
By a note dated 19 March 1946, the French government
Informed the Lebanese government tb&t French troops could
be «Ithdramn from Lebanon at

an earlier date thah 1 April

194? If the Lebanese government mould take certain steps
to aid In the evacuation.

France called upon Lebanon to

5.

Security Council, TelegraiB from the Syrian Premier and
Minister of Foreign Affairs io th^ Èécretaj^-ùeheralj
feoe. ^/64, Éem YorK, 23 'May 1946. (ëee appendix, page
160)

4.

Ibid.. Doc. 8/64.

5.

Security Council, Letter froa Sir Alexander Cadoggn
to the President of t he 3ecurit y ùouncl 1, DOC , S/51,
Ne# Tort, 3 May 1^46. fSee#pendix,'Page 158)

6.

Ibid.. Doc. 8/51.
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grant to the frenoh ooomaad la the Levant the full use of
the public eervlces anA of the Lebmneee army for the trans
port, guarding, anâ embarkation of all mater lei,

franoe

also requested the Lebenese government to agree to the
setting up of a joint ^anoo-Lebaneee military ataff fc*
the coordination of all activities connected «it%i the evac
uation.

Lebanon accepted these provlelona and verified

the fact by a letter of 21 Karch 1946 from the Lebanese
Minister of Foreign Affairs to Bidault,
In a mutual exchange of letter a betmew the Lebanese
and French Ministers of Jforelgn Affairs of 23 March 1946,
the date et «blch French troops as a «hole were to be
8

withdrawn from Lebanon «es set at 31 Augaat 1946.

from

the 31 August 1946 to the 51 Deceober 1946, France «eis to
be allowed to maintain thirty officers and three hundred
technlGlans In Lebanon for the purposes of supervising the

shipments of materiel to France.

Both countries accepted

these stipulations.
In a letter dated 12 June 1946, Dr. Charles Malik,
Lebanese lllnleter to the United wtates, informed the Se
curity Council that negotiations had been ccncluded be
tween his government end France to bring about the com-

7.

Security Council, op. cit.. Doc. S/52.

8.

Security Gouncll, op. oit., Doc. S/90.
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plete évacuation of Frenob troopg fro3 Lebanon.

Rls let

ter Included a letter from Hamld yrangle, the Lebanese
Mlnlmter of Foreign Affaire, vbloh etated;

"The Lebsneae

goTertment le satisfied »lth the outcome of the said nefrotlatlons and haa decided to Inform the Seourlt? Council
9
thereof.*
The "dlepute** over the eTaouftlon of French and
Brltlah troopa frtm Syria and Lebanon Kas, therefore, a
closed lamie.

II
Certain definite coneluelona oan be dra#D from the
operation of the Security Council In the Syrian-Lebenese
question.
pute."

The Council Iteelf did not aettle

the "^dls-

It had no le^l authority to act after the veto

of the StettlnluB motion without reconsidering the ques
tion.

At the moet, the Security Counoll merely provided

a world forum «hlch heard the oaeee of t e four parties
to the "dispute*"

In thle reepect, the value of the

Counoll ahould not be underestimated.

General agreement

reached among %e members within the Counoll influenced
Prance and the United Klqgdom to the eitent that they

@4

Ibid., Doc. 8/90.
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accepted on their oen initiative the content of the Stettlniize
motion and acted outeide the Council to bring about settle
ment of the "dispute."

Dleoueelon #lthln the Council aided

in Initiating thl# actlon*-aegotlatlonG between Franoe, the
United Kingdom, Syria, and Lebanon—mhloh brought about the
evacuation of foreign troops.
Otber important queetions wtre not settled by the Coun
cil during the time mhieh the Syrian-Lebanese "dispute" «as
before it.

No decision ems reached on nAiether the mainten

ance of Prwch and British troops in Syria and Lebanon con
stituted. a "dispute" or e "situation."

Even so, from the

evidence presented. It can be concluded that a "dispute"
did exist.

(Bidault ea@ the only member to maintain con

sistently that a "dispute" did wt exist.)

Moreover, the

Council did not decide whether the vote necessary to determine the e%lstence of a "dispute" ems to be "substantive"
or "procedural*"

Again from the evidence presented, the

concluëion to be dra#m is that much a vote if taken should
have been "substantive."

AM, finally, the Council never

determlwd the legality of the Anglo-freoeh Agreemezt of
13 December 1945.

Still, that agreewnt earn apparently

regarded am illegal by moet of the members of the Security
Council.
In its early meetings In 1946, the Council avoided
or at learnt «as non-committal on such controveraial ques-
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tlons 8S tho9€

mentioned above.

Decisions in these ques

tions %ere left to the discretion of the lodlTldual membere.

Perhaps thle «ae a #lBe policy.

Perhaps the members

realized there wa$ little poeslbillty for agreement.

By

mvoldlng Commitment, the Council did leave Itself a greater
pOBalbillty for agreement on its aajor i85ue-"^the determin
ation of a method fw the evacuation of the foreign troop»
in the Levant.
emple*

Bomever, thia proeedwe did set a bad ex

It created the Impreeglon for imdlvidial meia)ere

and the #orld that the
minor iseuea.

Goimoll oould not even agree on

It appeared not even to try, for a vote was

taken on only one of the three isauea olted.

If the mem

bers were aware that theme questions probably could not be
settled at that time, then the procedural techniques de
veloped by the Oouneil were at leaet workable.

On the other

hand, the Security Gounoil in falling to decide all these
queetiona might well be charged with having failed in Ite
duty.
During the meetinge in which the Syrlan-Lebaneee "dis
pute" was heard, Council action further showed the begin
ning of the epllt between the Great Fowera, later to be
called the "Cold Sar*"

Vyshlneky coneiatently opposed

Bevln, Bidault, Eoo, and Stettinlus, hie opposition con
tinuing even though Bevin and Bidault made certain impor
tant conceeelone to the Soviet delegate.

Still, theee
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oonce8eioii8 failed to satisfy Vyshlnsky, aM he eventual
ly vetoed the Stettlnlus motion fcr the aettlment of the
Syrian-'Lebaneae "dlepute."
A peradoz oan be

seen In Soviet gtretegy.

Tyahlnsky,

«ho had championed the oauae of Syria and Lebemon through
out all the dlacuaalona, chanced leaving the levant nations
devoid of United Nations aid by hla veto.

The Council

could thus make no guarantee to Syria and Lebanon that
French and British troopa #ould be evacuated, for it had
no legal authority to act under the Stettlnlua motion.
Furthermore, It «aa highly debatable that any other plan
mould be aa acceptable to a majority of the members.

There

fore, the veto by Vyahlnaky «as not only a betrayal of the
Syrian-Lebanese oauae, but it «es an eiample of Soviet un
cooperative spirit and en indication of pocslble future
Soviet action in the Security Council,
Yet, even though the Soviet veto blocked the Council*a
action to settle the Syrian-Lebanese "dispute," and even
though the

Council failed to settle important questions

(regarding "substantive" and "procedural" voting, the eiistence of a "dispute," end the legality of the AngloFrench Agreement), the Council did at least provide a wrld
for usa #hl(ÈL heard the Syrian-Lebanese plea.

Discussion in

this forum made known to France end the United Kingdom the
majority opinion of the lumbere, and in good feith and in
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a eplrlt of cooperation vlth this majority opinion* the
tso Great Po*erG evacuated their troops from Syria and
Lebanon.

Although evacuation vas carried out by Prance

and the Dnlt^d Kingdom on their ovn Initiative, they i;ere
atlBMilated to this action by the Security Council dlscusëlons.

This «as the "vietory** of the United Nations,
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jeotlv# aid to undermtandlng conditions In the Levant from
pre-World War I to 1945»

The appendix contained the texts

of Important documente ln@lading the propoeed Franco-Syrian
and Franoo-Lebeneee treaties of 1936.
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The Times providea an sioelleat aoiircë of backgrotmd
material foz the yeara 1941 and 1945.

The Times and the

megazlBe articles furnlebed little information on the
Syrlan-Lebemese question before the Goimoll, «Ith one me;jor exceptIon.

The leeuea of the Tlmea for February 16,

1946 and for February 1?, 1946, oontalned an exoellent
analyala of the goaltiona of the Great Powere to the queetlon.
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Gegeral Catroux's Proolamatlon of 8 June 1941
After conferring #ith General Wavell and General
d# Gaulle, General Gatrouz Isaued a proolamatiùn on the 8tb
of June, in the name of General de Gaulle, Chief of the
free French, to t^^ in&abiteats of Syria an6 the Lebanon;
"People of Syria and the Lebanon! At the moment «hen
the forces of Free France, united to the forces of the
British lm#lre, our ally, are entering your territory,
I declare that I aaaime the powers, responsibilities,
aad duties of the repreaentative of "La France au
l#Taac." I do thla in the naae of Free France, *hioh
Identifies herself aith the traditional and real
Prance, and in the aaae of her Chief, General de
Gaulle. In this capaoity I come to pet an end to the
mandatory regime and to proclaim you free and indepeMejjt.
«Ton will therefore be henceforward sovereign and in
dependent peoples, and you #111 be able either to
form yourselTea into aepar&te statee or to unite into
a aingle State. In either event, your Independent
and sovereign status will be guaranteed by a Treaty
In «hich our mutual relations *111 be defined. This
treaty mill be negotiated aa soon as possible betmeen
your representattvee and myself, Pending its concluaion, our autu&l poaition %111 be one of close unity
in pursuit of a common ideal and common aima.
Allies to Ensure Syrian Independence.
"People of Syria and the Lebanoâ, you mill see from
this deolarstion that if the Free French and Britieh
forces cross your frontier, it la mot to take away
your liberty, it is to ensure i t . It is to drive out
of Syria the for&e# of Bitler. It la to prevent the
Levant from becoming an enemy base directed against
the British and against ourselves-.
"*e mho are fighting for the liberty of the people
cannot allow #e enemy to submerge your country step
by step, obtain control of your per eons and your be
longing®, and turn you into slaves, fe cannot alio*
the populations which Fr&nce hae promised to defend
to be thrown into the hands of the most wanton and
pitiless master that history has known. We cannot
allow the age-long interests of France in the Levant

130

to be k&sdcd over to the GB&my.
The Blockade Will b# Lifted.
"People of Syria and the Lebanon! If, In answer to
our appeal, you rally to ua, you should knoa th&t
the British OoYernment, In agreement *lth free
franoG, hss promised to grant you all the advantagea
enjoyed by the free countrlea mhlah are associated
#lth them. Thus the blooka&e *111 be lifted and you
«111 enter into Immediate relation* *lth the sterling
bloc, *hlch *111 open up the tldeet possibilities to
ycur Imports and exporta. Tou *111 be able to buy
end soli freely #lth all the free countries,
"People of Gyrla a&d the Lebanont A great hour In
yonr hlBtory haa sounded. France declares you Independeat by the voice of her aona %ho are fighting
for her life and for the liberty of the world.*
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Sir Mlles Lampeoa'* Deelaratloa of 8 June 1941
fhls call to arms from Gene ml Catroux Bas fol
lowed by a â«claratioa of support from Sir Miles
LampSOB, Brltlah Aabassador Im Cairo, ©a behalf of
the British Ooveramemt:
"Gênerai Oatroux, oa behalf of General de Gaulle,
Chief of the free freneh, has isseed a deelaration
to the iBhabltanta of Syria mâ Lebsooa before ad
vancing with the object of expelling the Germane.
In this he declare# the liberty and IMependenoe of
Syria and lebanon. He uniertafees to negotlet* a
treaty to ensure these obj#ot#.
"I am authorize# by his Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom to declare that they support and as
sociate themmelvea «ith the assuranoe of independence
given by General Catroux on behalf of General de
Gaulle to Syria and Lebanon.
"I am also authorised to give you the assurance that
should you support
join the Allies, his Majesty's
Government In the United Kingdom offers you all the
advantage# enjoyed by free countries who are aasociat# with them. The blockade *111 be lifted and you
may enter lato Immediate relations with the sterling
bloc, which will give you enormoa#, besides immediate,
advantage# fram the point of view of your exports and
Importe. You will be able to sell your products and
to bay freely in all free countries."
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Les Aooorde Fraaoo-Brltannlquee sar Le Levant
Texte Officiel
L# alaietfre d** affaire* dtreng&re* a communiqué le
texte des accord* franco-britannique* aur le Levant, signe*
a Londres, le 15 deGembrc(1945);
Accord yo. 1
Le* expert* militaire* fyanpai* et britannique* #e
rdualroat * Beyrouth le ai décembre 1945 pour arrêter le*
modalité* d*un programme d*dvacuation e&helonnde,
avec regroupement corrélatif des force*,
L*go de* objete^de la diecuaalon *er# de fi^er une
date tre* prochaine a laquelle commencera cette évacuation.
Il eet entendu que l*dvecuetlOB de le Syrie *e fera
"parti pa8*u", de telle aorte qu'elle sera achevée en même
temps pour les force* frsngaiaee et pour le* force*
britannique*.
le programme d'évacuation sera établi de telle eorte
qu'il assurera le maintien au Levant d'élément* suffisant*
pour garantir la eécurité, jmequ'au moment où l'organisa
tion de* Ration* unies aura à etatuer sur le dispositif de
la sécurité collective deb* cette tone.
Juequ'à ce que cette miae en place aoit effectuée, le
gouvernement francaie conservera des elements regroupe* au
Liban.
Le* gouvernements, français et britannique%.feront part
aux gouvernements libpnaie et *yrien des olau*é*ïe&*ee qui
concerne le# medalltes de l'évacuation et inviteront lesdit*
gouvernement* à déaigner, les plu* tët possible, de* repré^
«entant* quallfidb pour discuter lè* di*po*itlon6 à arrêter
d'un commun accord en consequence de ces déclarations.
La discueeioa portera également sur les mesures qui
seraient à prendre pour faciliter aux gouvernements ayrien
et libanais l'exercice de* mission* de maintien dë l'ordre
qui leur Incombent.
Accord Ho. g
Le gouvernement provisoire de la république française
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et le gouveraernent de ga Majeete Aaaa le Boyaume-Uni,
a^aat ezamln^ la altuatloo dans le Moyaa-Orleat,
deblareot qa'll# *ont aalme* de la meae lateatlon de faire
ee qui ddpemd d'esz pour que eoit aeaurdé àu% paya oôn8ide%da et pour que aoit reepeetee l*Imae&ea6noe qui leur
a fte promise.
Lee deux go*verBe*eate eoaviemaeat qu'il eat de leur
iatdrét mutel de favorieyr, #a eollaboratloa avec d'autres
gouveraemeata, la proaperitë^ ëeoaomiqu# de# peuplee de
oette rdgioa daae la paix et la eeeuritd. Ils proedderoat
auz eohaagae d'iaformatiea leur permettaat d'dViter les
divergeaces de politique qui eeraie&t euseeptibles de oompromettre leurs iatdrets mutuels,
Les deux gouTeraemeats affirmeat leur iateation de ae
rlea eatrepreadre pour ae substituer au% iatdrdts qu^ils
#e reooaaaisseat mutuellemeat dans le Moyea-Orieat, oompte
pleiaement teau du atatut politique des paye en eause.
C'est daas eet esprit^qu'ils eiamiaeroat toute propositioa qui serait soumîee a l'organisation des Natloas
unies au sujet de la seeurîté collective.

Lebaneae Bote to fr&aoe of 9 Jaouary 1946
Le Liban, qal a eoatrlbw^ a l'effort eommun de guerre

ea mettant, notamment, agn territoire & la disposition dee
Troupee Allle&a. a demand^* maintes reprîmes le retrait de
ses Troupee après la Tletoire ear le# l'A%e,
Le pfinelpa de l'dvaeuatloa vient d*ëtre ddcld^ par
lee deux PuÈaaanoea dont le* Tronpee atationnent apqpre en
8yr^# et an Liban# et aa# date tre* repproohde a ete envia.aedé poar aa #lae à aadautlon ainei qu'il eat prdvu dan*
l*Aaaord aonalu par eee deoz Puiaeanoe* et qu'elle# ont
notlfia'au Gouveroaant libanai* le 18 D$a#mbre 1945,
Le Qoùvermament libaaal» n*eut pa# manqué d*ezprlmer
#a aatiafaetioa d* eette meamre al elle n*avalt dtdconpue
en des termes et subordonnée d dea eondltiona qui ne con
cordent pa# avec le principe d^abll,
C'est alnal que, suivant l'Accord, de* eïdmenta de
troupes dtren^&zea se retireront due territoire syrien pour
se regrouper au Liban, juaqu*au moment ou l'Organisation
des Nations Unies aura atatud' sur le dispositif de la aë^urltd collective*
Le Gouvernement libanais a imme&iatement fait connaître
au Ministre de Grande Bretagne et au représentant de la
France au Liban, qu'etcnt tierce partie au regard de l'ACGord, il ne pouvait (qw) aa reeonnaitre le* stipulation# de
nature à porter attahte aux droits et aua Intdrfte du Liban,
Le Qoavernamant libanais a protesté et proteste en par
ticulier contre toute violation par l'Accord francobritannique, des dlapositiona du Pacte des Nations Unies.
Il ne peut laisser passer sans les relever, lea termes
"IntdrëtB" et "responsabilités" mentionne^ dans l'Accord
et que rienc ne aaurait justifier.
Le Gouvernement libanais, gouvernement d'un paya inde^
pendant et souverain, se declare seul responsable du main
tien de la sdkuritf sur aon territoire. De mÂae il aasum#
seul et 11 entend assurer entièrement la protection des In
térêts lëg&tlmea de tous les étrangers admis à ad^ourner au
Liban.
Sous les réserves ausdltea. le Gouvernement libanais
prend note que la prlnclp* de l'évacuation de aon territoire

est d/finitiTemeût établi et accepte. Il en demanda l*applicatlOB iBtdgrale et Imad^late. Il renouvelle l'ezpreealon de a@ volonté de cooperation au maintien de la justice
et de la sécurité' Internationale.
Beyrouth, le 9 janvier 1946
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Traaslatloa of the letter to the Secretery-0eneral from
the""Ëêmës of the Lebanese amd Syrian l5éle^âtlQS8.
lon&on, England
February 4, 1948

To Mr, Trygve lie
Seeretary-General
The United Natlone
(Salutation omitted In document)
Freneh and British troops are still being maintained
In Syria and the Lebanon, although hostilities «ere ended
many montbe ago.
The presence of theae troops, whloh eonatitutea a
grave Infringment of the aoverelgnty of t#o State* members
of the United Katlone, may give rise to eeriou* diaputea.
The past haa Ghoma that some of these troops have been a
constant menaee to peace and security in this region.
The GoveroÈemts of Syria and the Lebanon expected that
these foreign troops #OBld be mithdramn Immediately upon
the ceaaatlon of hostilities *lth Germany and Japan, and as
a result of the representations these Qovernments have made
unceasingly to that end. But on 13 December 1945, they
#ere notified of a Franco-British agreement, of which *e
reproduce the folloming extract:
"The program of evacuation #111 be dravn up In
saeh a way that it #111 ensure the maintenance In the
Levant of sufficient forces to guarantee security,
until such time as the United Rktlone Organization
has decided on the organization of collective security
In this zone.
"Until these arrangements have been carried out,
French Govermmnt #111 retain forces regrouped in the
Lebanon.
This agreement, accordingly, makes the #ithdra#al of
foreign troops subject to conditions mhloh are Inconsistent
with the spirit and letter of the United Mations Charter.
Therefore, since the t#o Contracting Foners have them
selves referred, in the aforesaid agreement, to the United
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Nations» the Syrian and lebaaeae delegations, acting on the
InatruotlOBs of their Governments, have tie honour, in aooordanoe «1th Article 34 of the Charter* to bring this dis
pute to the attention of the Security Council end to request
it to adopt a decision recommending the total and simultane
ous evacuation of the foreign troops from the territories of
Syria and the Lebanon.
They are ready to aselet the Security Council by supply
ing it #lth all relevant information for the purpose.
(Signed)
H. Frangie
Head of the Lebanese Delegation
(Signed)
P. Khourl
Head of the Syrian Delegation

Letter from Sir Aiezaaaer Cadogaa to the Iresldent of the
Security ^'Couacil oj^ ifay 1"» '1046.

Tour Eioelleacy,
On iDGtruotlons from cy GoTernment I have the Honour
to requeet you to bring the follovlng to the attention of
the Security Gouaoll.
Cn 16 February at the close of the Security Council'*
dlsousaloB regarding the «Ithdr&sal of forelg# trooc# from
the Levant States, a vote *&B taken on the following reaolutloB which «88 preeenteâ by the United States representatlve:
"The Security Council, taking note of statements
made by the four parties and by other members of the
Council, ezpresaes Its confidence that foreign troops
la Syria and Lebanon *111 be withdrawn as soon as
practicable and that negotiations to that end Bill be
undertaken by the parties without delay; and requests
the parties to Inform It of the results of the negot
iations.*
Although the Council's vote In favour of this res
olution had no legal validity the United Kingdom represent
ative uadertook to give effect to the majority decision of
the Council as expressed In It. Accordingly, His Majesty's
Government, who had likewise agreed to act In accordance
with the majority opinion of the Gounoll, sent a military
delegation to Paris to agree on the necessary arrangements.
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom now has
the honour to Inform the member* of the Security Council
that the following arrangeaents were then made for the with
drawal of British troops;
1. All British troop* (were) to be withdrawn from Syria
by 30 April. The withdrawal was actually carried out in
advance of this date and was completed by 15 April*
2. The first thousand British troops (were) to be with
drawn from the Lebanon with a similar number of Frenoh
troops by 51 March* Thle mcve&ent wa* carried out by the
mentioned.
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3. The remainder of British troops, except for e small
liquidation party, (was) to be withdrawn from the Lebanon by
SO June.
4, This plan was duly ooamunlceted to the Syrien and
Labanese Governments, who have suggested no oodlfloatlona.
I have the honour to be Your Ezoellency's Obedient Servant,
(Signed)
A. Cadogan

Telegram froffi the Syrlan Premier and Mlnlater for Foreign
Affairs to the Secretary^Qeccral ot the l9 Kây IM6.

HI* Ezeellenoy the President of the Security Council
Re* York
At the EBrd sitting of the Security Council held at London
on Saturday the 16 Febrmry 1946 for discussing the questlon of the #ithdrs#al of foreign troops from the Syrian and
Lebanese territories the United States representative pre
sented to the Council the following resolution:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKING NOTE OF STATEMEÏM'S mng BY THE
FOUR PARTIES AND BY 0TB2R MEMBERS OF TgE COUKCIL EXPRESSES
ITS CONFIDENCE THAT FOREIW TROOPS IN SYRIA ARD THE LEBANON
WILL BE WITHDRAWN A3 SOON AS T-RACTICABLE AM) THAT NEGOTIA
TIONS TO THAT 3ND WILL BE UNDZRT^JKEN BY TARTIES WITHOUT DE
LAY AND BFOUESTS PARTIES TO INFORM IT OF THE RESULTS CF TE2
NEGOTIATIONS.
Although thl* resolution had no legal validity in vie# of
paragraph 3 of the 2?th Article of the charter it got the
approval of the majority of the members of the Security
Council among shorn sere the representatives of the United
Kingdom and France sho undertook to give effect to i t .
The Syrian Government hss the honour to inform the members
of the Security Council that the evacuation of the foreign
troops from the Syrian territory in compliance with the
proposal of the delegate of the United, States of America
has been accomplished during the first two weeks of April
1946.
Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Saadallah 11 Jeblri

Letter fro* Ambassador H# Bonset to the President of the
Security Counoil of May 3# léiè.

Re% York
50 April 1946

To Sis Kzoellency 5&fe% Pasha,
President of the Security Council,
Buster College,
Re* York.
31r,
I have the honour to send you here# 1th a eommumioatloa from my Government relating to the results of nego
tiations regarding the #ithdra#ai of French troops from
Syria and the Lebanon*
I should be grateful if you would bring this document to the knovledgs of the delegates to the Security
Council*
I have the honour to remain, etc.
(Signed) S. Bonnet

Baolosare:

To lette? on page 161

At Its meeting In London on 16 February 1946, «hen It
oonsiaered the presence of foreign troops In Syria and the
Lebanon, the Security Council eae aeked to vote on the following motion submitted by the United States delegate:
"The Security Gogneil takes note of the etatemente made
by the foar parties end by the other members of the Council;
ezpreaeee Ite confidence that the foreign troops in Syria
and the Lebanon #111 be *ithdra#a me eoon ae practicable,
and that Begotietione to that end «ill be undertaken by the
parties without delay; and requests the parties to inform
it of the results,"
Although the vote taken on thi# motion did not of itself carry any legal force, the French Government immed
iately declared that it mould abide by the decisions of the
majority. In fulfillment of this umdertaklng it has the
honour to bring to the knowledge of the mKabere of the
Security Council that &e negotiations undertaken with the
various parties concerned have resulted in an agreement,
the terms of ehich are stated below:
(1) AS regar&s Syria the French Oov«nment and the
British Government have jointly made the necessary arrange
ments so that the evacuation of Syrian territory may be
fully carried out by 30 April 1946.
(S) Ae regards the Lebanon there took place, in
pursuance of conversations between French and British
experts, conversations in Paris with the Lebanese Minister
for Foreign Affairs, who accepted the Invitation to Paris
extended to him by the French Miniater for Foreign Affairs
at the end of the 61«eussions in the Security Council,
#lth a view to exploring with him the mêthod most likely
to result In en agreement between the two Governments in
accordance with the notion of the Council.
In accordance #ith these conversations the French
Government, by a note dated 19 March, Informed the Lebanese
Government that the time limite reoomownded by the military
experts could be brought appreciably closer if the Lebanese
Government for its part undertook to grant the French
command in the Levant the full support of the public
services and of the Lebanese Army for the transport,
guarding, and embarkation of material. At the same time
the French Government asked the Lebanese Government to
agree to the setting up of a joint Franco-Lebanese military
staff.

In the eveat of the Lebanese Oovernment's agreeing to
promlae Its full support In this oonneetlon the French
Qoveriment stated that, for Its part* It «as ready to redue® the time limits previously contaaplated In the follo#lng manner. The withdrawal of French troops as a %hole
from the Lebanon could be completed by 31 August 1946.
Prom 31 Au;?ust to 31 December 1946 the French Government
would retain In the Lebanon only a group of thirty officers
and approzlmately three hundred technicians In order to en
sure control over and transport of material; the departure
of thes# last mentioned elements would ^ve to take place
not later than 31 December. Lastly, In order to meet a
Bleh eipressed by the Lebanese Governments, the French
Government etressed- Its desire to ensure the withdrawal of
the bulk of fighting forces before 50 June 1946.
The Lebanese minister for Foreign Affaire Informed the
French Government on 21 March that these proposals were
acceptable to hie Government. Be undertook, further, to
make available to the French command the full co-operation
of public servleea and of the Lebanese army for the technloal operations In connection with embarkation.
In pursuance of tbla agreement the French and Lebanese
Minister# for Foreign Affairs ezchanged letters on 23 March
1946, the text of which has been published In the press,
noting the happy outcome of the negotiations recommended to
the parties in the resolution proposed to the Security
Council on 19 February.

Letter from the Mlalster of Ltbanoa In Waablngtoa, D. C
Io 'the''SmoreGry^enera1 of June 20$
"
Legation of Lebanon
Waablngton, D, C,
12 June 1946
Mr, Secretary-General:
I have the honoar to tran&mlt to you hereelth a
letter from Ble Zzeellenoy the Minister of Foreign
Affaire of Lebanon, together elth the tezt of t*o let
ter* ezohanged heteeen the Mlnleter of foreign Affaire
of Lebanon and the Mlnleter of foreign Affairs of France.
I have the horour to be, eto,
(Signed) Dr. Charles Malik
Mlnleter of Lebanon
Kr. Trygve Lie,
Seeretary-General of the Dnlte4 Ration*

Eaolosure:

To letter on page 16&

Republic of Lebanon
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tolltloal Department
Beyrouth, 9 Kay 1946

Mr. Seoretary-Qenéral:
Further to the communioatlon addreased on 27
February 194G to the General Secretariat of the United
Rations by the Ghairwan of the Lebanese and Syrian delegAtlone, and in accordance *lth tbe reaolutlon proposed
by tbe Delegate for tbe United Statea of America, to
which the Brltlah and French Governments have adhered
notwithstanding the veto of the Delegate for the Union
of Socialist soviet Republics, I have the honour to in
form you that negotiations have been undertaken between
Mr. Georges Bidault, French Foreign Minister, and myself
*ith a vie# to determining tbe forms of evacuation of
French troops from Lebanon.
Those negotiations have resulted in an agreement
established by an exchange of letters dated S3 March
1946,
The Lebanese GovermMnt is satisfied *ith the out
come of the said negotiations end has decided to inform
the Security Council thereof.
In these clroumstances I have the honour to submit
to you the text of the two letters m%ehang#d and to re
quest you to communicate them to the Security Council.
I have the honour to be, etc.
(Signed)
Hamid Frangle
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Trygve Lie,
Secretary-General of the United Nations

Bnolosure:

To letter on page 164
Republic of Franoe

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Pairs, 23 March 1946
K. le WlGlstre,

I had the honour to inform you on 19 March that as
a reeult of the oonferenoe of Freoob and British military
experts ehloh took place im Parle from 2*6 March# the
French Military Headquarters fiied 1 April 1947 as the
date by *blch, In vie* of the liaited facilities locally
available tD the Freneh High Command in the Levant, the
%ithdra«al of all the French troope stationed in Lebanon
could be completed,
I informed you at the aame time that it might be
poselble to shorten and modify this time-limit, if addi
tional resources and facilities could be made available
to the French High Command by the Lebanese Government.
It is for this reason that I asked you for the aid
and co-operation(f your Government under the conditions
which #e agreed upon, and I indicated to you at the same
time the modifications which might in consequence be
made in the evacuation plan.
On 21 Kerch you were good enough to inform me that
your Government had agreed to the proposals which I had
made to you. It follows there from that:
A. The Lebanese Government undertakes to grant to the
French Elgh Command in the Levant the following assistance:
1. By the public services, the co-operation of the
gendarmerie, of the police and of the administrative
organs and the provision to the French High Command
of such contingents of workers as the French Military
authorities might need for the maintenance, transshlpment and embarkation of material;
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2. By the Lebaaeae ar&y, the aupply of aeceasary ma
terial, of a certain amount of labor, of specialized
teams, and the provision, at the request of the
Frenoh authorities, of all guard service that It might
be asked for.
3. The attaohmeat of Lebanese officers to a joint
franco-Lebanese Military staff for the purpose of aid
ing the t^o High Commands and keeping them Informed on
the progress of evacuation opération*.
B. On the basis of the adherence of the Lebanese Govern
ment to the programme set forth In the three fore-going
paragraphs, the French Government, for Its o*n part, under
takes to adopt the folloelqg evacuatlOD programme.
(a) subject to the provisions contained In r&rsareph
(b) beloo^ the *lthdra*al from Lebanon of the French
troops as a *hole shall be concluded on 31 August
1946, by which date all auxiliary units *111 have been
dissolved;
(b) Prom 31 August 1946 to 31 December 1946, the
French Government shall be empoigered to maintain in
Lebanon a group of 30 offlcere and about 300 techni
cians for the parpos# of supervising control and
transport of material. The departure of these lat
ter units *111 be effected by 31 December at the
latest.
C. In response to the vlshes ezpressed by the Lebanese
Government, the French Government ezpresses Its desire
to effect the *ithdra#al of the bulk of the Combatant
troops by 31 June 1946. It *111 devolve upon the joint
Pranco-Lebeaese staff to propose the Preaeh High Command,
having regard to material conditions and to the progress
of operations, appropriate measures for the implementation
of such a programme.*
I should be obliged to you if you mould kindly confirm
that the Lebanese Governmeat agrees to the reciprocal obli
gations of our two Goveramants as set forth la the present
letter.
I have the honour to be, etc.
(Signed) Georgp Bidault
Minister of foreign Affairs

Eaoloaure:

To letter on page 164

Bepabllo of Lebanon
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
folltioal Departoent
Parie, 23 March 1946
M. le Mi&ietre,
In your letter of today's date you «ere kind enough
to state the follomiqg:
I had the honour to inform yom on 19 March that aa
a result of the oonferenoe of French and British military
experts ahich took place in Taris from 2-6 March, the
French Military Headquarters fized 1 April 1947 as the
date by «hlch, in vie* of the limited facilities locally
available to the French High Command in the Levant, the
*ithdra*el of all the French troops stationed in Lebanon
could be completed,
I informed you at the same time that it sight be
possible to shorten aad modify this time-limit, if addi
tional resources and facilities could be made available
to the French High Command by the Lebanese Government.
It is for this reason that I asked you for the aid
and co-operation of your Government under the conditions
which «e agreed upon, and I indicated to you at the same
time the modifications «hich might in consequence be
mode in the evacuation plan*
On 21 March you «ere good enough to inform me that
your Government had agreed to the proposals *hl&h 1 had
made to you. It follo«s there from that:
A. The Lebanese Government undertakes to grant to the
French High Command in the Levant the following assistance:
1. by the public services, the co-operation of the
gendarmerie, of the police and of the administrative
organs and the provision to the French Hi^ Command
of such contingents of «orkers as the french Mili
tary authorities might need for the maintenance,
trans-shipment and embarkation of material;

2. by the Lebaoeee army, t&e supply of ^cesaary
material, of a certain amount of labor, of special
ized teams, and t&e provision, at the request of the
Preneh authorities, of ell guard eerYlcee that It
ml&ht be asked for.
3. the attachment of Lebanese officers to a joint
Franoo-lebanese Military staff for the purpose of
aiding the tvo High Commenda and keeping them In
formed An the progress of evacuation operations.
B. Cn the beals of the adherence of t^e Lebanese Govern
ment to the programme set forth In the three fore-going
par&grsphs, the French Government, for Its own part, un
dertakes to adopt the following evacuation programme.
(a) aubjeot to the provisions contained In paragraph
(bj belo*, the withdrawal fr.pm Lebanon of the French
troopa as a whole shall be ccncluded on 31 August
1946, by which date al] auilllery unite will have
been dlseolved;
(b) from 31 Aur^at 1946 to 31 December 1946, the
French Government shall be empowered to malrteln In
Lebanon a group of 30 officers and about 300 tech
nicians for the purpose of supervising control and
transport of material. The departure of these lat
ter units will be effected by 51 December at the
lateat.
C. In r aponse to the glahes ezpreaaed by the Lebanese
Government, the French Government eipressea Ita desire
to effect the withdrawal of the bulk of the Coabatant
troops by SI June 1946. It will devolve upon the joint
Franco-Lebanese *taff to propose the French High Command,
having regard to material conditions and to the progress
of operations, appropriate measurea for the Implementation
of such G programe."
I have t e honour to confirm to you the approval by
the Lebanese Government of the reciprocal engagements un
dertaken by our two governments as set forth la the above
letter,
I have the honour to be, etc.
(Signed) HamldFrangle
Minister of Foreign Affairs

